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1 Introduction
The philosopher Thomas Hobbes argued that the state brings order into chaos by im-
posing a common set of rules on individuals if they forgo some personal freedoms.1
In modern economic terminology, we can interpret his idea in the context of transac-
tion costs: By sticking to the same legal framework within a state, individuals may
forgo some freedoms but can rely on the validity of the framework when conducting
transactions with other people. This order increases trust between economic agents and
consequently, lowers their transaction cost. What the state is to public order, the firm
is to private order. In his seminal work on the theory of the firm, Coase (1937) argues
that firms exist because transaction costs within the firm can be lower than within
a market environment. As a consequence, economic agents organize in firms for some
activities and conduct spot market transactions for others.
Thus, states and firms both represent different levels of human organization and
governance, which have often become intertwined. Under socialism, most companies
were part of the state. At other times, some firms – such as the Dutch East India
company or the American United Fruit company – acquired state-like powers. While
these examples belong to the realm of history, the focus of this doctoral thesis lies
on the empirical analysis of a hybrid organizational form, which is widespread in the
modern world: State-owned enterprises (SOEs). Modern SOEs operate as companies
mostly in market environments and have the state as a substantial shareholder. There-
fore, this thesis is settled in the sphere of empirical corporate finance. It uses modern
econometric methods to analyze how state ownership affects corporate decisions and
perceptions as well as how these feedback into balance sheet metrics. Due to the nature
of the government shareholder, the research questions also extend to the fields of public
finance and public policy.
Economic interaction of individuals is central to the institution of the firm: Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) define the firm as the centralized contractual agent in a team
productive process. Economic production is complicated and relies on a vast number
of relations between suppliers, producers, workers, and clients. Each economic agent
has its obligations and rights within this process. However, it is impossible to define
complete contracts for such relationships, i.e., contracts that precisely state obligations
and rights for all parties in all states of the world. Firms, as institutions of private
order, facilitate contracting when costs to use individual market contracts are too high
(Williamson, 1973, 2002). These costs derive from transaction costs and market im-
1See, for a recent edition, Hobbes and Gaskin (1996).
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perfections and lead to hierarchic organizational forms. In public finance, there is a
need for public ordering: “Politics is a structure of complex exchange among individ-
uals, a structure within which persons seek to secure collectively their own privately
defined objectives that cannot be efficiently secured through simple market exchanges”
(Buchanan, 1987). From an institutional perspective, there is little conceptual differ-
ence between governments and firms (Tirole, 1994). Indeed, the theory of the firm has
many common patterns even with early public order theories of the state: In essence,
we can interpret the chaos of Thomas Hobbes as a very high transaction cost that
renders a society dysfunctional. Hobbes’ imposition of law on citizens restricts their
freedom for a common benefit: Order. In modern democracies, citizens delegate legis-
lation to parliaments and governments. The reasoning is very similar compared to the
theory of the firm: Transaction costs and market imperfections such as public goods
and externalities can lead to prohibitively high costs for the individual. A significant
consequence from this is that types of governance (the state, firms, markets, or hy-
brids such as SOEs) differ structurally in their attributes, costs, and competencies and
can handle a different portfolio of transactions efficiently. The most relevant type of
governance in this thesis is the firm.
We can understand the firm as an economic institution of contracting and thus
go beyond the traditional interpretation of economics as a science focusing on choice
only (Williamson, 2002). This helps to describe human actors in more realistic terms.
A firm acts like a mini-society with a vast array of norms beyond those centered on
the exchange and its immediate processes. The contracting perspective further allows
to distinct transactions between faceless instantaneous firm exchanges at equilibrium
prices towards situations where the identities of the parties matter (Ben-Porath, 1980).
What defines the identity of a firm? Numerous attributes seem of importance: First,
there is the nature of the product the firm provides. Is it a common good or a public
good? Second, there is the extent of vertical integration: Does the firm incorporate
the whole production process or only a part of it? Third, there is ownership structure:
Who holds the residual control rights and what is the purpose of ownership (Grossman
and Hart, 1986)? And fourth, there are agency conflicts and the incentive structure
within the firm. Thus, analysis of the firm as an institution of private ordering matters
precisely because of different firm identities. Study of state ownership is vital because
contracts are incomplete and governments still own and operate substantial shares of
the economy (Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Tirole, 1994; Hart et al., 1997).
Considering the significant privatizations in the 1980s and 1990s, it is perhaps
surprising that governments acquired more assets (USD 1.52 trillion) than they sold
(USD 1.48 trillion) over the 2001-2012 period (Fotak and Megginson, 2015). In countries
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of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) alone, the
governments own 0.86 trillion USD in commercial minority holdings and 2.41 trillion
USD in commercial majority holdings (OECD, 2014b, 2017). These figures do not even
take into account the immense state holdings of emerging economies such as China,
India, and Brasil.
Numerous theories have tried to explain why the state acts as owner, and why em-
pirical literature identifies substantial differences between SOEs and privately owned
firms. Chapter 2.1 introduces the three main theories of state ownership and presents
important implications in more detail. Chapter 2.2 summarizes empirical literature
along the theoretical considerations and also introduces empirical results from related
topics such as politically connected firms.2 Broadly, we can divide the literature into
three periods: Economists conducted a first prominent strand of research before and
during the transition period of Eastern Europe and China. A major issue during this
period was the privatization of government assets in these countries. As former social-
ist economies became global economic actors, the focus shifted on state capitalism,
often (but not exclusively) centered on Chinese SOEs. With the emergence of large
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), economists have looked at asset allocation and invest-
ment policies of the state as an investor. Relatively little research exists, however, on
state ownership in market environments with institutionalized competitive ownership
neutrality. This thesis extends this last strand of literature by empirically analyzing
SOEs in the EU and OECD countries. It contributes to the literature on different lev-
els: First, it answers so far neglected research questions related to previous literature,
especially in the context of taxation. Second, it replicates established results using
new datasets, which are bigger than in most other studies, and third, it introduces
new arguments which could help to explain the established empirical characteristics of
SOEs.
This thesis is an empirical work. All content chapters treat topics related to state
ownership by developing new hypotheses and testing them using extensive datasets
consisting of firm-level balance sheet data (Orbis). To do so, they rely on empirical
comparisons between SOEs and private companies to isolate the effect of state owner-
ship. Orbis contains current and historical ownership information from official sources
and allows for identification of SOEs. A key issue to address is non-random state own-
ership, which could bias coefficient estimates. Depending on the research question, I
employ either propensity score matching techniques or selection models to address non-
random state ownership. Both are state-of-the-art methods in the empirical corporate
2Political connections can lead to preferential treatment by authorities and are therefore similar to
state ownership.
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finance literature and allow to correct for selection and other potentially critical is-
sues such as endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity (Li and Prabhala, 2007). The
particular estimation procedure is described extensively in each content chapter. Be-
sides, each chapter contains a detailed listing of data restrictions and applied data
management in the chapter appendix.
The content chapters of this thesis represent independent research articles but are
nevertheless closely related both content-wise and methodologically. Chapter 3 deals
with debt-related tax incentives under partial state ownership. Chapter 4 focuses on
the effective taxation of wholly owned commercial SOEs. Chapter 5 deals with implicit
state guarantees and societal bias towards state enterprise. Chapters 3 and 4 share
the focus on taxation within a state ownership context. They also use very similar
estimation strategies. Results complement each other and contribute to a better un-
derstanding of why and how state ownership affects firm taxation. Chapters 3 and 5
relate because Chapter 5 investigates a key assumption of Chapter 3: Do SOEs benefit
from preferential access to finance? Methodologically, Chapter 5 differs from Chapters
3 and 4 because at close consideration, a selection approach suits the research question
better than a matching approach. The choice of estimation strategy should, however,
not be interpreted as a binary choice of appropriateness: Both matching and selection
models address data concerns such as selection adequately (Li and Prabhala, 2007).
The experimental part of Chapter 5 indicates that the public-good function often at-
tributed to state ownership may introduce a behavioral bias, which complements the
more traditional incentive-based hypotheses in the other chapters.
The most crucial result across all studies is that state ownership is not neutral, even
in developed market economies. It changes the incentives within and the perception of
firms, and these feedback into corporate finance decisions of companies. In the following,
I will briefly introduce the research questions of each content chapter and present their
central results.
Chapter 3: The impact of taxes on debt financing under partial state
ownership
This Chapter is joint work with Georg Wamser and looks at tax sensitivities and debt
financing of mixed-ownership firms. In particular, it deals with the question of how
partial state ownership affects the tax incentives of private co-owners. Previous studies
suggest that state ownership facilitates access to debt financing because of implicit
state guarantees to bondholders. Private co-owners of partial SOEs may exploit such
guarantees to save taxes and increase the return on equity to private shareholders.
We hypothesize that the latter behavior alters the cost-benefit trade-off between debt
and equity financing in such a way that debt ratios under shared ownership are set at
4
a maximum level, irrespective of variations in tax rates. It is the implicit guarantee
associated with state ownership that renders the cost of high debt levels less relevant.
Therefore, the implicit guarantee primarily determines debt ratios and not the tax rate.
The dataset consists of balance sheet data of joint affiliates between SOEs and
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from 22 OECD and EU member countries. We look
at long-term leverage ratios of mixed-ownership firms and compare them with suitable
privately owned companies. The effect of being partially state-owned is identified by
first finding comparable control units of privately held affiliates for each SOE affiliate.
The requirements for being accepted as a similar control unit are relatively strict, as
matched pairs (of partially state-owned and private affiliates) must operate in the same
country and the same sector. We then estimate pair-fixed effects regressions and further
control for time-fixed effects, as well as time-varying control variables, which previous
literature identifies as relevant determinants of debt ratios.
Our empirical analysis supports the hypothesis of a maximum debt level: We find
debt ratios of shared ownership companies to be higher but unresponsive to changes in
tax rates. The fact that partially state-owned affiliates are found to use substantially
more debt suggests that these firms operate under implicit state guarantees. Previous
empirical results relating to weak SOE monitoring let us conclude that privately owned
MNEs make use of facilitated access to debt to maximize interest tax shields in such
affiliates. Additional results in this Chapter indicate that MNEs do not exploit shared
ownership for international tax planning.
We confirm our central finding in many robustness tests, including different match-
ing procedures, alternative outcome measures, and checks where we randomly assign
treatment status. The main conclusion of this Chapter is that partially state-owned
firms neglect the cost of debt and employ a maximum attainable debt ratio. This sug-
gests that government participation may enable MNEs to reduce tax payments, which
may ultimately lead to a loss of revenue to the public owner. A policy implication of
this Chapter is that state owners should closely monitor the capital structure of mixed-
ownership firms. Otherwise, there could be a hidden and so far neglected cost to the
state owner in the form of lower tax receipts.
Chapter 4: Is commercial state ownership tax neutral?
A pillar of the European Union’s (EU) single market is the prohibition of state aid:
Governments must not discriminate against some firms by offering tax advantages to
others. EU regulation aims to ensure competitive neutrality among all commercially
active firms. However, national competition authorities monitor adherence to EU com-
petition law to a large extent, which has lead to substantial differences in monitoring
quality across member states. Motivated by this institutional setting, this Chapter an-
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alyzes the tax neutrality of state ownership in EU member states. Governments could
subsidize their SOEs with low taxes out of political considerations (to secure employ-
ment) or use taxes to force distributions under dividend-averse managers. The Chap-
ter, therefore, compares three different specifications of the effective tax rate (ETR) of
wholly owned commercial SOEs with those of similar private firms. To the best of my
knowledge, the Chapter is the first to address the tax neutrality of SOEs in a European
context.
The analysis uses single financial statement data from 18 EU member countries and
employs selection-on-observables propensity score matching to identify for each SOE
a suitable control group of private firms. The control group consists of firms within a
relatively strict caliper that also operate in the same country as the SOE. In outcome
regressions, I control for group-fixed effects (based on the best matches), a vector of
time-varying firm characteristics that have been used in previous studies as well as
time, and sector effects. Thus, the estimation approach is similar to Chapter 3 and
controls for non-random selection into state ownership.
Results indicate that commercial SOEs pay, on average, higher effective tax rates
than comparable privately owned firms. Hence, results do not suggest that govern-
ments subsidize commercial SOEs. A likely explanation is the budgetary importance of
commercial state ownership, which makes governments force distributions from their
commercial companies via tax payments. A complementing explanation may be higher
levels of tax-planning in private firms. Additional results indicate that this effect is not
equally present in all member states.
The Chapter contains an extensive set of robustness tests. In particular, it analyzes
if the central finding extends to variations in model specification and parametrization,
consolidated financial statement data, long-term specifications of the effective tax rate,
and different estimation techniques. It also verifies if results are a mere statistical coin-
cidence by conducting an extensive falsification test with pseudo-ownership assignment.
All these tests confirm the main finding of higher SOE ETRs. The central conclusion of
this Chapter is that tax neutrality in the EU’s single market remains imperfect towards
ownership structure, and the extent of imperfection depends on the member state.
Chapter 5: State ownership, company risk, and societal value
A key feature of state ownership is that bondholders of SOE debt assume implicit
state guarantees. Whereas Chapter 3 takes this as an established result, Chapter 5
first analyzes an extensive firm-level data set to see if implicit guarantees are indeed
present. Thus, the central part of this Chapter replicates an established result using a
much bigger dataset than previous studies, which consists of non-listed firms. The last
part of this Chapter reports experimental results and introduces a behavioral argument
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that could help to explain lower financing costs for SOEs. The experimental Section
is among the first to introduce behavioral arguments into the literature on ownership
structure and is joint work with Sebastian Olschewski and Ulrich Schmidt.
The Chapter starts by examining how firm performance affects the cost of debt.
It uses financial statement data from 15 EU countries in 2006-2015 and employs an
endogenous selection model that allows addressing potential unobserved heterogeneity
and endogenous independent variables. The estimation approach differs from Chapters
3 and 4 for several reasons: First, we are mainly interested in coefficient differences
between two ownership groups for our profitability variable. Second, we cannot ex-
clude differential impacts depending on ownership for other control variables. Third,
we believe it is vital to include unobserved information correlated with selection as
an additional control variable to limit endogeneity concerns in our regression models.
We achieve the latter by calculating and adding the inverse Mill’s ratios from a state
ownership selection model. For these reasons, we opt for an estimation strategy that
treats SOEs and private firms as two different regimes and controls for endogenous
selection into them.
Results show that (i) SOEs, on average, pay less for their debt and (ii) the more
profitable a private firm, the less it pays for its debt. Whereas an increase in operating
profitability decreases interest rates of private companies, firm profitability is not a
relevant determinant for SOE interest rates. The reason behind the second result is
that profitability functions as a risk proxy. The relation does not hold, however, for
SOEs, which points to implicit guarantees. However, the complete absence of a rela-
tionship between our company risk proxy and the cost of finance for SOEs suggests
that other factors than risk are relevant, too. This is because, in the EU, commercial
SOEs and private firms are subject to the same bankruptcy framework, i.e., risk should
also matter for SOEs. The differential result is very robust, even under situations of se-
vere sovereign financial distress. Other sensitivity tests include instrumental variables,
variations in the profitability measure, modifications in panel balance, and changes in
model specification and parametrization.
Previous literature has identified political bias as a determinant of SOE financing
costs. Such a bias could mainly exist with state investors, for instance, state-owned
banks. Motivated by the argument that SOEs often exist to address market imperfec-
tions, we analyze if social concerns could be an additional factor that provides cheaper
financing for state companies. Our experimental approach uses questionnaires to deter-
mine investment decisions of participants. They choose between a project that generates
a private return only (imitating a private firm) and a project that is less efficient but
creates a payoff to society in addition to regular returns (mimicking a state-owned com-
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pany). Results indicate that investment into the social but inefficient project is positive
in all specifications of the investment decision. We take this finding as evidence that
people may favor state ownership in some occasions because of a societal return, even
if this is inefficient.
This Chapter confirms previous empirical results on implicit guarantees, which in-
dicate a competitive advantage of commercially active SOEs . Additional experimental
results suggest that SOEs may also benefit from a behavioral bias in society. The Chap-
ter is thus among the first to highlight the behavioral implications of ownership, which
could be an exciting direction for future research.
The rest of this doctoral thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief
introduction to theoretical and empirical aspects, which the literature has associated
with state ownership. Then follow the three content Chapters 3, 4, and 5 that were
briefly described above. The thesis concludes with a summary in Section 6 and the
bibliography.
2 State ownership of firms
2.1 Theoretical approaches towards state ownership
Three major theories exist to explain and describe state ownership of companies. Atkin-
son and Stiglitz (2015) framed the “social view”, which suggests that SOEs exist to
mitigate market failures and increase overall welfare. For example, private postal op-
erators have no incentive to service remote areas because the profit generated by a few
parcels does not cover the costs of delivery. Similar arguments arise for other network
industries such as railways and electricity. In such cases, the state as an owner may
accept lower profit levels for the sake of providing a specific service. The assumption
is then that the non-discriminatory provision of such a service is beneficial to society
as a whole. The social view also extends to state ownership of financial institutions.
The argument is then that private actors may be reluctant to invest in projects that
yield societal benefits but low financial returns. An example is Germany’s Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau which focuses on investments with added value in the environmental
and social sphere. The social view is dominant in the European political sphere, where
massive public investment funds have been established in recent years.3 A vital feature
3The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) uses public money to compensate private
investors for the increased risk of eligible investment projects. Eligibility rests on criteria with assumed
long-term welfare implications such as strategic infrastructure, renewable energy, and others.
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of the social view is that it assumes a societal benefit from state ownership that would
be absent if companies were private (and therefore profit-maximizing). Chapter 5 ana-
lyzes whether the underlying assumption of this view influences firms’ cost of finance.
It is important to note that often, it is complicated to disentangle commercial and pub-
lic benefit. Besides, all economic sectors of the EU/OECD countries see private firm
activity, which makes it very difficult to determine when state ownership is preferable
on welfare grounds.
The second “political view” on state ownership of firms emerged during the tran-
sition from planned to market economies. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) postulate that
SOEs are a means to achieve the goals of politicians. Such goals may be diverse and
range from maximizing employment, securing voters’ happiness, or achieving geopolit-
ical agendas. Inefficiency arises because politicians use SOEs to transfer resources to
their supporters or use them to pursue private agendas (Cox and McCubbins, 1986;
Shleifer, 1998; John et al., 2008). Political agendas are facilitated by the fact that tax-
payers – as ultimate owners of SOEs – face an extreme kind of separation between
ownership and control. Dinc and Gupta (2011) show that, whereas efficiency gains
from privatization are dispersed among the population, the costs (for example in the
form of layoffs) are concentrated among a few – especially among workers and politi-
cians of the region the privatized firm operates. Not all agents in society are organized
equally, which gives well-organized interest groups – such as workers and politicians –
an advantage in deciding resource allocations towards SOEs. The additional cost, for
instance in the form of excess labor, is not internalized by anyone with sufficient pow-
ers to influence the government. Instead, the general population relies on politicians
and civil servants to act in their interest (Bennedsen, 2000). Naturally, politicians may
want to mask their vested interests and pretend not to meddle in SOEs, which some-
times makes evidence for the political view difficult to disentangle from conventional
agency problems. Nevertheless, plenty of likely anecdotal evidence exists: For example,
the European Commission sent a Statement of Objections in April 2015 to the Russian
SOE Gazprom for alleged abuse of its dominance on Central and Eastern European gas
supply markets.4 Another recent potential example is German state bank Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau’s intervention (on behalf of the German government) to keep the
insolvent carrier Air Berlin flying during the pre-election summer holidays in 2017.
The third “agency view” borrows the notion of the social view that SOEs mitigate
market failures but integrates arguments of the political view. Banerjee (1997) develops
4The statement carried a clear political dimension because it accused Gazprom of abusing its pricing
policy to achieve political ends, such as participation of SOEs from Eastern European countries in
specific pipeline projects.
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a theory of misgovernance of how a benevolent government my create misallocation
and corruption which rests on the facts that (I) governments respond to market fail-
ures, and (II) the government has agents who maximize private benefits and not the
general welfare. The agency view explains well the empirical fact that state owner-
ship continues to be widespread in the network industries and why it leads to lower
corporate governance quality at the same time (Borisova et al., 2012).
Each view on state ownership is theoretically plausible, but which is the most
relevant? Most empirical studies support the political and the agency views, i.e., SOEs
lead to a welfare loss caused either by deliberate political actions or by agency conflicts.
It is important to note, that it may not always be possible to distinguish the political
and agency views empirically. They are also not mutually exclusive. There is, however,
little factual evidence in the literature that SOEs raise welfare. Nevertheless, the social
view remains very popular in the political sphere and public discussion. In the context
of this thesis, all three views are relevant to develop the research questions and interpret
the empirical results.
Economic theory as also come up with numerous arguments on how state ownership
may affect firm behavior and incentives of the management. I will summarize the most
relevant for this thesis in the following.
The first argument is that state ownership induces a soft budget constraint. The
term was coined by Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986) to describe persistent shortages in state-
dominated socialist economies (exogenous cause) but is now also understood as an
endogenous time inconsistency problem (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). Hence, it
can be generalized as a situation in which a financing entity cannot credibly commit
itself not to bail out a creditor or, analogously, re-invest in a project with positive
expected profit and sunk cost (Kornai et al., 2003). Consequently, a soft budget con-
straint may give rise to moral hazard at the creditor level.5 Soft budget constraints are
naturally intimately related to the phenomenon of implicit guarantees, which we can
interpret as the perception of soft budget constraints by investors (Kornai et al., 2003).
Implicit guarantees potentially affect borrowing costs and financing behavior and are
of particular relevance in content Chapters 3 and 5.
A second argument is low-powered incentives. They arise in a situation where a
5Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that the conventional wisdom of only SOEs suffering from soft
budget constraints is not as straightforward as it seems because governments have bailed out private
firms as well. Lin and Tan (1999) argue that once the state has a strategic interest in a firm (including
private ones), a soft budget constraint may arise. An additional aspect that may determine the degree
of softness is the closeness between a borrowing company and the lending financial institution (Rizov,
2008). The concept is also not necessarily limited to firms: Numerous studies have argued that country
bailouts or quantitative easing programmes carry a moral hazard risk (Vaubel, 1983; De Grauwe, 2013).
Consequently, they may soften budget constraints.
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transacting party is unable to collect full returns from a transaction (Williamson, 1985;
Tirole, 1994; Banerjee, 1997). Low-powered incentives caused by state ownership affect
both, the company management and the owning government institution. On the man-
agement level, the degree of ownership matters as low-powered incentives will arguably
be less relevant in minority-owned listed SOEs (with private co-owners) compared to
wholly state-owned firms. Especially in wholly owned SOEs, managers cannot collect
share packages as bonus payments because this would amount to privatization. As a
consequence, they may care less about firm valuation and stock market performance
and prefer to live a “quiet life” (Hicks, 1935; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). The
controlling state institutions such as ministries or government agencies may also be
affected by low-powered incentives because they too act as fiduciaries for the general
public and not as owners. Besides, political fortunes are unlikely to be very sensitive
to SOE performance in normal times, which limits politicians’ incentives to monitor
enterprise management and leads to weaker monitoring of SOEs (Vickers and Yarrow,
1991; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2012). Nevertheless, politicians may have high-powered
incentives concerning politically sensitive SOEs under exceptional circumstances, for
instance, if the fate of a specific company could significantly influence an election result
(Frant, 1996; D’Souza and Nash, 2017). This is in line with the political view because
private benefits are unusually large in such a situation. Differences in management and
board incentives between SOEs and private firms are of relevance in content Chapters
3 and 4: Weak monitoring by the state shareholder enables the private co-owners to
set maximum debt levels in Chapter 3. Low-powered management incentives to engage
in tax planning may partly explain higher ETRs of SOEs.
2.2 Empirical aspects of state ownership
SOEs are essential elements of many national economies (OECD, 2017). Although the
intensity of state ownership has ebbed and flowed with the prevailing political doctrine,
states have always actively engaged in economic activity. Recently, the trend has been
going towards more significant state holdings: Guedhami (2012) reports a clear upwards
trend in government investment activities since the late 1980s, which culminates in very
high shares of government acquisitions during the Asian crisis of 1998 and the financial
crisis of 2008 and 2009. European governments were particularly active buyers, with
seven European countries ranging in the top 15.6 On the sectoral level, most investments
were in the finance/real estate sectors as well as utilities. Guedhami (2012) notes that
6The countries are the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, France, and Luxem-
bourg.
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an increasing share in these transactions is due to SWFs, which account for around
one-fifth of total purchases by government investors.
State ownership, however, may not always be interpreted as a binary ownership
situation irrespective of the ownership share, the owning government institution, and
purpose of ownership. For example, a meta-analysis by Djankov and Murrell (2002)
shows that commercial SOEs perform better than traditional SOEs (with public policy
obligation) and may even – under specific circumstances – be preferable to private
ownership. For this reason, all content chapters of this doctoral thesis precisely define
state ownership in their respective contexts. Musacchio and Lazzarini (2012) summarize
the most frequent manifestations of state ownership, which they sum up as varieties of
state capitalism.
First, there is conventional state ownership of a company by a country’s central gov-
ernment or regional and local entities. Table 2.2.1 contains numbers from an OECD
(2017) survey on company ownership by central governments across the globe. As can
be seen, the Chinese central government is a full or majority owner of 51,341 commer-
cial SOEs, with a combined estimated value of 29.2 trillion USD. Commercial state
ownership outside China is substantial as well: Survey countries own a full or majority
share in 2,467 companies valued at 2,4 trillion USD. Additionally, OECD countries have
minority stakes worth 0.86 trillion USD (OECD, 2014b). Often, partial state owner-
ship consists of post-privatization residual holdings, i.e., companies which were initially
wholly owned by the state and were privatized to some extent. This pattern is notably
present in the network industries of the EU and some OECD countries as well as the
former transition economies in Eastern Europe.7
Second, there is government ownership for investment purposes. Since 2008, more
than 25 countries have created SWFs, which invest in company equity and held a total
of 4.5 trillion in 2014 (Fotak and Megginson, 2015). Mostly, these are minority holdings
and, at least on paper, serve a portfolio-diversification purpose.
Third, governments sometimes become owners for political reasons, for example
when they act as an owner of last resort to preserve jobs or guarantee financial stability
in formerly private companies. The OECD (2017) lists several cases in EU countries,
where the purchase of government equity could point to political agendas. For example,
the German government bought 25 percent of Commerzbank in early 2009 to ensure
continued lending at the height of the global financial crisis.
Figure 2.2.1 presents the sectoral distribution of commercial centrally owned SOEs
according to the OECD (2017). The left pie contains information on company equity
7The extent of privatization depends on the sector: For instance, residual holdings in the electricity
and gas sector remain higher than in the telecommunications sector (OECD, 2017).
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Table 2.2.1: Central SOEs in OECD survey countries
The table presents the number of firms, employees, and market value of commercial majority-owned
central government SOEs; the company value is based on year-end estimates in 2015; the data does
not include minority-owned SOEs or entities held by regional or municipal administrations; data is
taken from the OECD (2017) survey.
Country Number of SOEs Number of employees Value USD bn
Argentina 59 130,776 28
Australia 8 42,607 14
Austria 10 72,491 5
Brazil 134 597,505 145
Canada 44 83,462 30
Chile 25 50,361 21
China 51,341 20,248,999 29,201
Colombia 39 33,033 23
Costa Rica 32 43,013 13
Czech Republic 133 133,826 29
Denmark 21 18,728 14
Estonia 66 26,026 4
Finland 47 72,391 40
France 51 826,967 77
Germany 71 370,440 72
Greece 42 42,927 83
Hungary 370 148,193 9
Iceland 35 3,636 4
India 270 3,284,845 339
Ireland 25 39,079 10
Israel 28 57,114
Italy 20 499,765 208
Japan 8 256,265 82
Korea 56 147,833 218
Latvia 71 49,962 8
Lithuania 128 40,711 6
Mexico 78 73,686 21
Netherlands 29 110,400 83
New Zealand 37 36,214 29
Norway 55 230,601 108
Poland 126 128,016 16
Slovakia 113 60,471
Slovenia 37 47,052 13
Spain 51 94,635 37
Sweden 49 124,133 37
Switzerland 4 106,883 45
Turkey 39 438,990 63
United Kingdom 16 153,604 115
Total (excluding China) 2,467 9,238,528 2,408
13
across sectors and the right pie plots employment shares. Figure 2.2.1 shows that SOEs
are present in most relevant economic areas, even though they predominate in network
industries such as electricity, gas, and transportation. SOEs are also ubiquitous in the
banking industry, where large state development banks have expanded substantially in
recent years (Monnet et al., 2014). While the strong presence of SOEs in the network
sectors is evidence for the social or agency views, state ownership in financial companies
could point to political financing. Hence, the observed prevalence of SOEs does not
unequivocally support one of the theoretical views.



































It is important to note that Table 2.2.1 and Figure 2.2.1 only contain data for
centrally-owned SOEs. Often, regional and local governments own significant shares
in firms as well. For instance, in a recent report on state ownership in Europe, the
European Commission reports that in Italy exist around 6,000 local SOEs that employ
a total of 500,000 people (2.1 percent of total employment). Data on regional and local
SOEs is much scarcer because they are seldom listed on stock exchanges (but may still
be commercially active while operating as limited liability companies). The OECD
(2017) estimates that only 45 percent of SOEs by value and 25 percent of SOEs by
employment are listed on stock exchanges. Hence, the fact that this doctoral thesis
draws on an extensive sample that includes ownership information for non-listed firms
is a key distinction to previous empirical research in the field.
An extensive literature has analyzed state ownership of companies. Empirical stud-
ies focus on firm-level data analysis and interpret results in line with the theoretical
approaches outlined in Section 2.1. However, studies have also added many stand-alone
effects that extend the fundamental theories of state ownership. The literature is fur-
thermore not exclusively from the economic sphere, as related fields such as business,
law, and sociology have contributed significantly. An important issue of empirical work
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is the specific SOE definition a study uses because results may well depend on the
type of state ownership. Most studies analyze data of listed majority-owned commer-
cial SOEs. This doctoral thesis, in contrast, mostly uses non-listed wholly state-owned
subsidiaries (except for Chapter 3, which uses joint affiliates of SOEs and MNEs).
Even in the latter case, affiliates are often non-listed firms. If firms are not listed, and
therefore, less information is easily accessible, implicit guarantees may be more relevant
compared to more transparent and publicly traded majority-owned SOEs. Seemingly
contradicting results in the ownership literature can often – at closer scrutiny – be
attributed to different specifications of ownership and the variables of interest.8
In line with the political view on state ownership, many studies focus on the med-
dling of state owners and vested interests in firms. In this respect, there is also a
significant strand of literature focusing on political connections and their effects on
firm characteristics and decisions. Though technically not the same thing, SOEs can
be interpreted as a subgroup of politically connected firms because they usually have
politicians or high-ranking government officials on their supervisory boards.9 Hence,
many results from the political connections literature seem relevant in an SOE con-
text. Kahan and Rock (2011) discuss how – from a legal perspective – a state majority
owner has a higher levy to impose its agenda on a firm than a private controlling owner.
D’Souza and Nash (2017) present evidence that private benefits, which politicians can
extract from state-controlled firms, dominate economic decision making. Political in-
terference comes at a cost to the firm: Nasr et al. (2012) find that the cost of equity of
partially privatized SOEs increases with the state share and that this increase is more
pronounced if the privatizing government is considered more interventionist. Other
studies confirm a negative impact of state ownership on firm value (Shirley and Walsh,
2000; Lin and Su, 2008; Borisova et al., 2012). Faccio (2006) finds that political con-
nections do not unambiguously increase firm value, which moderates results from a
previous study drawing on limited data from Indonesia (Fisman, 2001). A large SOE
share in the economy may not only affect SOEs themselves but also have implica-
tions for other firms: For example, Brandt and Li (2003) show that banks discriminate
against private firms to obtain benefits from connected politicians.
8One example is the positive bond spread that some studies find for SOEs in non-crisis times
(Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Borisova et al., 2015). Both studies use spreads based on corporate
bonds instead of standard credit contracts, which increases the distance between creditor and debtor
and additionally limits their validity to very large firms that select into issuing corporate bonds.
9Faccio (2006) provides a comprehensive overview on political connections around the globe, which
she defines as a situation where a substantial owner or key official (CEO, CFO, vice-president, or
secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister, or closely related to a politician. This is the case
with many central SOEs. In regional or local SOEs, board members may be mayors, or high-ranking
officials of the respective government entities.
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Political agendas seem to be especially present in state-owned banks: Khwaja and
Mian (2005) find that state-owned banks lend more to politically connected firms, even
though they have higher default rates. Dinc (2005) shows that state-owned banks in-
crease their lending in election years relative to private banks. He also argues that the
problem of political meddling may be stronger in banks than in non-financial compa-
nies. Similarly, Sapienza (2004) finds a political dimension in the landing behavior of
state-owned banks, which charge lower rates in regions where related political parties
are stronger. Nevertheless, state-owned banks may still be more efficient in allocating
capital compared to direct transfers by governments (Cull and Xu, 2000).
The rise of SWFs has led to concerns that such investments are politically motivated
(Keller, 2009). For example, SWFs could impose conflicting goals on their targets, such
as securing investment and knowledge transfer into their jurisdictions. A survey on em-
pirical literature by Fotak and Megginson (2015) argues that SWFs differ substantially
in their asset allocation and professionalism across countries. However, concerns about
political investment are mostly unfounded. SWFs differ, though, in their investment
patterns from other large institutional investors (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008). In
particular, they (i) invest in companies that are culturally close, (ii) they overinvest
in equities and (ii) they invest in firms with large market capitalization. They further
tend to chase past returns and hold poorly diversified portfolios both in geographic and
industry terms. Especially point (ii) may still indicate a political dimension, targeted
at constituents: It is easier to justify investments in big well-known companies with
global brands than in diversified and complicated portfolios.
A large empirical literature deals with debt financing of SOEs and relates to the
theoretical aspects of implicit guarantees and soft budget constraints. In the privati-
zation context of the 1990s, many studies found evidence that SOEs use more debt
than private (or newly privatized) firms.10 While findings from this period probably
relate to the ongoing transition process and institutional particularities, more recent
studies have pointed at implicit state guarantees to explain financing cost differences
across firms in market economies without a socialist past. For instance, the OECD
(2014a) concludes from a big survey that SOEs access debt on the commercial market-
place, but – compared to private firms – at a lower cost. In China, non-traded SOEs
have significantly higher leverage and easier access to long-term debt than private or
foreign firms (Li et al., 2009). Private firms hold more cash than SOEs – a fact that
further supports the presence of soft budget constraints of Chinese SOEs, especially
10See, for instance, Megginson et al. (1994), and for surveys Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and
Megginson and Netter (2001). A study by Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) shows that the problem
persists in transition countries where the pace of reform has been slow.
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with state-owned banks (Megginson et al., 2014). Capital structure decisions and polit-
ical interests may be intertwined, as multinational Chinese SOEs have higher leverage
ratios as they promote national overseas strategies (Zhang and Zhang, 2016).
There is also evidence that the financing advantage may depend on the economic
environment as implicit guarantees may be particularly important during times of
economic crisis (Borisova et al., 2015). The authors conclude that in non-crisis times,
SOEs may even face higher costs of debt compared to privately-owned firms because
bond spreads reflect the lower quality of corporate governance in these firms. Borisova
and Megginson (2011) reach a similar conclusion: They look at the effect of post-
privatization residual holdings and find that credit spreads increase while the state
share decreases but remains positive. Once a firm is entirely privately owned, it faces
lower spreads and hence lower borrowing costs. By using corporate bond spreads of
listed firms, both studies target a substantially different group of companies than the
content chapters of this thesis (large firms that self-select into issuing bonds rather
than obtaining bank debt).
Again, results from the literature on politically connected firms seem relevant: Two
studies find higher debt levels and a higher bail-out probability for politically connected
firms, while they are less profitable when compared to private peers on an accounting
basis (Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2010).
When it comes to performance measures such as profitability and efficiency, con-
ventional wisdom has long associated SOEs with worse corporate performance. The
theoretical underpinning of these assertions could lie in low-powered incentives of the
management. Empirical studies mostly reach similar conclusions: Numerous studies and
surveys document significant differences in performance between SOEs and private (or
privatized) firms (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Estrin
et al., 2009).11 In China, Fan et al. (2007) show that partially privatized firms with
bureaucrats as CEOs perform worse and suffer from low-quality board monitoring at
the same time. The performance impact is not limited to former transition economies:
Borisova et al. (2012) find that government ownership leads to lower corporate gover-
nance quality in the EU. The relation also holds when state owners are SWFs, i.e., state
entities that claim to act as a non-controlling investor and not as a meddling owner.
Bortolotti et al. (2015) find that sovereign wealth fund targets suffer from declining
return on assets and sales growth three years after sovereign wealth fund investments.
11Dinc and Gupta (2011) note that governments are more likely to privatize profitable firms. How-
ever, most studies comparing private firms with privatized firms do not control for endogenous pri-
vatization decisions. Using an instrumental variables approach, the authors show that significant
improvements in profitability and efficiency persist even under endogenous privatization.
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In times of crisis, government ownership may also protect firms from losing value
(due to a higher bailout probability), at least in countries with good institutions that
protect private shareholders from being expropriated (Beuselinck et al., 2017). There is
also evidence that SOEs allocate capital less efficiently compared to private firms: Chen
et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2016) show that private conglomerates in China allocate
more internal capital to units with better investment projects than state firms do. Chen
et al. (2017) find that government ownership decreases investment sensitivity for good
projects. Jaslowitzer et al. (2016) look at European data and show that conservatism
and stability-seeking characterize investment levels of SOEs. These empirical studies
on SOE investment are in line with political investment agendas and a “quiet life”
behavior of SOE managers.
The short literature survey above is not exhaustive and focuses only on the most
important aspects of state ownership. Therefore, each chapter again reviews relevant
studies for the research question at hand – including related literature from other fields
of economics, such as debt financing, tax planning, effective taxation, and behavioral
economics.
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3 The impact of taxes on debt financing under par-
tial state ownership
3.1 Introduction
An extensive literature analyzing SOEs argues that commercial lenders assume implicit
state guarantees when providing credit. Consequently, SOEs should be able to issue
more debt. Many empirical studies support this hypothesis. The survey of Megginson
and Netter (2001) suggests that the privatization of an SOE usually leads to a sig-
nificantly lower debt-to-asset ratio. Rizov (2008) provides a more general overview of
theoretical and empirical work analyzing the consequences of a soft budget constraint
on leverage.12 Two reports by the (OECD, 2012, 2014a) confirm that the pricing be-
havior of lenders differs if the borrower is an SOE. A very recent paper by Chen et al.
(2016) finds that private firms in China have lower leverage than SOEs, suggesting that
SOEs have facilitated access to debt financing.
While many SOEs are not wholly state-owned, previous literature has ignored how
implicit guarantees change the behavior of private co-owners. Similarly, we know little
about how the presence of a state owner, regardless of the ownership share, alters the
risk perception of creditors. This is surprising, as mixed ownership is widespread: The
OECD (2014b) estimates minority state holdings alone amount to 860 billion USD
across member states. In an international context, it is often the case that domestic
SOEs and privately owned MNEs (MNEs) have stakes in the same affiliates.13
Analyzing the consequences of state guarantees is naturally difficult: They are im-
plicit and therefore unobserved. Although a study by the OECD (2014a) confirms that
SOEs (from European or OECD countries) obtain debt in the commercial market-
place, just like privately held firms, commercial credit markets seem to be increasingly
influenced by state-owned banks, and this could facilitate access to credit for SOEs
(Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005).14 Private co-owners of mixed-ownership companies may
particularly benefit from the facilitated debt access. From their perspective, implicit
12Implicit state guarantees are closely related to soft budget constraints (Kornai et al., 2003), which
is why numerous studies on the subject are of equal relevance in our context. Theory and empirical
work suggest a rise in leverage, the softer the budget constraint, i.e., the stronger the assumed implicit
guarantee.
13See Norbäck and Persson (2004), arguing that in about 29% of the privatizations in OECD coun-
tries the buyer was a foreign firm; see also Gupta (2005).
14State-owned banks in Europe increased their assets by at least 30 percent from 2008 to 2012
compared to only a 4-percent increase for private banks (Monnet et al., 2014).
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guarantees might change the standard trade-off between tax benefit (deductible in-
terest expense) and cost of financial distress. For example, a private co-owner might
pressure managers to set a maximum attainable debt level to avoid unilateral distri-
butions (via tax payments) to the government. This suggests two things. First, debt
levels of mixed-ownership firms are higher. Second, debt responses to corporate tax
rates in mixed-ownership firms should be less pronounced.
Tax-deductible interest expenses allow firms to avoid tax payments and suggest
a positive correlation between business taxes and debt financing. While there is a
vast number of studies on the role of taxes for capital structure choice,15 previous
research has not addressed the issue of whether the debt responses of partial SOEs differ
with regard to the standard determinants of capital structure. In particular, partial
state ownership may alter a firm’s debt tax-responsiveness for three reasons. First, the
government as a shareholder benefits from both taxes and dividends.16 However, under
shared ownership, it will prefer tax payments to dividends because tax payments are
not distributed to all shareholders. Second, private co-owners might take advantage of
easier debt access and benefit from maximum tax shields, irrespective of the corporate
tax level. Third, agency conflicts could affect the behavior of managers under partial
state ownership in a different way compared to private firms, and this might have
implications for the decisions about debt financing.
This paper suggests a differential impact of taxes on debt financing, depending
on ownership. We particularly provide evidence that mixed-ownership firms use sig-
nificantly more debt, but are less tax-sensitive than private firms. For the empirical
analysis, we use a large micro-level dataset (ORBIS), which allows us to distinguish
between affiliates of MNEs in which an SOE is a co-owner and affiliates of MNEs
where this is not the case.17 By comparing affiliates with government participation
to similar but privately owned ones, we can identify the differential impact of taxa-
tion on capital structure caused by partial state ownership. We thereby show that the
well-established effect of taxes on capital structure choice does not hold if the firm is
partially state-owned. Instead, leverage levels are higher, irrespective of the tax rate,
15Influential contributions to this literature are the ones by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers
(1977), and Harris and Raviv (1991). Empirical contributions finding a positive effect of taxes on
debt financing are the ones by MacKie-Mason (1990), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Desai et al. (2004),
Huizinga et al. (2008), Buettner et al. (2009); for a meta-study, see Feld et al. (2013); for surveys, see
Myers (2001), and Graham (2003).
16This assumes that the firm operates in the same country as the government owner, which is the
case for a vast majority of SOEs and also in the sample we use for our empirical analysis.
17Our data consists of affiliates with ownership above 50 percent (subsidiaries) and affiliates with
ownership below 50 percent. When we use “SOE” in an affiliate context, we always refer to partially
state-owned affiliates, that is firms with a mixed MNE-SOE ownership structure.
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suggesting significantly higher tax shields for private shareholders. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that makes this distinction when examining the effect
of taxes on debt financing.
An unconditional comparison using our data suggests that the average debt-to-asset
ratio of partially SOE-held affiliates is about 5.8 percentage points higher than the one
of affiliates without SOE ownership. Differences in debt financing at the extensive and
the intensive margin drive this discrepancy: The unconditional probability of having
positive debt is about 15.4 percent higher for affiliates where an SOE is involved; debt-
to-asset ratios of partially state-owned affiliates with positive debt exceed the ones
of private firms by an average of 2.5 percent. Another interesting observation from
the data is that leverage is hardly correlated with taxes in case of partially SOE-held
affiliates, while debt ratios of private firms exhibit a clear positive correlation. This may
be surprising given numerous anecdotes about the tax planning and tax avoidance of
SOEs, and given that SOEs operating in OECD and EU countries are subject to the
same tax treatment as private firms (OECD, 2012).18
One of the central issues we need to address in an empirical analysis is that the
status of state ownership is not random, and unconditional comparisons (of outcomes)
between partially SOE-held and non-SOE-held affiliates will therefore necessarily pro-
duce biased estimates. We design our investigation approach in a way that particularly
allows us to understand the differential impact of taxes on debt financing, given the
non-random assignment of state ownership. To account for the latter, we first match
pairs of similar affiliates of MNEs, where each pair involves one partially SOE-held af-
filiate (treated) and one non-SOE-held affiliate (control). We require these pairs to be
active in the same sector and country. The differential impact of taxes is then identified
by using time variation in tax incentives, conditional on time-varying determinants of
debt financing as well as time and matched-pair-specific effects. For the basic results,
and assuming a tax rate of 25%, our estimates suggest that being (partially) SOE-held
is associated with an 8 percentage points higher debt ratio. A central finding is that
treated affiliates do not respond to taxes at all. This indicates that the classic leverage
trade-off becomes weaker or even disappears under state ownership. We additionally
show that the intensive margin drives the difference between mixed-ownership and pri-
vate units. All results are robust to (i) exact matching within country and sector, (ii)
alternative regression specifications, (iii) varying specifications of the propensity score,
as well as (iv) placebo effects.
Our empirical results are consistent with theories on capital structure and state
18Within the EU, state aid legislation prohibits differential treatment of SOEs if they are commer-
cially active.
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ownership. First, partial state ownership facilitates access to credit. Second, private
firms in mixed-ownership relationships aim at exploiting a maximum attainable debt
ratio. Thereby, the private co-owners can avoid unilateral distributions to state share-
holders, which count on budgetary contributions from commercial SOEs (European
Commission, 2016). Since partial state ownership facilitates access to debt and alters
the standard debt trade-off towards higher levels of debt, our findings may also have
implications for MNEs and their tax planning activities. In particular, debt as a vehicle
to avoid taxes seems to be an attractive tax planning strategy if monitoring by state
owners is weak (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Fan et al., 2007). Third, higher leverage
helps dividend-averse managers of partially SOEs to increase their leeway for “empire
building” and investment in “pet projects” (Cui, 2015b). Fourth, rate of return targets
from governments may give managers of partially state-owned affiliates an incentive
to use very high levels of debt, irrespective of the tax rate. Fifth, firms may suffer
from a leverage ratchet effect, which biases capital structure decisions towards higher
debt levels (Admati et al., 2018). This effect is likely to be particularly strong in SOEs
because of restrictions on equity issues imposed by the government.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides all definitions
of the variables we use in our analysis and reviews the relevant literature. Section
3.3 explains the econometric approach. Section 3.4 presents descriptive statistics and
the main result. Section 3.5 summarizes a broad range of sensitivity tests. Section 3.6
elaborates on implications of our findings. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Taxation, state ownership, and debt
3.2.1 Taxes and debt financing of SOEs
The differential effect of taxes on SOEs has attracted very little attention in the corpo-
rate finance literature. Cui (2015b) summarizes three different (not mutually exclusive)
perspectives on the issue. First, taxes are irrelevant in the context of wholly-owned
SOEs: It does not matter whether the government receives taxes or dividends. How-
ever, differential tax treatment matters in mixed-ownership companies: Governments
tax the dividends paid to private investors, whereas distributions to the state are not
subject to additional tax. Otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that SOE managers are
indifferent between tax and dividend payout, assuming the absence of agency conflicts.
Second, there is a perspective called the “condition of neutrality”. It derives from
the observation that most SOEs operate in market environments where preferential
taxation would give SOEs a competitive advantage over private firms. Hence, SOE
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taxation is necessary to ensure fair competition. This point of view is particularly
strong in the EU, where preferential tax treatment of SOEs would contradict state aid
legislation aimed at providing a level playing field in the single market.19 However, gov-
ernments sometimes act in response to market failure, and competitive neutrality may
consequently not be a sufficient argument to explain SOE taxation.20 Within an SOE,
it may be unclear which activities stem from public service obligations and which are of
commercial interest. Moreover, it is hard to say if public service obligations ultimately
benefit or hurt an SOE’s market activities. Still, SOEs and their private shareholders
may benefit from other competitive advantages such as implicit debt guarantees. At
the same time, SOEs have been found to be less profitable (Dewenter and Malatesta,
2001; Megginson and Netter, 2001) and less well managed (Borisova et al., 2012).
Third, SOE taxation is a means of forcing distributions under agency conflicts
(Cui, 2015b). Note that taxes, in this view, are a substitute for dividend payments
to the government in the spirit of Jensen (1986). A firm should pay out dividends to
shareholders if the marginal benefit of a payout is higher than that of an additional unit
of investment. Managers may be reluctant to pay dividends due to agency conflicts.
For instance, they may prefer to invest in projects that produce private benefits, or
they pursue “empire building” and “quiet life” strategies. Thus, shareholders have
to engage in effective monitoring to mitigate divergent interests of managers, a task
that may be harder to accomplish for SOEs (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Musacchio
and Lazzarini, 2012). Less effective monitoring is often attributed to a weaker sense
of ownership in government agencies in charge of SOE supervision compared to large
shareholders in private firms. SOE managers may, therefore, care more about corporate
taxes than managers of private firms as weaker monitoring and corporate governance
increase opportunities for “empire-building” strategies (Cui, 2015b).
Governments in many EU member states use financial gains from their commer-
cially active companies in budgets (European Commission, 2016). Effective tax rates
of wholly-owned commercial SOEs reflect this behavior: Jakob (2018) shows that they
pay higher effective tax rates in Europe than comparable private firms. In our mixed-
ownership study, tax payments increase distributions to state shareholders and lower
19The relevant articles are 107-109 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Even though
exceptions persist on when SOEs may receive state aid (at arm’s-length), Article 90 of the Treaty on
the European Community explicitly subjects public undertakings of “general economic interest” to
EU competition law.
20We see in our data that governments often hold a participating interest in network industries,
such as energy companies, airlines, railways, postal services, utilities and other sectors of public in-
terest. Many former state monopolies have been partly privatized over the last decades. However, the
comprehensive review of ownership structures undertaken for this study reveal continued government
participation in these sectors across all countries included in our sample.
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distributions to private owners. Hence, governments have an incentive to force high tax
payments to increase their distributions over those of private shareholders. In contrast,
private shareholders might pressure the management to avoid unilateral distributions
towards government owners.
Summing up, mixed-ownership firms face different tax-related capital structure
trade-offs compared to private companies. In particular, incentives differ because of
(i) implicit state guarantees, (ii) weak monitoring by governments, (iii) bigger agency
conflicts, and (iv) forced tax distributions to governments. Note that these points sub-
stantially depend on ownership and not on the level of tax rates. As a consequence, the
standard cost-benefit capital structure trade-offs no longer apply. The reason is that
partial state ownership affects the cost of financial distress as well as the tax benefits
of using debt financing. Instead, we propose for mixed-ownership companies:
Hypothesis: Mixed-ownership SOEs exploit the facilitated access to debt financing
and employ a maximum attainable debt ratio to shield private investors from cor-
porate taxes. The optimal capital structure then primarily depends on the presence
of implicit guarantees and less on corporate tax rates.
Our empirical analysis provides a test of this hypothesis by focusing on the differential
impact of ownership on leverage, and by examining the tax-responsiveness of debt if
firms are in partial state ownership.
Note, finally, that debt financing may help to meet rate-of-return targets set by
governments. Such goals are used by three-quarters of all OECD countries to assess
the performance of SOEs. With very few exceptions, governments do not link them to
capital structure decisions (OECD, 2014a).
3.2.2 Data and the definition of state ownership
Our analysis focuses on MNEs and their affiliates. We use the commercial ORBIS firm-
level panel dataset from Bureau van Dijk. ORBIS records balance sheet and income
statement data from millions of companies across the globe. An essential advantage of
ORBIS is the inclusion of non-listed firms and affiliates, which allows us to analyze debt
financing at the non-consolidated micro level (the affiliate level). We should mention,
though, that the dataset suffers from a large number of missing values in some variables
that are important for this study. This reduces the overall sample size to a significant
extent.
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We first use information provided by Bureau van Dijk to identify affiliates of SOEs.
In ORBIS, a company is classified as state-owned if the state owns a substantial share
of at least 25 percent of a company’s controlling equity. We define an indicator variable
SOEi, which equals 1 if affiliate i is co-owned by an SOE. If this is not the case and no
SOE is involved in the controlling capital of i, we set SOEi = 0. As mentioned above,
we focus on MNEs, i.e., firms that have at least one affiliate abroad in which the parent
company holds at least 1 percent. In a next step, we manually verify the ownership
structure of each affiliate with SOEi = 1, using the historical ownership information
available in the online ORBIS database. Thus, we ensure that during the years from
2004 to 2013, an affiliate was always partially owned by an SOE.21 At the same time,
we ensure that the affiliate had a mixed ownership structure by identifying at least one
private shareholder in each year. We also make sure that the MNEs and their affiliates
with SOEi = 0 are purely private firms by manually checking their historical ownership
structure in each year. Affiliates that we find to be partially state-owned (for example,
if the owning government holds a share smaller than 25 percent of the parent company)
are removed from the dataset in the respective years. We thereby make sure that we
compare affiliates of MNEs with state participation to affiliates of MNEs where the
state is not involved at all.
The ownership structure of some affiliates cannot be fully determined, as the data
include some holding companies for which no ultimate ownership data is available. We
assume that such firms are privately owned, which is most likely the case as OECD
governments make all their holdings public. Besides, we are ultimately interested in
implicit guarantees, for which state ownership has to be publicly known.
Note that our data include small and passive investments by SWFs. In ORBIS,
we can easily differentiate between SWF portfolio companies and companies directly
owned by the state because SWF companies carry the ownership label “country via its
funds” compared to “country”. SWF portfolio companies tend to be non-substantial
and hold less than 10 percent of affiliate equity, which is below our sample threshold for
substantial ownership. Cui (2015b) argues that SWF portfolio companies differ from
traditional SOEs because the SWF stake is mostly not substantial and will alter firm
behavior and incentives to a much lesser extent.22 In any case, we do not consider
SWF portfolios as SOEs, and this is consistent with the political view of state owner-
21Around 77 percent of treated firms fulfill our ownership structure requirements for all years in the
period considered. We also construct matched pairs for different ownership patterns in the respective
years to avoid a survivorship bias in our estimates.
22Nevertheless, a body of research has shown that SWF participation does affect the characteristics
of target firms. See Fotak and Megginson (2015) for a survey.
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ship (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). The latter suggests that SOEs may be
vehicles of politicians’ private interests such as forcing distributions or pursuing em-
ployment and investment policies. The state primarily acts as an investor rather than
as an owner when acquiring non-controlling positions in firms via its SWF. The aim is
then to realize a long-term financial return (Fotak and Megginson, 2015).
The definition of an entity being state-owned or private is crucial. Few studies find
a negative correlation between state ownership and debt. For example, the study by
Bortolotti et al. (2015) suggests a decrease in leverage of publicly traded firms after
investments of state-owned investors. However, they focus on investments in minority
stakes, whereas we use affiliates of substantially state-owned SOEs. Borisova and Meg-
ginson (2011) find that the cost of debt increases with a decreasing share of government
ownership, which implies lower leverage. Entirely privatized firms, in turn, face lower
spreads (used by Borisova and Megginson, 2011, as a proxy for the cost of debt) and
hence lower borrowing costs. A study by Borisova et al. (2015) suggests that implicit
guarantees have only been relevant during the financial crisis (starting in 2008) and
that SOEs face higher bond spreads in normal times. These studies appear to con-
tradict previous findings. The focus on bond spreads may, however, not be the most
relevant one given that the medium-sized utility affiliate (of the partially state-owned
units) is the typical observation in our sample.
It is important to recall that, at this point, the partially state-owned affiliate i,
which we will analyze in the empirical part below, is at the same time an independent
entity of a private MNE. The affiliate is located somewhere within the EU/OECD
member states, but not necessarily in the same country as the SOE.23 The goal of the
empirical analysis is to match (comparable) affiliates that are fully privately owned
with mixed-ownership affiliates.
3.2.3 Debt financing
The variable we are interested in is long-term debt, which we define as long-term credit
(i.e., maturities of more than one year) divided by total assets. We denote this variable
for affiliate i as LEVit. We focus on long-term debt as it should be the choice variable
when (i) firms decide on optimal tax shields, and when (ii) implicit state guarantees
are more important for long-term financing (which is very likely). Similarly, facilitated
debt access at state banks should, in particular, affect long-term funding.24 We report
results for two alternative outcome variables in the sensitivity analysis in Section 3.5.
23We also estimate our model where SOEs and affiliates operate in the same country.
24For instance, European state-owned banks focus on long-term lending (Monnet et al., 2014).
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Figure 3.2.1 depicts the outcome variable, LEVit, over time. The solid line shows
the average debt ratio of mixed-ownership affiliates (SOEi = 1), the dashed line the
average debt ratio for the fully privately-held affiliates (SOEi = 0). While the level
of this ratio stays roughly constant over time for the control group, it plummets and
subsequently rises again quite significantly on two occasions in the treatment group.
The timing seems to suggest a relation to events at the macroeconomic level: The first
peak in 2008 coincides with the global financial crisis, the second peak in 2012 may
be related to the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. The cyclical responses of debt
financing of the SOEs support the results of Borisova et al. (2015). These show that
implicit guarantees of SOEs are particularly relevant in times of macroeconomic crisis.
Figure 3.2.1: Yearly average of the outcome variable
Figure 3.2.1 plots yearly averages of our outcome variable LEVit for state-owned and privately owned
firms with LEVit > 0 from 2005 to 2013. LEVit is defined as long-term credit divided by total assets





































The central goal of our empirical analysis is to learn about a possible differential impact
of the corporate tax rate that applies at location k and time t, TAXkt, on debt financing
of affiliate i, LEVit. To estimate the differential impact we use interactions of TAXkt
and the indicator SOEi.
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First, however, our empirical approach requires identifying pairs of affiliates, where
each pair consists of one affiliate that is held by an SOE (SOEi = 1) and one that is
not (SOEi = 0). The former unit is called treated, and the latter unit is called control.
Whether affiliate i is assigned to one or the other group depends on vectors of affiliate-
i-specific and host-country-k-specific determinants, which we summarize in X0i and
Z0k, as well as the industry s in which an affiliate operates, ψs. We then specify the
following linear index:
SOEit0 = β1X0it0 + β2Z0kt0 + ψi + εikt0 . (3.1)
We use specification (3.1) to predict the propensity p̂i of i being SOE-held, using a
binary probability model (probit). Based on this probability model we produce two
vectors of propensity scores: One for the SOE-held affiliates p̂1, and one for the ones
that are not SOE-held, p̂0. The time index t0 indicates that we focus on observations
in the initial year (t0 = 2005) in our data.
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The next step requires identifying the nearest neighbor for each treated unit i. Let
cmi denote the respective control unit m that we match to the treated unit i. The best
match is determined by cmi = min{m}
(|p̂1i − p̂0m|), ∀ m 6= i. We start by matching across
countries and sectors but also provide results based on exact country and industry
matching. This produces pairs of affiliates {SOEi = 1;SOEm = 0} where one is SOE-
held and one is not. Note that we only use observations as controls which are 100
percent owned by an MNE to ensure they are fully privately owned. Once we have
identified cmi for each treated unit, we estimate
LEVit = α1SOEi + α2TAXkt + α3SOEi × TAXkt
+ α4Xit +α5Zkt + φt + c
m
i + ψs + ωk + εiskt, (3.2)
where LEVit denotes the debt-to-asset ratio of affiliate i in year t (t = 2005, ..., 2013), SOEi
indicates treatment status, and TAXkt is the statutory tax rate of country k in year t, the
host location of affiliate i. We are mainly interested in the coefficient α1 of the treatment
variable SOEi and the interaction term SOEi × TAXkt. In particular, the coefficient α3
provides an estimate for the differential impact of TAXkt under partial state ownership. It
25We lose t = 2004 due to first differencing of some variables. If the ownership verification (described
above) reveals relevant changes in ownership during the sample period, we remove the observation
from the sample for the respective years.
28
is identified through variation in tax rates over time as we condition on φt and c
m
i , which
denote time, and pair-specific effects. Similarly, ψs and ωk denote sector and country effects,
respectively. Note that the index m in cmi indicates that the pair fixed effect is based on the
best match as determined above. Thus, conditioning on cmi means that we remove all cross-
sectional differences between affiliate pairs and it allows us to identify the differential impact
of being SOE-held by time-averaging over all treatment-control units within each pair.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
For our empirical analysis, we use a mostly balanced panel, in which both treated and control
units are observed in almost every year from 2005 to 2013. Our dataset includes affiliates
operating in 22 countries, all of which are either OECD or EU member countries. This leads
to a total of 1,780 treated and 73,033 control observations over the whole observed time
interval. The average SOE parent holds 27 percent of a joint affiliate, and the average non-
SOE parent owns 25 percent.26 The treated units operate only in 12 of the 22 countries,
all of which are EU member countries with the exceptions of Norway and South Korea.
The countries with the most treated observations are Germany, France, and Belgium. Some
countries, like Italy, are not represented in our sample because of missing information in some
of the control variables.27
Descriptive statistics at the sectoral level suggest that governments are involved in many
industries. However, there is more government activity in sectors like transport, electricity,
and communications, than in others, like wholesale trade. Table 3.4.1 depicts the relative
shares using a sectoral classification based on the first digit of the US-SIC-code. To ensure
that sectoral distributions do not drive our results, we include SIC-1 dummies in the estimates
of the propensity scores.28
26The mean ownership share in the paper by Beuselinck et al. (2017) is about 22% (cf. Table 1).
27This is not representative, as SOEs play a prominent role in many EU and OECD member states,
especially in Italy (European Commission, 2016). Note that the sample composition is not relevant,
however, in the sense that cross-country variation is fully taken into account in results where we match
treated and control units located in the same country. Moreover, our estimates are robust to a full
set of country dummies in the propensity score estimation. To save degrees of freedom in the basic
estimate, we follow Borisova et al. (2012) and include only dummies indicating the La Porta et al.
(1998) legal origin.
28Our results are also robust to exact matching by sector (see below).
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Table 3.4.1: Sectoral distribution of state ownership
The table presents the sectoral distribution of partially state-owned and fully privately owned firms;
the sectoral distribution is based on 1-digit SIC identifier codes.
SIC-Sector MNE SOE Total
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 500 0.68 0 0 500 0.67
Mining 420 0.58 0 0 420 0.56
Construction 3,532 4.84 70 3.93 3,602 4.81
Manufacturing 19,300 26.43 250 14.04 19,550 26.13
Transport, Communications, Electric, Gas 5,600 7.67 700 39.33 6,300 8.42
Wholesale Trade 19,328 26.46 80 4.49 19,408 25.94
Retail Trade 3,070 4.20 20 1.12 3,090 4.13
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 7,116 9.74 250 14.04 7,366 9.85
Services 13,018 17.82 390 21.91 13,408 17.92
Public Administration 1,149 1.57 20 1.12 1,169 1.56
Total 73,033 100.00 1,780 100.00 74,813 100.00
Table 3.4.2 presents summary statistics for all variables of interest.29 We are mainly
interested in LEVit, the long-term debt-to-asset ratio of affiliate i at time t. We remove
affiliates where long-term debt exceeds or equals the total assets as corporations in the OECD
and EU require some equity.30 As we would expect, the unconditional correlation between
LEVit and SOEi is positive. Note that the mean of LEVit is smaller than in most studies,
which may be for the following reasons: First, we focus on long-term borrowing and exclude
any debt with a maturity of less than one year.31 Second, our dataset includes a large share
of zero-leverage firms. To be precise, 42 percent of the affiliates report zero long-term debt,
which is higher than the 32 percent reported by Strebulaev and Yang (2013) in their study
using US data from 1962 and 2009.32 We account for the fact that many of our observations
have zero debt by estimating an extensive and an intensive margin debt choice in Section 3.5.
We additionally use two alternative specifications of outcome as a robustness check in the
same section.
The control variables we include in the outcome equation are ones that have been shown
to affect the capital structure of firms in previous literature. In particular, we condition on
the following variables: TAXkt is the statutory tax rate that applies to entity i at location
29Table 3.8.3 in the chapter appendix reports a correlation matrix for the variables used in the
regressions. Table 3.8.5 provides data sources and a description of all variables.
30When including observations in our empirical analysis with LEVit = 1, the results are unchanged,
though.
31We present estimates including short-term debt in Section 3.5.
32The inclusion of short-term debt leads to a zero-leverage share of 35 percent, which is close to
Strebulaev and Yang (2013).
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k and year t. In most countries, firms can deduct interest payments from their tax base and
therefore have a tax-incentive to use debt financing. The data consistently confirm a positive
correlation between TAXkt and LEVit (0.0508; see Table 3.8.3 in the chapter appendix). At
the same time, governments may want to force distributions via taxation from their SOEs,
which is an alternative way of raising revenue under the assumption of a dividend-averse
management.
We use the following firm-level variables: First, Graham and Leary (2011) suggest prof-
itability as an important determinant of leverage. We follow Huizinga et al. (2008) and use
the return on total assets (ROAit) as a measure of profitability. The reasoning for its inclusion
is straightforward: The more profitable a firm, the more likely it will get credit. From the
government’s perspective, it is arguably more interesting to participate in profitable ventures,
or more lucrative to sell stakes in more profitable SOEs (Dinc and Gupta, 2011). Second, the
variable ATANGit is the ratio of fixed to total assets. Asset tangibility (ATANGit) has been
found to be an important determinant of capital structure because tangible assets can be
used as collateral to obtain credit (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Graham and Leary, 2011). Key
industries with a large propensity to be state-owned are industries with a high share of fixed
assets, such as utilities, airlines, and energy companies. The variable is strongly correlated
with both LEVit and SOEi (see Table 3.8.3).
Table 3.4.2: Descriptive statistics
The table presents summary statistics of the dependent variable LEVit, state ownership SOEi and
the control variables used to estimate equation (3.2); Table 3.4.2 is based on 74,813 observations.
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
LEVit 0.07 0.16 0 0.99
TAXkt 0.30 0.06 0.1 0.40
ROAit 6.81 17.16 -100 99.94
ATANGit 0.30 0.29 0 1
log(TA)it 9.27 2.03 0 18.03
log(SALES)it 9.44 1.90 0 17.59
CORRFkt 74.50 14.80 33 97
INV ESTFkt 72.40 14.21 50 95
CREDITMkt 131.35 42.90 30.38 248.94
GDPGkt 1.61 2.72 -14.81 11.90
GDPPCkt 39,572 10,937 11,623 96,711
Graham and Leary (2011) further suggest to include a measure of firm size. Larger firms
have better access to credit. The government is also more likely to intervene if a firm is large.
This is because political reasons for ownership become more important with increasing firm
size. We use total assets (log(TA)it) as a proxy for firm size. We also produce results where
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we use the log of total sales as size proxy (log(SALES)it), but as we have many missing
values in the sales variable, we prefer log(TA)it. Using one or the other does not change our
findings.
At the country level, beside TAXkt, we include two indicators from the Heritage Foun-
dation, freedom from corruption (CORRFkt) and investment freedom (INV ESTFkt), as
well as a proxy for credit market depth (CREDITMkt), GDP growth (GDPGkt) and GDP
per capita (GDPPCkt). We take the latter three variables from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database.
3.4.1 Basic result
Based on a probit model and equation (3.1), we first estimate propensity scores for being
state-owned. In particular, we use firm size, firm leverage, sales growth, an investment proxy,
return on assets, a proxy for credit market size, GDP per capita, GDP growth and an indicator
of legal origin based on La Porta et al. (1998) as control variables. Our specification of the
propensity score is very similar to the specification used by Borisova et al. (2012), but we
additionally include polynomials of the explanatory variables and some additional regressors
such as a proxy for investment growth, ∆log(FA)it, where FA denotes the fixed assets of
affiliate i. However, some of the variables used by Borisova et al. (2012) are not available in
ORBIS. We finally include one-digit SIC-sector dummies. The results of the propensity score
estimation are presented in Table 3.8.4 in the chapter appendix.
We then try to find a comparable entirely privately owned affiliate (with SOEi = 0) for
each partially state-owned treated affiliate (with SOEi = 1) in the base year 2005. We do
this by using the procedure described above (nearest-neighbor-matching based on propensity
scores obtained from the probit estimates).33
Based on the pairs we then run outcome regressions as indicated in equation (3.2). It
is important to note that the estimates include pair fixed effects, which absorb unobserved
heterogeneity between the matched pairs but allow us to identify the impact of being partially
state-owned. All regressions additionally condition on country-specific effects (by including
33We match the pairs using the alternative calipers 0.5, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, as well as 10 and 1 percent
of the propensity score standard deviation. Thus, we apply even stricter caliper criteria than suggested
by Austin (2011). The results (of the outcome regressions) are very robust and do not change with
calipers. We take this as evidence of a good first step model and proceed with a caliper of 0.5 to
maximize our sample size.
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country dummies), industry-specific effects (by including one-digit SIC-sector dummies), as
well as time-varying affiliate and country controls. Table 3.4.3 provides the basic results.
These results are based on 1,481 observations and 92 treated units matched with 92 nearest
neighbor control units observed over time.
Table 3.4.3: Basic result
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on N = 1, 481 observations; the base year for
pair matching is 2005; the dependent variable is the long-term debt-to-asset ratio; *** significant at

























Given a tax rate of 20%, our model predicts a 13 percentage points higher debt ratio for
mixed-ownership firms. Note that the indicator SOEi controls for all remaining unobserved
effects within matched pairs. Thus, the effect of TAXkt is identified from changes in the
tax over time. For SOEi = 0, a 1-percentage-point increase in TAXkt is associated with an
almost 1 percentage point higher debt-to-asset ratio. This implies that the 13 percentage
points mixed-ownership effect from above has a tax equivalent of about 13 percentage points
(tax differential which has about the same impact). The tax effect is larger than the typical tax
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responsiveness found in the previous literature (see Feld et al., 2013, for a meta-study). The
additional interaction term TAXkt × SOEi suggests that one of the reasons for the finding of
a relatively moderate tax elasticity in previous literature may be related to the heterogeneity
in tax responses depending on ownership. The negative interaction term implies that the
effect of taxes when firms are partially state-owned is virtually zero. This finding appears
to contradict empirical studies using Chinese data referred to in Cui (2015a). These studies
find a positive relationship between state ownership and tax sensitivity. Instead, our results
support the argument that mixed-ownership firms use more debt irrespective of the tax rate
and thus the classical cost-benefit trade-off in capital structure choice becomes less relevant.
A large part of the following sections will examine how robust our finding of a reduced tax
sensitivity of partial SOEs is. What we can conclude from Table 3.4.3 is that there is a
differential impact of taxes on debt financing, depending on ownership. One explanation is
that private shareholders (in mixed relationships) make use of a maximum attainable debt
ratio, which they do not exceed, and no longer respond to marginal changes in taxes.
The effects of other controls are generally in line with what previous studies have found.
An increase in the tangible asset share leads to a rise in leverage because fixed assets make
better collateral, which firms can pledge against bank loans. The only country-level control
that is significant is corruption freedom. The negative relation supports the argument made by
Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010), who show that higher levels of corruption discourage the use
of equity financing. The other country controls and the firm size proxy are not significant.
This may well be due to the country and pair fixed effects included. In addition to the
sensitivity analysis presented in the next section, our basic estimates are very robust, and
we confirm the estimated effects at very similar significance levels when excluding financial




We first assess the robustness of our main result by providing estimates from exact (country
and sector) matching. Table 3.5.1 presents the findings for both models. Exact matching by
country yields a similar magnitude and significance level for the coefficient on SOEi (Column
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A) compared to the baseline result. This is not very surprising given that the basic estimates
condition on country effects in the outcome equation. Perhaps surprisingly, ATANGit is no
longer significant.
Table 3.5.1: Exact matching
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 1, 195, and NB = 1, 024 observations,
respectively; the base year for pair matching is 2005; sector matches are within three-digit SICs; ***
significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent
level.























Country effects No Yes
Sector effects Yes No
The right-hand side (Column B) of the table provides the results when utilizing exact
matching at the level of three-digit SIC-sectors. The effect of SOEi remains robust at the five
percent level but is now weaker in magnitude (0.2783 compared to 0.3351). The tax sensitivity
is confirmed to be substantially smaller for the SOEs, but its total effect remains positive.
ATANGit and CORRFkt are estimated with the same sign as in Table 3.4.3, though the
coefficients of both variables are smaller now. A potential problem we are facing is that the
number of matches becomes relatively small. The results in Column A are based on 78 pairs
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compared to the 92 from our main result. When matching within the three-digit SIC-sectors,
we only find 67 pairs due to the additional restriction of matching exactly on an affiliate’s
industry (note, though, that both regressions still use more than 1,000 observations). However,
we conclude from Table 3.5.1 that our benchmark results are not biased by possible spurious
correlations arising from comparisons across countries or sectors.
3.5.2 Extensive vs. intensive margin
From the descriptive statistics, it is unclear whether the extensive margin (i.e., the determi-
nants of zero vs. positive leverage) drives differential responses or the intensive margin (that
is, marginal changes in leverage conditional on non-zero debt). To look at this, we estimate
equation (3.2) for both margins separately. Table 3.5.2 presents the results.
Apart from ATANGit, which seems to be an important determinant of having positive
debt, none of the other variables has a significant impact on the extensive margin. Of course,
this does not mean that there are no cross-sectional differences in the use of debt at the
extensive margin. However, it appears that all of these differences are captured by the fixed
effects approach. The estimates at the intensive margin (right-hand side in Table 3.5.2) con-
firm all the findings from Table 3.4.3. Only the magnitudes of the effects, as well as the
statistical significance, increase compared to the basic findings. This suggests that most of
the differential variation in the data happens at the intensive margin.
Given that the OECD finds that SOEs in its member countries access debt almost exclu-
sively in the commercial marketplace (OECD, 2014a), we are not surprised to see descriptive
differences in the extensive margin disappear in the panel regressions. The large effects found
for the intensive margin point to lower borrowing costs (for the partially state-owned firms),
which is in line with an altered cost-benefit trade-off under mixed ownership.
3.5.3 Alternative outcome measures
The very low long-term leverage ratio in our data is a possible source of concern. To address
this issue, we estimate our model using two alternative specifications of the debt ratio. First,
we include all debt with a maturity of less than one year. The mean leverage is now 17 percent
for state-owned and 13 percent for privately owned firms. A total of 35 percent has no short-
or long-term debt at all. This zero share is still higher than in most studies, but fairly close to
Strebulaev and Yang (2013). Column A of Table 3.5.3 provides the results. While the impact
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Table 3.5.2: Extensive and intensive margin of debt financing
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 1, 481 and NB = 847 observations,
respectively; the base year for pair matching is 2005; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant
at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.























Country effects Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes
of TAXkt remains almost unchanged, the effect of SOEi on the outcome is weaker and less
robust, but still significant at the 10% level. The same holds for the interaction term TAXkt
× SOEi. We conclude that partial state ownership primarily facilitates access to long-term
debt rather than to short-term debt, a finding that could point to better relationships with
long-term lenders, such as state-owned development banks. Second, we define an alternative
dependent variable as the total non-current liabilities divided by total assets. The mean of this
variable is 0.27 for SOEi = 1, and 0.2 for SOEi = 0.
34 The share of zeros decreases to 9 and 17
percent, respectively. This is because the definition of debt is now broader. For example, the
34For data from five sectors in six countries, Vause (2009) reports an average value of this variable
of about 0.28.
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non-current liabilities include all deferred tax liabilities of more than twelve months. While
we believe that the debt definition from above is more appropriate, this alternative measure
has certainly the advantage that it includes any form of long-term financial obligations an
affiliate has. It is also plausible to argue that total non-current liabilities may be less likely
to suffer from reporting errors or missing values since they are a major balance sheet item.
Moreover, the alternative leverage ratio is a useful indicator in its own right because the
impact of taxation may depend on the level and timing of deferred taxes. For example,
a government may allow an SOE to defer tax payments into the long-term future out of
political considerations (despite EU competitive neutrality regulation). In doing so, it softens
a firm’s budget constraint (Schaffer, 1998) – which of course is in the interest of private co-
owners. If partial state ownership helps to defer tax payments more easily, the tax sensitivity
should further decrease.
Table 3.5.3 reports the estimates with total non-current liabilities divided by total as-
sets as the dependent variable (Column B). The effect of SOEi is stronger and statistically
more significant. While the impact of TAXkt is very similar compared to the magnitude in
our baseline model, the negative coefficient of the interaction term becomes larger. This is
consistent with the argument made above that deferring taxes becomes easier under state
ownership. The coefficient of ATANGit becomes smaller. This is plausible as well, as collat-
eral is essential when raising debt, but it does not influence other items now included in the
outcome variable. In contrast to our findings from above, the effects of ROAit, GDPGkt, and
log(TA)it are now estimated to be statistically significant.
3.5.4 Placebo treatments
In this Section, we present further robustness results showing that “placebo treatments” do
not affect our outcome variable. In particular, the aim is to assess whether the predictions
reported in earlier sections can clearly be attributed to treatment status. To obtain placebo
treatment effects, we first randomly select 178 observations as “treated” in our base year 2005.
The 178 observations correspond to the actual number of treated affiliates in the dataset. We
then run our pair-fixed effects regression from above and repeat the random assignment
procedure 1,000 times. Table 3.5.4 presents the averaged regression statistics, and Figure
3.8.1 in the chapter appendix depicts the empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDF)
of the three variables of interest. The vertical lines correspond to the benchmark results from
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Table 3.5.3: Alternative outcome measures
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 1, 481 and NB = 1, 264 observations,
respectively; the base year for pair matching is 2005; outcome in Column A is total short- and long-
term debt divided by total assets; outcome in Column B is total long-term liabilities divided by total
assets. *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the
10 percent level.























Country effects Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes
Table 3.4.3.
As can be seen in Table 3.5.4, the average from the 1,000 random treatments is very close
to zero, suggesting no treatment effect at all. The distribution of the pseudo-SOEi coefficients
in Figure 3.8.1 reveals that all estimates are below the estimate of 0.3351 from Table 3.4.3.
The 5 percent confidence intervals given in the right panel of Figure 3.8.1 show that only a
tiny number of random assignments produce a significantly positive coefficient. The average
of 1,000 placebo coefficients for TAXkt in Table 3.5.4 has, as expected, a positive sign, but
is not statistically significant. The empirical CDF of TAXkt coefficients in Figure 3.8.1 is
skewed towards positive values and indicates that firms respond to increases in TAXkt with
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Table 3.5.4: Placebo effects
The table presents the average of 1,000 pair-fixed effects regressions based on n = 178 randomly
assigned treatment observations; the base year for pair matching is 2005; the dependent variable is
the long-term debt-to-asset ratio; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent







TAXkt × SOEi 0.0071
(0.2457)
higher debt levels. To a lesser extent, this also holds for 5 percent confidence intervals in the
right panel. The averaged coefficient of the interaction term TAXkt × SOEi in Table 3.5.4
is not significant either. A closer look at the empirical CDF in Figure 3.8.1 reveals a fairly
even distribution around 0 for the coefficient, and a slightly positively skewed CDF for the
5 percent confidence intervals. Summing up, regressions with pseudo-SOEs do not produce
significant outcomes for the ownership indicator SOEi or the interaction term TAXkt ×
SOEi, but do imply a significant impact of TAXkt on LEVit as the conventional debt-tax
trade-off suggests. We conclude that the effects of SOEi and TAXkt × SOEi from our main
result indeed derive from state ownership.
3.5.5 Location of the mixed-ownership affiliate
An important issue in our context might be the location of affiliates. More specifically, the
differential impact of taxes on capital structure choice should be stronger if an affiliate op-
erates in the same country as the SOE. A tax planning MNE will try to minimize overall
tax payments independently of location but facilitated access to debt could depend on the
affiliate operating in the same country as the owning state. Besides, a government owner
cares more about tax payments within its jurisdiction than abroad. This may be even more
the case if taxes act as a “forcing-distributions” tool as argued by Cui (2015b).
Table 3.5.5 presents our estimates of equation (3.2) when only affiliates are considered
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Table 3.5.5: Local SOEs
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on N = 1, 416 observations; the base year for
pair matching is 2005; the dependent variable is the long-term debt-to-asset ratio; *** significant at

























that operate in the same jurisdiction as the SOE parent.35 All variables of interest show a
significant increase in magnitude and significance level. However, we confirm that mixed own-
ership significantly impacts leverage, irrespective of the tax rate. This evidence is consistent
with the arguments from above: The facilitated access induced by partial state ownership
should lead to a stronger effect of SOEi (the coefficient is now 0.4545). The tax rate does
not matter for mixed-ownership firms, as the cost-benefit trade-off becomes less relevant.
35In most but not all cases, the location of the SOE parent coincides with the location of the owning
government. A few firms in our sample have various owning governments (mostly France and Belgium)
or are firms registered in the OECD by non-OECD governments.
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3.6 SOEs and international tax planning
So far, our results have shown that partial state ownership helps MNEs to expand the tax
shields of mixed-ownership affiliates. Let us now address the question of whether partially
state-owned affiliates are important vehicles for debt shifting within tax-planning MNEs.
It seems that partial state involvement does not discourage firms from making use of
preferential tax regimes and tax planning. For example, the European Commission argues
that tax rulings granted by Luxembourg to Engie, a French energy giant in partial state
ownership (33%), amount to illegal state aid.36 According to news reports, Engie, as well as
other partially-state-owned MNEs such as Eni, Thales, or EDF, have established holdings in
the Netherlands to cut their tax bills.37 A prominent case from Germany is WestLB, a bank
that was split up in 2012 and is assumed to have dodged an estimated amount of 600 million
euros in taxes between 2006 and 2011.38
Previous literature has argued that MNEs often use internal debt to save taxes. This
strategy involves lending from firm entities located in tax haven (or low-tax) countries to
affiliates located in high-tax countries, where interest payments reduce taxable income. Buet-
tner and Wamser (2013) suggest that optimizing MNEs operate a tax haven affiliate and
all lending is provided from that location.39 The empirical implication is that the minimum
tax rate within the firm should negatively correlate with borrowing at other locations. This
is because a higher tax in the country in which the MNE operates a lending affiliate re-
duces the incentives to use internal debt at other locations as the tax savings from providing
debt across borders decrease. While, in our data, we cannot distinguish between internal
and external debt financing, we would expect that the debt ratio at i increases if the tax
at the location of the “lowest-tax affiliate” is cut. For this purpose, we define the variable
MINTAXft = min(TAXkt) ∀ i ∈ Nf , where Nf denotes the total number of affiliates that
belong to MNE f .
Table 3.6.1 presents the test of the profit shifting hypothesis. Column A adds only the
MINTAXft variable, whereas Column B also controls for a differential impact depending on
36“EU probes French gas firm’s Luxembourg tax dealings” (Maurice, 2016).
37“French companies set up in Netherlands to cut tax bill” (Reuters, 2013).
38“Dividend-Stripping Probe Targets WestLB” (Iwersen and Votsmeier, 2015).
39The theoretical argument has been introduced by Mintz and Smart (2004). See also Møen et al.
(2018).
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ownership. The results suggest the following: In Column A, the effect of MINTAXft alone
does not affect firm leverage significantly. However, once we take the differential impact of
MINTAXft × SOEi into account (Column B), the minimum tax rate is estimated with a
negative sign. As expected, MNE affiliates with SOEi = 0 adjust their capital structure if
the tax rate at the minimum affiliate increases. This does not hold for firms with SOEi = 1,
as the interaction between MINTAXft and TAXkt has a positive sign. While the overall
effect of MINTAXft is still negative, the effect of the minimum tax is less important. This
is indirect evidence that tax planning and tax avoidance using internal lending play a less
important role under mixed ownership.
The finding is consistent with the other results from above: Affiliates that are partially
state-owned exploit maximum debt levels under state guarantees. Beyond that, however, the
affiliates do not respond to tax incentives comparable to entirely privately held affiliates.40
3.7 Conclusion
We examine the impact of partial state ownership on the debt financing of MNE affiliates
with state participation. We find that the well-established impact of profit taxation on capital
structure does not hold for mixed-ownership firms, using balance sheet data of affiliates from
22 OECD and EU member countries. Thus, a general finding of our study is that the impact of
taxes on debt financing depends on ownership. The partially state-owned affiliates are found
to use substantially more debt, which is evidence that these firms operate under implicit
state guarantees. We argue that privately owned MNEs make use of facilitated access to
debt to maximize interest tax shields in such affiliates. The effect of being partially state-
owned is identified by first finding comparable control units of privately held affiliates. The
requirements for being accepted as a comparable control unit are relatively strict, as matched
pairs (of partially state-owned and private affiliates) must operate in the same country and
the same sector. Moreover, our estimation approach accounts for time and pair-fixed effects,
as well as a number of time-varying control variables, which are standard in the literature
analyzing debt ratios.
We confirm our central finding in many robustness tests, including checks where we ran-
domly assign treatment status. We additionally provide evidence that partial state ownership
40We should note that the results presented in Table 3.6.1 are sensitive to the caliper choice in the
matching procedure. In particular, the estimates are more robust when smaller calipers are chosen.
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Table 3.6.1: Minimum tax affiliates
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 935 and NB = 935 observations,
respectively; the base year for pair matching is 2005; Column A does not differentiate the effect of
a change in the minimum tax rate of the group with respect to ownership; Column B controls for
a differential impact. *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *
significant at the 10 percent level.

























MINTAXft × SOEi 0.6524*
(0.3675)
Country effects Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes
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does not relate to other tax planning strategies involving debt financing for reasons of in-
ternational tax planning. The main finding of our study is that partially state-owned firms
neglect the cost of debt and employ a maximum attainable debt ratio. This suggests that
government participation may enable MNEs to reduce tax payments, which may ultimately
lead to a loss of revenue for the public owner.
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3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.8.1 Additional sensitivity analyses
3.8.1.1 Additional controls
We additionally include two controls, which have been used in the literature as determinants
of leverage (see Graham and Leary, 2011, for a survey).41 In Table 3.8.1 we include the invest-
ment proxy ∆log(FA)it already used in the propensity score estimation. Investment levels of
a firm can affect the leverage level through several channels. First, credit may have been used
to finance investment. Hence, a higher investment level should coincide with higher leverage.
Second, many credit contracts restrict investments of a firm through financial covenants. Low
investment levels could thus be an indicator for an already highly leveraged firm. Roberts and
Sufi (2009) present evidence that one-fourth of U.S. public companies violate such covenants
at some point. The ensuing technical default allows lenders to decrease the size of a credit
facility or even terminate the contract early, with adverse consequences on firm leverage. But
also if no technical default is present, i.e., a covenant has not been breached, lenders may be
more cautious in disbursing revolving credit facilities if a firm has very high investment levels
due to increased cash flow risk. Column A of Table 3.8.1 presents estimates with investment
as an additional control. The results are very similar in magnitude and significance to our
basic results for all variables. Hence, our results do not support the idea that investment
levels affect affiliate leverage.
Another control is a firm’s growth opportunities, denoted by GROPskt, which can be an
indicator of future profits and should positively affect leverage (Harris and Raviv, 1991). We
use the Huizinga et al. (2008) definition as the annual growth rate median of affiliate sales
in an affiliate’s country and industry. However, the inclusion of growth opportunities does
not significantly alter our results. We also conduct robustness checks for inflation, the cost
of enforcing formal contracts and financial freedom (not separately reported). None of these
additional controls alters the findings in any significant way, but the number of observations
becomes substantially smaller because of missing values in these controls.
41Note that we prefer the more parsimonious specifications from above to have as many observations
as possible.
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Table 3.8.1: Investment and growth opportunities
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 1, 481 and NB = 847 observations,
respectively; the base year for pair matching is 2005; sector matches are within three-digit SICs; ***
significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent
level.



























Country effects Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes
3.8.1.2 Variations in the propensity score estimation
The specification of our propensity score model is very similar to the one in Borisova et al.
(2012). Although we believe this specification is very plausible on economic grounds, we re-
estimate our model with different propensity scores. As a first step, we include asset tangibility
ATANGit as an additional predictor of treatment status and then re-estimate our outcome
equation (3.2). Column A of Table 3.8.2 presents the results. The inclusion of asset tangibility
increases the magnitude of coefficients and robustness of all variables of interest. The impact
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Table 3.8.2: Variations in propensity score estimation
The table presents pair-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 1, 481 and NB = 847 observations,
respectively; the base year for pair matching is 2005; sector matches are within three-digit SICs; ***
significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent
level.























Country effects Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes
of the treatment variable SOEi is now 0.41. An increase in the tax rate TAXkt of one
percentage point, ceteris paribus, increases leverage by 1.18 percentage points, an increase
in magnitude of roughly 20 percent. Similarly, the effect of the interaction term TAXkt ×
SOEi has increased to the same extent, suggesting that the tax rate does not influence the
capital structure of partially state-owned MNEs at all. Firm profitability, asset tangibility,
and corruption freedom are significant and remain in line with prior estimation results.
We finally use a specification to estimate equation (3.1) without the sales growth control
∆log(SALES)it. Unfortunately, the ORBIS dataset suffers from many missing values in
the total sales variable which we use to compute ∆log(SALES)it. Hence, by excluding the
variable at both estimation stages, we can base our model on NB = 1, 798 observations, an
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increase of about 21 percent. Column B of Table 3.8.2 presents the estimates without sales
growth in the first stage. The results look very similar to our baseline estimates.
3.8.2 Additional figures and tables
Table 3.8.3: Correlation matrix
The table presents correlations of the dependent variable LEVit, state ownership SOEi and the control














































































TAXkt 0.05 0.05 1.00
ROAit -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
ATANGit 0.36 0.14 -0.03 -0.13 1.00
log(TA)it 0.10 0.11 0.15 -0.00 0.30 1.00
log(SALES)it -0.05 0.04 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.79 1.00
CORRFkt 0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
INV ESTFkt 0.10 0.03 -0.20 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.38 1.00
CREDITMkt 0.09 0.03 0.50 -0.06 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.43 0.13 1.00
GDPGkt -0.02 -0.00 -0.16 0.08 -0.00 -0.09 -0.06 -0.14 0.01 -0.40 1.00
GDPPCkt -0.02 -0.00 0.32 0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 0.78 0.10 0.26 -0.06 1.00
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Figure 3.8.1: Distribution of placebo estimates
Figure 3.8.1 depicts empirical cumulative distribution functions for 1,000 coefficient estimates of our
variables of interest; treatment was assigned to 178 randomly selected cross-sectional units in each
iteration; the first row contains the coefficient estimates and 5 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for
SOEi; the second and third row follow analogously for TAXkt and TAXkt × SOEi; vertical lines
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Table 3.8.4: Propensity score estimation
The table presents the propensity score estimation of (3.1) based on N = 5, 827 observations in
t = 2005; the dependent variable is the propensity score to be partially state-owned; the CI is the 5
percent confidence interval; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level;



















































Legal origin: French 4.8292*
(2.7608)
Legal origin: German 3.8950
(2.8984)



















3.8.3 Variable definitions and data
Table 3.8.5: Variable definitions
Firm level (Source: Orbis)
LEVit Long-term debt / total assets of firm i in year t.
SOEi Binary indicator of partial state ownership.
TAXkt × SOEi Interaction term of SOEi and TAXkt.
ROAit Return on assets of firm i in year t.
ATANGit Asset tangibility: fixed assets / total assets of firm i in year t.
log(TA)it Log(total assets) of firm i in year t.
∆log(FA)it Investment proxy: log(fixed assets)it − log(fixed assets)i,t−1.
∆log(SALES)it Sales growth: log(turnover)it − log(turnover)i,t−1.
Country level
TAXkt Statutory tax rate of country k in year t.
CORRFkt Corruption freedom in country k and year t (Source: Heritage
Foundation).
INV ESTFkt Investment freedom in country k and year t (Source: Heritage
Foundation).
CREDITMkt Domestic credit provided by banking sector in country k and year
t as percentage of GDP (Source: Worldbank).
GDPGkt Annual GDP growth in percent in country k and year t (Source:
Worldbank).
GDPPCkt GDP per capita in country k and year t, PPP at constant 2011
international USD (Source: Worldbank).
Legal origin Legal origin dummy variables of country k based on La Porta et
al. (1998).
Sector level
Sector dummies Sector dummies are based on 1-digit SIC identifiers.
GROPskt Growth opportunities are defined as in Huizinga et al. (2008):
The growth rate median of affiliate sales in an affiliate’s industry
s, country k and year t.
• BvD definition of SOE:
– Minimum percentage that must characterize the path from a subject company up
to its ultimate owner: 25.01 percent. Hence, a company is considered an SOE if
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the government has at least 25 percent direct or indirect control. The path from
an SOE to an affiliate is at least 10 percent.
• BvD definition of affiliate:
– MNE affiliates: Affiliates located in a specific region not ultimately owned but
owned by at least 1 percent; may have other shareholders in the foreign country.
Extracted for all world regions.
• Only unconsolidated balance sheet information is used (BvD conscode “U1”).
• LEVit ∈ [0; 1[. We assume that a fully leveraged firm should be a reporting error since
every incorporation form we know requires some equity. The result does not depend
on this restriction.
• Only observations with no missing values in LEVit from 2004-2013 are considered.
• Shared SOE-MNE affiliates with a sum of SOE-MNE ownership exceeding 100 percent
are dropped as reporting errors.
• Joint affiliates of two SOEs are excluded because we want to focus on joint SOE-MNE
affiliates.
• Only wholly-owned MNE subsidiaries are allowed as controls. This ensures that we can
unambiguously verify ownership structures.
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4 Is commercial state ownership tax neutral?
4.1 Introduction
The EU has led an intense policy and legislative debate on tax planning of MNEs and state aid
to such firms.42 The debate originated from an assessment and corresponding action plan on
tax base erosion and profit shifting by the OECD (2013a,b). Governments potentially actively
encouraged tax planning strategies by offering attractive conditions in their jurisdictions.43 A
significantly lower tax burden for one firm constitutes a competitive advantage relative to its
peers. Therefore, state aid is a key concern to ensure the functioning of the EU’s single market
and prohibited by its legislation.44 The European debate has neglected so far whether EU
member states’ extensive ownership of commercially active SOEs is tax neutral. This paper
analyzes whether ETRs of commercially active SOEs differ from those of comparable private
firms. It contributes to the existing literature by comprehensively assessing ownership tax
neutrality within the EU.
Governments have granted special tax treatment to some private companies in return for
investment and employment. Hence, they may grant tax advantages to their own commercially
active SOEs out of similar considerations. Such behavior would lead to lower ETRs of SOEs
and undermine competition in the single market at the expense of private firms. There are
also theoretical arguments why ETRs of SOEs could be higher: First, EU governments receive
substantial budgetary contributions from their commercial SOEs (European Commission,
2016). Under agency conflicts, taxes can force distributions from dividend-averse managers
(Cui, 2015b). Second, SOE managers may face lower incentives to minimize tax payments than
their private-firm counterparts. This is because the owning state is the ultimate beneficiary
of both taxes and dividends. Third, public scrutiny on SOE taxation may be higher and tax
planning less acceptable in the public eye (Dyreng et al., 2016).
42Specific events substantially shaped this debate. For example, a set of internal advance tax rulings
of Luxembourgian authorities was leaked to the public in November 2014, revealing how multinational
firms have engaged in aggressive tax planning strategies by shifting profits into the grand duchy. A
second example is the tax-related record fine imposed on Apple by the European Commission in
September 2016.
43Throughout this study, I use the term “tax planning” to describe all efforts of a company to
reduce its effective tax rate. Hence, I do not distinguish between legal and illegal activities.
44Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), Article 107.
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It is – to some extent – a political decision which firm is state-owned and which firm
is not. Hence, ownership is not random but depends on a set of variables, which are partly
tricky to observe. Consistent evaluation of whether state ownership affects company ETRs
needs to consider non-random ownership in its estimation procedure. Thus, this study fol-
lows a selection-on-observables approach and estimates a propensity score of state ownership
similar to Borisova et al. (2012). The propensity score identifies a set of similar private firms
by nearest neighbor matching, which serves as a control group to construct group-fixed ef-
fects. In a subsequent step, I estimate group-fixed-effects regressions that control for a state
ownership dummy, a vector of time-varying firm characteristics as well as time and sector
effects. Controlling for the group-fixed effect eliminates any unobserved time-constant factors
between groups. Matching SOEs and private firms within a country ensures that this fixed
effect absorbs relevant unobserved country factors such as tax policy attitudes or tax law
enforcement quality (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Such factors can either be exploited by pri-
vate firms or used to support SOEs (Nicodeme, 2001). This estimation approach consistently
identifies the impact of state ownership on effective company taxation in the beta coefficient
of the state ownership dummy variable.
This study uses a mostly balanced panel from 2009 to 2015 which forms part of Bureau van
Dijk’s Orbis database. Orbis contains detailed financial and ownership data from annual single
and consolidated company financial statements. An advantage of Orbis is that it includes
non-listed firms and takes ownership information from official sources. This substantially
increases the sample size compared to studies focusing on manual ownership research and
listed firms only. The America-focused tax literature identifies a critical issue of financial
statement tax data: Managers have an incentive to present high profit levels to investors and
low profit levels to tax authorities (book-tax trade-off). Thus, differences could arise between
the profit and tax items in a firm’s financial statement (aimed at investors) and the same
firm’s tax statement (targeted at authorities). The tax statement contains the actual taxes
paid, the financial statement not necessarily. The book-tax trade-off is mostly relevant at
the consolidated level – which is where the US levies corporate taxes. Differences arise in
particular because of reporting incentives and the consolidation process itself. Hanlon (2003)
and Mcgill and Outslay (2004) point out the limitations of financial statement data when
looking at tax-related issues in the US. These concerns are less relevant in this study: EU
member states levy taxes at the single-entity level, which leads to a higher degree of book-tax
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conformity (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Watrin et al., 2014). The EU obliges every multi-
entity company to present separate financial reports for all its single entities (subsidiaries).
My sample consists of unconsolidated single-entity firm-years from EU countries. Deferred
taxes cause a large share of book-tax differences, an issue I address in Section 4.5 by reporting
outcomes for long-run ETRs similar to Dyreng et al. (2008). Hence, the overall inference of
this study is relatively free from book-tax bias.
Empirical results strongly suggest that SOEs in the EU pay higher ETRs than private
firms. The primary model predicts a robust markup of 1.6 percentage points using the pre-tax
profit ETR as the dependent variable. The magnitude of the effect depends to some extent
on the profit measure I use to compute ETRs, which is why this study employs three different
ones through all model specifications. At the same time, estimated ETR elasticities to statu-
tory tax rates are persistently inelastic for both ownership groups – suggesting that private
firms and SOEs respond to an increase in statutory tax rates with more tax planning. This
finding is consistent with empirically established tax planning strategies such as increased
debt usage under higher tax rates (see Feld et al. (2013) for a meta-study) and anecdotal
evidence suggesting that SOEs engage in tax planning just as private firms do.45 Several
explanations for this central finding seem plausible: First, owning governments may force dis-
tributions via tax payments (Cui, 2015a), which leads to higher ETRs of SOEs. This appears
particularly credible considering the budgetary contributions of commercial SOEs. Second,
tax payments of SOEs may be under closer public scrutiny than private-firm taxation, which
has the same effect (Dyreng et al., 2016). Third, SOE managers could pursue a quiet life and
refrain from active tax planning, especially at lower statutory rates, i.e., when the opportunity
cost in forgone pet projects is low. Descriptive statistics suggest that the ETR markup for
SOEs may not be equally strong in all countries. This is not surprising because EU member
states have different intensities and regulatory backgrounds of state ownership. The main
result of this study is robust to (i) exact matching within country and two-digit NACE2
sector, (ii) variations in the number of matched private cross-sectional units, (iii) changes in
model and propensity score specifications, (iv) long-term ETRs as dependent variables, (v)
alternative econometric approaches, (vi) the use of consolidated instead of unconsolidated
financial data, and (vii) placebo falsification tests.
45A well-known case is “sale and leaseback” deals of municipal enterprises, which primarily aim at
reducing tax payments.
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The contribution of this study is twofold: First, to the best of my knowledge, it is the
first to undertake a comprehensive empirical analysis of effective firm-level taxation and state
ownership in Europe. In this, it adds effective taxation to an established set of differences
between private and state-owned firms. Second, it contributes to the policy discussion on tax
planning by showing that effective taxation within the EU’s single market is not ownership
neutral. Hence, it indicates that private firms may be more successful in reducing their tax
liabilities than SOEs, which could adversely affect competitive neutrality.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 deals with the ETR measures
employed in empirical models, develops testable hypotheses and reviews the relevant litera-
ture on taxation and state ownership. Section 4.3 develops the empirical methodology and
describes its implementation using the Orbis data set. Section 4.4 looks at descriptive statis-
tics and contains the main estimates. Section 4.5 contains sensitivity analysis. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Definitions: Effective taxation and state ownership
4.2.1 Effective taxation
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide a comprehensive overview of ETR-based indicators
used in prior taxation research. This study applies three different specifications of the most
common one: The average backward-looking ETR.46 All three are computed using balance






where TAXit is firm i’s aggregated tax liability in year t and PTPit is its pre-tax profit in the
same period.47 The ETRPTPit is a standard measure in the literature and suggested as such
46In this study, the abbreviation “ETR” always refers to the average backward-looking ETR. In
addition to simple ETRs, I estimate all models using a second indicator type proposed by Hanlon
and Heitzman (2010), namely ETR-tax rate differentials. Results point to similar conclusions and are
available upon request.
47In Orbis, I divide the item #taxa (taxation) by #plbt (profit/loss before tax) in equation (4.1),
#oppl (operating profit) in equation (4.2), and #ebta (EBITDA) in equation (4.3), respectively.
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in IAS 12.86.48 A recent study that uses this indicator with a similar data set is Watrin and
Thomsen (2016). It is also widely used in actual corporate decision making (Graham et al.,
2017). The ETRPTPit is calculated using a company’s pre-tax profit, i.e., after subtracting all
operating and financial expenses of the firm’s ordinary business activity in the given year.
An advantage of this specification is that the profit measure should be relatively close to
actual taxable income. The literature is, however, not entirely conclusive on which profit
measure to use. Nicodeme (2001), for instance, suggests using a firm’s operating profit in the
denominator because its calculation does not differ much across countries. Hence, as a second





where TAXit are again firm i’s total tax expenses in year t and OPPit its operating profit of






With EBIit as the denominator, results are less dependent on national accounting practices
and depreciation policies of individual firms (Vause, 2009). There is no single best ETR
definition, as each has advantages and drawbacks. It is also important to understand that
ETRs based on alternative profit measures capture different things: For example, variations
between SOEs and private firms in the ETREBIit should not originate from deviating depreci-
ation policies, whereas differences in ETRPTPit could arise because of depreciation-based tax
planning. Therefore, this study always reports regression results using ETRs (4.1) to (4.3) to
avoid relying on a single ETR definition.
A strength of all indicators is that they stem from actual firm data. A shared weakness
arises from reliance on accounting tax data, which can differ from actual taxes paid. Compa-
nies usually keep at least two sets of books – one for accounting purposes and one for taxation.
In the former, they target investors and attempt to present the company in an informative
48More specifically, TAXit should consist of current tax expenses minus deferred tax liabilities.
Unfortunately, Orbis only provides an aggregate total tax variable which does not allow to identify
a firm’s deferred tax liabilities separately. All ETRs in this study rely on the total tax variable from
Orbis.
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way. In the latter, they target tax authorities and attempt to minimize tax exposure. For this
reason, numerous studies focusing on US data show that inferences from accounting data on
tax-related topics do not always yield reliable results (Graham, 1996; Hanlon, 2003; Mcgill
and Outslay, 2004; Dyreng et al., 2008). The fact that a considerable amount of studies have
nevertheless attempted to do so stems from the non-disclosure of companies’ tax statements.49
Book-tax differences vary greatly between countries. In Europe, they are significantly lower,
especially in single (individual) accounts (Mcgill and Outslay, 2004; Burgstahler et al., 2006;
Goncharov and Werner, 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). The EU obliges every entity by
law to publish these accounts, which constitute the basis to assess taxable income (Watrin
et al., 2014). For this reason, I use single financial statements of European firms in all models
except for the consolidated model presented in Section 4.5. I conclude that the present study
is less susceptible to biased inference than many previous studies using American data.
In addition to book-tax differences, a few other caveats remain: First, a company can
reduce tax payments by reporting lower accounting earnings and lower taxable income. This
“conforming” tax planning would not show up in the accounting information and cannot
be captured by any indicator based on accounting figures (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).
The same holds for permanent tax rebates, which would not show up in accounting tax
data (Buijink et al., 2002). There is a strong reason to believe that permanent tax rebates
to commercially active SOEs (or other firms) are mostly absent in the EU because they
would fall foul on the EU’s state aid legislation.50 In contrast, the ETR measures in this
study capture non-conforming tax planning strategies such as temporary rebates, transfer
pricing or amortization techniques. Second, national accounting frameworks could affect re-
sults. Within the EU, regulation has harmonized accounting rules to a significant extent.51
Cross-country differences in accounting practices persist. According to Collins and Shack-
elford (1995), critical areas of such differences are the treatment of depreciation, goodwill
amortization, pension expense and expenses for research and development. Another possi-
49Of these, a first group of studies focuses on determinants of companies’ ETRs (Zimmerman,
1983; Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997) and a second group on cross-country
comparisons (Collins and Shackelford, 1995; Buijink et al., 2002).
50TFEU, article 107. The introductory examples show that governments have wooed large MNEs
with precisely such rebates. However, they may rather be the exception than the rule.
51The Fourth and Seventh Company Law Directives harmonized accounting rules to a significant
extent and were implemented into national law in the 1980s and 1990s. They oblige publicly traded
and private companies to prepare audited financial statements following the directives.
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ble source that has gained importance in recent years is the treatment of intangible assets.
Differences in the legal framework should be captured to a large extent by the group-fixed
effect, which controls for unobserved heterogeneity of SOEs and comparable private firms
within a specific country. Firm-level accounting variations within a group are precisely the
driving force that could make a private firm’s tax strategy more effective than an SOE’s. The
last caveat is that company taxation is of a dynamic nature. Comparisons using yearly data
alone may be misleading (Dyreng et al., 2008). To address this issue, I report results using
long-term ETRs in Section 4.5.
4.2.2 State ownership in the EU and hypothesis development
The extent of state ownership in the EU varies from country to country. For example, the
United Kingdom has completely privatized its energy and much of its transport sector,
whereas SOEs are important players in the same industries in both France and Belgium.
In most countries, state ownership is widespread: A recent report by the European Commis-
sion (2016) shows that in 13 of the block’s 28 member countries the market value of central
SOEs exceeds ten percent of GDP, among them France and Italy. The employment share of
SOEs relative to the total workforce ranges between two and six percent in the majority of
countries but goes up to ten percent in France. Budgetary contributions of SOEs are non-
negligible: Finland, for instance, received an average of 1.5 percent of GDP from 2005 to 2014
from its SOEs. Numerous other countries like Sweden, Estonia, Slovakia, and the Netherlands
also received distributions in this period exceeding one percent of GDP. These are substantial
numbers: In 2016, total government revenue from value-added tax ranged between 3 and 13
percent of GDP in EU member states. High budgetary contributions suggest that many SOEs
in EU countries are of commercial nature.
Few studies have looked at the effect of ownership structure on ETRs. A study by Chen
et al. (2010) uses S&P 1500 effective book and cash tax rates to analyze whether family-owned
firms are more or less tax-aggressive than non-family-owned firms. Their results indicate a
lower aggressiveness of family-owned firms.
State ownership could alter company ETRs towards both lower and higher levels. From
a regulatory perspective, commercial firm activity should be subject to the same legal frame-
work across all EU member states irrespective of ownership structure. The purpose of this is
that EU member states remain autonomous in their asset ownership decisions while ensuring
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that private companies or companies from other member states are not discriminated against.
The competitive neutrality agenda of the EU leads to the benchmark Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1 Competitive neutrality in the EU single market extends to effective taxation,
and there is no significant difference between SOE and private-firm ETRs.
The EU single market is, however, still imperfect in many aspects. In theory, the Euro-
pean Commission ensures competitive neutrality and should prevent member states deviating
from it. In practice, the Commission delegates a large share of monitoring and implementa-
tion of EU competition law to national competition authorities. As a result, oversight and
enforcement of EU competition law vary greatly between countries – a key concern of current
EU legislative activity.52 Besides, it would be premature to derive the existence of large state
sectors from the non-commercial Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015) argument of market failure
alone.53 Instead, state ownership appears to have a clear political dimension (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998).54 For example, about 21 percent of SOEs in Italy offer goods or
services without any public service obligation (European Commission, 2016). At least 3,000
Italian SOEs have less than six employees, and in about half of them, there are more directors
than workers. If the state controls both the tax authority and the company, conflicts of inter-
est can arise. On the one hand, a government must commit to competitive neutrality in the
EU’s single market and prevent preferential treatment of any commercially active cooperation
– independently of ownership. On the other hand, favorable taxation may be preferred over
job losses or private market entry. Moreover, some SOEs have become internationally active,
and their success could be a question of national pride. As governments are willing to give
privately owned firms special tax treatment for political considerations, they could do the
same for their commercially active SOEs. Hence, the political view of state ownership offers
an explanation of why governments could be more lenient with their firms, which would lead
to lower ETRs of SOEs. This leads to Hypothesis 2:
52COM (2017) 142: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to
empower the competition authorities of the member states to be more effective enforcers and to
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.
53In this “social” theory of state ownership, the government steps in when private companies would
not provide an efficient level of products or services. An example to illustrate this argument is postal
services to remote areas, which private companies would not provide because it would incur them a
loss.
54The political view of state ownership argues that SOEs are vehicles of politicians’ private interests
such as extracting rents and pursuing employment or investment policies.
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Hypothesis 2 Commercial SOEs pay lower ETRs than comparable private firms because
governments subsidize their firms out of political considerations.
A number of empirical studies using non-European data find effects in this direction (Derashid
and Zhang, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2006; Cui, 2015a).
Other empirical findings associated with state ownership offer predictions why ETRs of
SOEs could be higher. SOEs have been found to suffer from worse corporate governance, lower
profitability, softer budget constraints, and lower labor intensities (Dewenter and Malatesta,
2001; Chen et al., 2011; Borisova et al., 2012; OECD, 2014a; Chen et al., 2017). A possible
explanation for the overall worse performance is low-powered incentives of the SOE manage-
ment, i.e., a situation where returns from a transaction cannot be collected directly by the
transacting party (Williamson, 1985; Tirole, 1994; Banerjee, 1997). SOE managers do not
own shares in wholly owned SOEs and cannot be rewarded with share options because this
would amount to privatization. Hence, SOE managers may benefit from increased firm profit
to a lesser extent than private firm managers. Aggressive tax planning is costly, requires ef-
fort and poses a potential employment risk in case of discovery, which could lead managers
to prefer a “quiet life” (Hicks, 1935; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Given the fact that
executives matter for levels of tax planning (Dyreng et al., 2010), the presence of low-powered
incentives of SOE managers compared to private firm managers could explain lower levels of
tax planning and higher ETRs of SOEs. A second argument derives from weak monitoring of
SOEs’ corporate activities (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2012).55
This could aggravate agency conflicts associated with free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) and lead
to empire building and pet projects. Taxation is then a useful tool to force distributions
from dividend-averse SOE managers (Cui, 2015a). The tax agency is already dealing with
tax-optimizing private firms, and taxation of SOEs does not require any additional skills (in
contrast to evaluating corporate activities). In case of discovery, the general public would
undoubtedly disapprove of SOE tax planning, a fact that managers may take into account
(Dyreng et al., 2016). This argument seems especially important when considering the sub-
stantial budgetary contributions of commercial SOEs. Taken together, these arguments give
rise to Hypothesis 3:
55Weaker SOE monitoring could also be the result of low-powered incentives in responsible ministries
or government agencies because they act as fiduciaries for the general public and not as owners (Frant,
1996).
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Hypothesis 3 Commercial SOEs pay higher ETRs than comparable private firms because
governments force budgetary contributions via tax payments and private firms engage in more
tax planning.
A study that finds higher ETRs for SOEs than for private firms in Chinese data is the one
by Wu et al. (2013). Note that Hypotheses 1 to 3 complement each other. The procedure
described in Section 4.3 provides a test for their validity.
4.2.3 Identification of ownership in Orbis and sample methodology
The study’s sample period ranges from 2009 to 2015 and includes companies with non-
missing unconsolidated financial statements in at least two of the seven years.56 I identify
unconsolidated financial statements with the indicators U1 and U2 from Orbis. U1 refers to
firms for which only unconsolidated data is available and U2 to firms with both types. A
single-entity company is state-owned if the Orbis variable #ownership type takes the form
“Public authority, state, government”. A group subsidiary is state-owned if the ownership
path from the group company to the subsidiary is 100 percent and Orbis classifies the group
as an SOE. If a company fulfills one of these criteria, the indicator variable is SOEi = 1.
A private firm may carry any other ownership label and takes on the indicator variable
SOEi = 0. To ensure a firm is truly private, I keep only observations with a single owning
entity that does not fall into the SOE categories above.
For many firm-years, I do not observe any ownership information, which reduces the
sample size significantly.57 I partially mitigate this by imputing up to two consecutive years
of missing ownership data if the same owner controls an observation before and after the
information gap with equal share. This study focuses on state ownership in general and does
not differentiate between different owning institutions. If a single entity firm has several direct
state owners – say a ministry, a state-owned bank, and a municipality – they are summed
up to a total state share. I drop an observation if its total percentage remains below 100
percent, i.e., any private owning entity remains. It is important to note that the sample
56The average cross-sectional unit has more than five firm-years, which gives the panel a largely
balanced structure.
57Missing values originate most likely from data collection and should not correlate with state
ownership or any of the control variables because state holdings are public. Therefore, I assume the
absence of sample selection based on ownership type.
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includes only SOEs operating in the same country as the owning state. Thus, taxes and firm
profit ultimately benefit the same state.58 This could alter ETRs in both directions: On the
one hand, it ensures that political arguments for state ownership such as local employment
are relevant. On the other hand, it could increase management incentives to live a quiet life
without tax planning. I do not impose such an owner-location restriction on private firms in
the sample.
The dataset only includes firms operating in the EU because European state aid legislation
prohibits any structural taxation difference between commercially active SOEs and private
firms. I assume SOEs are of commercial nature for several reasons: First, they exist as separate
legal corporations. All German sample SOEs are either registered as GmbH (limited liability
company) or AG (joint stock company), indicating that they do not form part of the general
government and remain outside its boundary. Similarly, Italian firms are registered either
as S.R.L. (limited liability) or S.P.A. (joint stock company). The same holds for SOEs in
other countries, which are either limited liability companies or stock companies. Second, I
consider only firms with positive ETRs. This ensures that sample SOEs are taxable entities
and therefore of commercial nature. Third, I exclude firms that could be exempt from taxes
because they provide non-profit services in the health or social sectors.59 I identify these firms
by their NACE2-categories O: Public administration, defense, compulsory social security,
P: Education, and Q: Human health and social work activities. Furthermore, I exclude all
financial firms (NACE2 category K: Financial and insurance activities) as state-owned banks
have a special regulatory status in some member states. If a sample SOE has a partial public
service obligation, this does not necessarily affect the taxation variable because, in OECD
countries, compensation for such activities mostly consists of direct transfers (OECD, 2014a).
Summing up, sample SOEs should be commercially active companies and receive the same
tax treatment as private firms.
The focus on EU data is useful from an accounting perspective as sufficient cross-country
differences remain while holding underlying accounting standards constant (Burgstahler et al.,
2006). Consolidated financial statements using IFRS are obligatory for companies in all EU
58In some member states, like Germany or Italy, several levels of government collect corporate taxes.
Taxes and profit may, therefore, benefit different levels of government.
59For instance, §52, Section 2 no. 3 and 4 of the Abgabenordnung in combination with §5 Section
1 no. 9 of the Körperschaftssteuergesetz exempts institutions of a purely non-profit character from
income taxation in Germany.
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countries. For single financial statements, national legislation differs across member states.
Orbis contains both IFRS and local GAAP single financial statements with the large majority
being local GAAP. All firms in my estimation sample use local GAAP to ensure that the
same legal accounting framework applies to each company in country-specific sub-samples.60
Figure 4.2.1: Average pre-tax profit ETR by country
Figure 4.2.1 plots the ETRPTPit from equation (4.1) for both ownership groups in six
EU member states.61 The dotted curve represents the corresponding corporate statutory tax
rates TAXRkt. The highest statutory tax rate – at around 35 percent – applies in France
(FR), followed by Germany (DE) and Italy (IT) at around 30 percent.62 A general trend is
60Appendix Table 4.7.1 presents estimates for the SOEi variable including IFRS-firms.
61Figure 4.2.1 contains the countries with the highest sample number of SOEs. Appendix Figure
4.7.1 plots equivalent curves for Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), Croatia
(HR), and Slovenia (SI).
62Statutory tax rates are only a crude proxy of individual company taxation because in many
countries different levels of government levy taxes. For instance, around half of corporate income tax
expenditure in Germany depends on the municipality. As a consequence, TAXRkt necessarily is an
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that ETRs for both SOEs and private firms are either constant or declining during the sample
period. In the Czech Republic (CZ) and Sweden (SE), the decline coincides with a reduction
in statutory rates. In France, the statutory tax rate briefly increased in 2012 and decreased
again in 2014. This coincides with a substantial decrease in ETRs starting from the statutory
rate increase. Germany, Italy, and Poland (PL) did not change their corporate tax rates in
the sample period. The ETRPTPit of SOEs is continuously higher than the one of private firms
in France, Italy, and Poland. In the Czech Republic and Germany, the two curves intersect,
whereas in Sweden the opposite is the case: SOEs have constantly lower average ETRPTPit
than private firms. This pattern also holds for a number of countries plotted in Appendix
Figure 4.7.1. Figures 4.2.1 and 4.7.1 suggest that ETR differences depend on the country,
which is most probably a consequence of different attitudes towards state ownership and
taxation across member states.
Two additional observations can be made in Figure 4.2.1: The first refers to base erosion
and profit shifting. A country with strong tax base erosion should have a constant statutory
rate and a downward-sloping ETR curve. It is important to recall that the ETR measures in
this study are based on financial statement profit and firms face little incentive to under-report
these measures (in contrast to tax statement income). Only France has such a pattern for both
private firms and SOEs and, interestingly, also has the highest corporate tax rate. In Germany
and Poland, the trend is downward-sloping only for SOEs, but not for private firms. Hence,
Figure 4.2.1 does not support claims of wide-spread tax base erosion, at least at tax rates
levied by the majority of member states. This finding is consistent with observations made
in US data by Dyreng et al. (2017). The second observation is that in the Czech Republic,
Italy an Poland, ETR curves are higher than statutory rates. Usually, ETRs are lower than
statutory tax rates (Vause, 2009; OECD, 2013b). The Orbis variable TAXit, which I use
to compute the dependent ETR variables from equations (4.1) to (4.3), represents a firm’s
total taxes, i.e., it may include other levies such as non-substantial regional taxes.63 A second
explanation is deferred taxes, which could raise the ETRPTPit of both ownership groups in
these countries more than in other countries. It is important to recall that this study focuses
average levy for the individual firm and may not include all taxes a firm has to pay.
63In Italy, corporate income tax is based on two pillars, the national imposta sul reddito sulle società
or IRES, and a regional tax, the imposta regionale sulle attività produttive or IRAP. Both apply to
financial statement profit and are thus reflected in the ETR variable, whereas the statutory tax rate
refers only to the IRES because it accounts for the lion’s share of corporate tax (PWC, 2016).
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on within-country differences between two ownership groups, and the group-fixed effect should
absorb any time-constant unobserved effects at the country level. Hence, results should not
depend on whether the average ETRPTPit is above or below the corresponding statutory rate.
4.3 Empirical methodology
The main goal of this study is to compare ETRs of SOEs with those of similar private firms in
the EU. Hence, the primary effect of interest is the coefficient of the state ownership dummy
SOEi in regressions of the dependent ETR variables from equations (4.1) to (4.3).
In a first step, I identify groups of companies, where each group consists of one company
that is state-owned (SOEi = 1) and m companies which are not (SOEi = 0 ∀ m). The
m companies should be similar to the SOE to ensure that the group-fixed effect absorbs
reasonable cross-sectional differences between groups. Each company i has a propensity to be
state-owned that depends on a vector of i-specific determinants Xi0 and country k-specific
determinants Zk0. Additionally, the propensity depends on the industry ψs, which leads to
the specification of the linear probability model index
SOEit0 = β1Xi0t0 + β2Zk0t0 + ψs + εikt0 , (4.4)
to predict the propensity p̂SOEit0 that company i is state-owned, employing a probit model.
The time index t0 in equation (4.4) indicates that I use only data from the initial year of the
sample.64 Estimating equation (4.4) produces two vectors of probabilistic state ownership:
One for SOEs, p̂1, and one for private companies, p̂0.
In a second step, I identify the m nearest neighbors for each SOE. Let c1i denote the
respective private firm j which is closest to the SOE i. The best match is determined by
c1i = min{j}
(|p̂i − p̂1j | < ρ) ∀ j 6= i. The caliper ρ represents the maximum difference in





i follows analogously. Matches are within country throughout this study to
ensure comparability of companies within groups. I also match within two-digit NACE2
sectors, which does not alter results significantly. Matching takes place without replacement,
64The initial year is 2010. The year 2009 drops out because of first differencing in control variables.
65The standard caliper ρ = 0.1 ∗ SDprobit is even stricter than the ρ = 0.2 ∗ SDprobit that Austin
(2011) suggests. As a robustness check, I also present results using the calipers 0.2 ∗ SDprobit and
0.01 ∗ SDprobit in Appendix Table 4.7.1.
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which causes a trade-off: On the one hand, a larger m increases the amount of information
in the control group and makes economically good comparisons more likely. On the other
hand, there may not be sufficient good matches for all SOEs, which leads to the exclusion of
some of them. I mitigate this trade-off by presenting model estimates with varying numbers
of matched control units.66 Matching produces groups of companies {SOEi = 1;SOE1i =
0 . . . , SOEmi = 0} where, within each group, one observation is state-owned and m private
firms are not.
After identifying c1i . . . c
m
i for each SOE, I proceed and estimate
Yit = α1SOEi +α2Xit +α3Zkt + φt + c
gm
i + ψs + εiskt, (4.5)
where Yit denotes the ETR dependent variables from equations (4.1) to (4.3) of company
i in year t (t = 2010, ..., 2015). The dummy SOEi is the main variable of interest, Xit
indicates a set of firm-level controls, Zkt a set of country-level variables, and φt, c
gm
i and ψs
denote time, group and sector-specific effects. Note that the index gm in cgmi indicates the
number of best matches used to define the group-fixed effect. Conditioning on cgmi removes
all time-constant cross-sectional differences between company groups. Hence, I can identify
the differential impact of being state-owned by time-averaging over all treatment and control
units within each group.
4.4 Descriptive statistics and basic results
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
The final sample consists of 159,398 firm-years, of which 7,612 are SOEs and 151,786 private
companies. I observe each company in at least two of the six years of the sample period. The
average number of firm-years per company is five, which gives the sample a largely balanced
structure. Table 4.4.1 contains summary statistics and Appendix Table 4.7.2 correlations for
the dependent variables and controls I use to estimate the propensity score of state ownership
(4.4) and the outcome equation (4.5).
The specification of the state ownership probit model (4.4) follows Borisova et al. (2012).
On the firm level, I include log(SALES)it as a proxy for firm size, the return on total assets
66The main model is based on m = 3 control units. Appendix Table 4.7.1 presents results for the
variable of interest SOEi when matching takes place with m = 1, m = 2 and m = 5 private firms.
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Table 4.4.1: Descriptive statistics





state ownership SOEi, and the control variables used to estimate models (4.4) and (4.5); statistics
are based on 159,398 observations.
Variable Firm-years State-owned Private
SOEi 159,398 7,612 151,786
Dependent Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
ETRPTPit 0.31 0.18 0.00 0.92
ETROPPit 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.84
ETREBIit 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.68
Control Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
log(TA)it 8.63 1.64 2.71 18.11
log(SALES)it 8.78 1.70 0.69 17.24
ROAit 10.10 10.31 0.01 99.78
LEVit 0.14 0.20 0.00 1.00
ATANGit 0.25 0.27 0.00 1.00
log(DEPR)it 4.79 1.96 0.00 14.84
∆log(FA)it 0.01 0.51 -7.88 8.79
∆log(SALES)it 0.03 0.35 -7.27 9.73
GROPskt -0.01 0.10 -2.69 3.15
TAXRkt 0.27 0.06 0.10 0.36
CREDITMkt 141.32 35.38 37.51 234.02
GDPGkt 0.89 1.81 -3.78 7.58
GDPPCkt 35,576.02 6,101.70 15,261.58 46,388.29
ROAit as a proxy for profitability, the leverage ratio LEVit, sales growth ∆log(SALES)it and
the change in fixed assets ∆log(FA)it as investment proxy.
67 On the country level, controls are
GDP growth GDPGkt, GDP per capita GDPPCkt, an indicator of a country’s credit market
size CREDITMkt, and dummy variables representing the La Porta et al. (1998) legal origin. I
add a set of sectoral dummies to control for different intensities of state ownership in different
sectors. For example, 22 percent of SOEs operate in the NACE2 category D: Electricity, gas,
steam and air conditioning supply whereas only 0.77 percent of private firms do. A final
control in the probit model is the respective dependent ETR variable from the outcome
equation (4.5). The probit model also contains all non-binary variables as squared and cubic
terms. Appendix Table 4.7.3 contains the probit results for all three ETR specifications.
I winsorize the three dependent variables of outcome equation (4.5), ETRPTPit , ETR
OPP
it ,
and ETREBIit at the top and bottom one percent to make results less dependent on outliers.
67Table 4.7.4 contains definitions and sources of all variables.
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The first, ETRPTPit , has a mean of 0.31, which is 13 percentage points higher than the mean
of the EBITDA-based ETREBIit . This is because a firm’s EBITDA still contains amortization
and interest, and is thus higher than pre-tax profit. ETROPPit has a mean of 0.26 because
operating profit lies between the other measures in a firm’s profit cascade. Correlations in
Appendix Table 4.7.2 follow accordingly: ETRPTPit and ETR
OPP
it correlate stronger (0.73)
than ETRPTPit and ETR
EBI
it (0.54). All three ETR specifications correlate weakly negatively
with the binary state ownership indicator SOEi. The average ETR
PTP
it in the sample is
higher than the average statutory tax rate TAXRkt. Most likely this is because the sample
contains a large share of companies operating in high-tax countries such as Germany and
Italy.
The choice of covariates for the outcome equation (4.5) follows previous studies by Gupta
and Newberry (1997) and Derashid and Zhang (2003). On the firm level, I include the ROAit
as a proxy for profitability. The sample’s average ROAit is ten percent. Its correlation with
SOEi is -0.09, which suggests that SOEs are less profitable. The second firm-level control
is a company’s leverage LEVit because interest payments are tax-deductible in all sample
countries and thus affect effective taxation. Next is asset tangibility ATANGit – a proxy for
capital intensity and thus for the nature of a business. Its correlation with state ownership is
0.25, which is possibly due to the fixed-asset-intensive sectors in which SOEs operate. I use
log(SALES)it as a firm size proxy. On the one hand, a bigger firm can be subject to greater
scrutiny from the tax administration, on the other hand, it can spend more on tax planning
strategies. Whether firm size positively or negatively affects effective taxation is therefore not
entirely clear, and several studies do not find the indicator to be a significant predictor at
all (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997). Here, log(SALES)it and the
alternative size proxy log(TA)it correlate negatively with the dependent variables. The last
firm-level variable is depreciation log(DEPR)it. Depreciation is tax deductible and therefore
reduces the outcome variables. Correlations from Appendix Table 4.7.2 point in this direction.
On the sectoral level, I include the growth opportunities indicator GROPskt as in Huizinga
et al. (2008). A key advantage of my data is its extension to non-listed firms, which has the
side effect of impeding the use of market-to-book ratios that other studies employ. The last
covariate is the country-level statutory tax rate. In my sample, corporate tax rates range
from ten percent in Bulgaria to 36.1 percent in France. High corporate tax rates may not
only increase the dependent variables but also encourage tax planning. In addition to these
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controls, I use sectoral dummies, time dummies, and the group-fixed effects, which should
absorb any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity on the country and group level.
Table 4.4.2: Country data
The table presents country-level summary statistics of the dependent variables ETRPTPit .
State-Owned Private
Country n N Mean Median n N Mean Median
Austria 50 217 0.25 0.25 574 2,552 0.22 0.25
Belgium 7 34 0.27 0.29 390 1,685 0.31 0.32
Bulgaria 3 12 0.09 0.10 411 1,555 0.14 0.13
Czech Republic 202 858 0.21 0.19 3,459 14,851 0.21 0.19
Germany 451 1,983 0.28 0.28 2,916 11,761 0.26 0.28
Estonia 8 35 0.16 0.16 78 322 0.12 0.07
Finland 56 236 0.16 0.15 669 2,920 0.20 0.21
France 118 469 0.30 0.30 8,412 36,966 0.27 0.28
Croatia 28 121 0.25 0.22 973 4,557 0.24 0.21
Hungary 5 25 0.06 0.06 126 578 0.13 0.11
Italy 351 1,399 0.52 0.49 11,849 50,685 0.45 0.41
Latvia 6 26 0.21 0.17 62 236 0.19 0.16
Poland 170 753 0.26 0.22 414 1,851 0.22 0.20
Romania 4 18 0.26 0.21 169 715 0.21 0.17
Sweden 337 1,366 0.20 0.19 4,032 17,592 0.21 0.21
Slovakia 2 6 0.20 0.19 243 1,066 0.26 0.23
Slovenia 13 54 0.19 0.20 380 1,816 0.18 0.17
Total 1,811 7,612 0.25 0.20 35,180 151,786 0.31 0.29
Table 4.4.2 shows the country-specific distribution of SOEs and private firms and also con-
tains country-wise descriptive statistics of the dependent variable ETRPTPit . The distribution
of companies across ownership groups and country is not representative. For example, we
observe only 118 cross-sectional SOE units in France, compared to 351 in Italy, even though
SOEs are no less dominant in the French economy. It is nevertheless plausible to assume
that country sample shares are free of selection bias as the dataset only contains information
that each firm is legally obliged to publish. Moreover, cross-country variation is fully taken
into account by exact country matching. Table 4.4.2 indicates that SOEs have a higher mean
ETRPTPit than private firms in 10 of the 17 countries. In six countries, the opposite is the
case, and in the Czech Republic, there is no apparent mean difference. This suggests that tax
neutrality of ownership depends on the EU member state. In a majority of 10 countries, the
mean and median ETRPTPit of SOEs are close, that is, they do not differ by more than 0.01.
In this case, the density above and below the mean ETR value is similar. ETR distributions
of private companies have a larger density for lower ETR levels in 10 countries (mean >
median). This could point to a higher degree of tax-planning by private firms.
71
4.4.2 Basic result
The main specification of model (4.5) uses three nearest neighbors per SOE to construct the
group-fixed effect. Table 4.4.3 presents the conditional results. It contains coefficient estimates
for the variable of interest, SOEi, and all time-varying controls. In addition to group effects,
the model also contains sector and time effects, which I do not report separately. The estimates
predict a higher dependent variable for SOEs irrespective of its specification. The effect of
SOEi on ETR
PTP
it (Column A) is 0.0160, which translates into a 1.6 percentage point higher
ETR for SOEs. The impact of SOEi on ETR
OPP
it is 0.0173 (Column B), and thus – at 1.73
percentage points – slightly stronger in magnitude. The coefficient of SOEi using ETR
EBI
it as
the dependent variable is only 0.0073 and the weakest (Column C). The effect is statistically
significant at the one percent level in Columns A and B, and at the five percent level in
Column C.
State ownership has a bigger impact on ETRPTPit and ETR
OPP
it compared to ETR
EBI
it ,
which suggests that amortization plays an important role in tax planning. To see why, recall
that ETRPTPit is calculated using pre-tax profit, i.e., after depreciation and interest. Previous
literature has related both balance sheet items with tax planning strategies (among many
others, see Collins and Shackelford (1995) and Huizinga et al. (2008)). ETREBIit derives from
EBITDA, i.e., profit before interest and depreciation, and leaves less room for tax planning.
Consequently, deviating coefficient intensities may point to different depreciation policies
between SOEs and private firms.
This main result clearly rejects Hypotheses 1 and 2. Neither do commercial SOEs have
similar ETRs on the EU level nor do they benefit from noticeable tax subsidies (which
would lower ETRs). Instead, it supports Hypothesis 3. I calculate elasticities of ETRPTPit by
ownership groups for different levels of the statutory tax rate TAXRkt to further examine
differences between the two ownership groups.68 Elasticities are almost identical and persis-
tently inelastic for both ownership groups – which could suggest that private firms and SOEs
respond to an increase in statutory tax rates with more tax planning. A further indication
in this direction is that elasticities are not significant at the 25 percent TAXRkt quantile
(a tax rate of 22 percent and elasticities of 0.79 for SOEs and 0.80 for private firms), but
highly significant at the 75 percent quantile (a tax rate of 30.18 percent and an elasticity
68The statutory tax rate TAXRkt only affects the ETR
PTP
it significantly, which is why I restrict
elasticity analysis to Column A.
72
Table 4.4.3: Basic result
The table presents group-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 12, 868, NB = 13, 156, and NC =
15, 505 observations, respectively; group-fixed effects are based on 3 nearest neighbors in 2010; matches
are within country; standard errors are clustered at the firm level; *** significant at the 1 percent
level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.







SOEi 0.0160*** 0.0173*** 0.0073**
(0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0030)
LEVit 0.0167 -0.1479*** -0.0706***
(0.0112) (0.0097) (0.0064)
log(SALES)it -0.0082*** -0.0078*** 0.0181***
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0016)
ATANGit -0.0196* -0.0669*** -0.0401***
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0071)
log(DEPR)it -0.0038* 0.0007 -0.0272***
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0014)
ROAit -0.0028*** -0.0002 0.0022***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
GROPskt -0.0237* 0.0326** 0.0124
(0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0093)
TAXRkt 0.8351*** 0.1055 0.1262
(0.1495) (0.1335) (0.0935)
Group effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
of 0.79 for both ownership types). These findings are consistent with empirically established
tax planning strategies such as increased debt usage under higher tax rates (see Feld et al.
(2013) for a meta-study) and anecdotal evidence suggesting that SOEs engage in tax plan-
ning just as private firms do. The main conditional result does not unequivocally support the
theory of SOE managers engaging in a quiet life without tax planning (because elasticities
are almost identical). Instead, it supports the argument of governments forcing distributions
via tax payments (Cui, 2015a) and of closer public scrutiny for SOE taxation (Dyreng et al.,
2016). Especially the first seems relevant, given the substantial budgetary contributions some
EU governments receive from their commercially active SOEs (European Commission, 2016).
Nevertheless, it would be premature to discard the quiet life hypothesis based on this result
alone.
The remaining control variables have the predicted effects. A higher debt share LEVit
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significantly reduces ETR-specifications with pre-interest profit measures (Columns B and C)
and is not significant in Column A. The firm size proxy log(SALES)it has an adverse effect
in Columns A and B and a positive effect in Column C. Nevertheless, results do suggest that
larger firms pay lower ETRs. Asset tangibility ATANGit and depreciation log(DEPR)it have
a negative impact in all specifications except for the insignificant log(DEPR)it coefficient in
Column B. Both variables measure capital intensity, which previous studies associated with
lower ETRs (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Derashid and Zhang,
2003).
The rest of this study will mainly deal with the question of how robust this main finding
is. In addition to the analysis presented in Section 4.5, I conduct a broad set of checks. First,
I use ETR-tax rate differences as dependent variables. Second, I match within sectors, use
one, two, and five nearest neighbors, and change the propensity calipers. Third, I modify the
probit model (4.4). Fourth, I include additional controls in the estimation of the outcome
equation (4.5) and fifth; I vary the design of the dataset. The benchmark result is robust to
all modifications. For more details on these tests, I refer to Appendix Section 4.7.1.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
4.5.1 Long-term ETR measures
As companies pay taxes regularly, tax planning may not materialize in yearly tax data due to
its dynamic nature (Dyreng et al., 2008). Additionally, business cycles can affect yearly tax
rates and lead to incorrect coefficient interpretations for longer time periods. Dyreng et al.
(2008) propose a “long-run cash effective tax rate” to cope with these issues. Unfortunately,
Orbis does not allow to explicitly isolate cash taxes in the specific year from deferred or other
taxes. Hence, I cannot reproduce their long-run measure directly. Nevertheless, I compute a






The long-term operating profit and EBITDA specifications, LTETROPPi and LTETR
EBI
i ,
follow analogously. I impose an additional restriction on the sample by only computing long-
run ETRs for firms with at least six years of non-missing data. This ensures that results
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capture long-term effective firm taxation but eliminates some countries from the sample.
Table 4.5.1 contains country-level mean values for the long-run LTETRPTPi .
Table 4.5.1: Long-term descriptives
The table presents summary statistics and tests for differences in means of the dependent variable
LTETRPTPi by country; the table only contains countries with at least 50 SOE firm-years; ***
significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent
level.
Country N Mean SOEi = 1 Mean SOEi = 0 Difference T-statistic
Austria 4,722 0.23 0.23 0.0155 1.38
Czech Republic 12,515 0.20 0.20 -0.0054*** -3.37
Germany 19,940 0.27 0.27 0.0045 1.81
Finland 2,601 0.15 0.20 -0.0500*** -8.02
France 31,001 0.30 0.28 0.0151*** 4.81
Croatia 4,649 0.23 0.21 0.0096*** 2.38
Italy 40,006 0.46 0.40 0.0568*** 15.18
Latvia 4,595 0.20 0.16 0.0402*** 7.66
Poland 3,186 0.24 0.21 0.0308*** 11.43
Sweden 16,376 0.18 0.19 -0.0162*** -7.74
Slovenia 1,802 0.19 0.18 0.0187** 2.83
Long-term rates of both ownership groups relate similarly to short-term ETRs (Table
4.4.2): A trend is that long-term mean values for both SOEs and private firms are lower
than annual means. For SOEs, this is the case in ten of eleven countries. For private firms,
this holds for eight countries. The last two columns of Table 4.5.1 contain the country-wise
differences in long-term ETR means between SOEs and private firms and the t-statistic of
a two-sided test. In six countries, the difference is statistically significant and positive, two
have positive but insignificant differences, and in three it is significantly negative. Hence,
country-level evidence points to somewhat higher long-term ETRs of SOEs, even though this
is not the case in all countries.
Next, I estimate the model with pooled OLS by collapsing the panel control variables
into time averages. The model also includes sector and country effects, the latter of which
captures all country variables such as the statutory tax rate TAXRkt.
The estimates are weaker compared to the yearly primary result from Table 4.4.3. The
SOEi coefficient indicates an increase of 1.11 percent for the LTETR
PTP
i (Column A). The
effect on the LTETROPPit is positive but not significant (Column B). The impact on the
LTETREBIit is 0.44 percent and significant at the ten percent level (Column C). Summing
up, Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 show that the yearly results also hold for long-term dependent
variables, even though results are less robust than the benchmark.
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Table 4.5.2: Long-run ETRs
The table presents pooled OLS regressions based on NA = 19, 772, NB = 21, 441, and NC = 23, 947
observations, respectively; the dependent variables are defined as indicated in equation (4.6); super-
script m indicates that controls are time-averaged; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant
at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.







SOEi 0.0111*** 0.0016 0.0044*
(0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0023)
LEV mi -0.0012*** 0.0003*** 0.0022***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
log(SALES)mi 0.0117*** -0.1497*** -0.0972***
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0026)
ATANGmi -0.0114*** -0.0326*** -0.0403***
(0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0026)
log(DEPR)mi 0.0021*** 0.0008 0.0206***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005)
ROAmi -0.0276 0.0170 0.0220
(0.0197) (0.0177) (0.0136)
GROPmsk -0.0016** 0.0026*** -0.0220***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
4.5.2 Pooled OLS
In this Section, I re-estimate the main model using pooled ordinary least squares (POLS)
as an alternative estimation strategy. This ignores the panel structure of the data but of-
fers the advantage of a much bigger sample size. A substantial share of firm-years contains
missing values already in controls of the state ownership specification from equation (4.4).
The matching procedure further reduces the sample size in case insufficient matches exist
for all SOEs. Whereas the basic estimates from Table 4.4.3 use between 12,000 and 16,000
firm-years, POLS allows to draw on 170,000 to 200,000 firm-years. Table 4.5.3 presents the
results. All POLS estimates contain country, sector, and time-fixed effects, which I do not
report separately.
Estimates of the state ownership coefficient are stronger in magnitude in Columns A-
C of Table 4.5.3 than in Table 4.4.3. If a company is state-owned, the model predicts an
increase of 2.55 percentage points for the ETRPTPit , a rise of 1.29 percentage points for the
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Table 4.5.3: Pooled OLS
The table presents pooled OLS regressions based on NA = 172, 574, NB = 180, 698, and NC = 194, 501
observations, respectively; standard errors are clustered at the firm level; *** significant at the 1
percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.







SOEi 0.0255*** 0.0129*** 0.0089***
(0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0021)
LEVit 0.0241*** -0.1495*** -0.0854***
(0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0019)
log(SALES)it 0.0008 0.0007 0.0221***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
ATANGit -0.0122*** -0.0418*** -0.0387***
(0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0021)
log(DEPR)it -0.0019*** 0.0020*** -0.0241***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
ROAit -0.0026*** -0.0004*** 0.0018***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
GROPskt -0.0135*** -0.0017 -0.0040
(0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0026)
TAXRkt 0.3908*** 0.2614*** 0.2094***
(0.0351) (0.0314) (0.0220)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
ETROPPit , and an increase of 0.89 percentage points for the ETR
EBI
it . All SOEi coefficients
are significant at the one percent level. The stronger magnitude of effects could be due to
the lack of group-fixed effects, which absorb cross-sectional variation in the primary results.
Most control variables are similar to the benchmark results.
Elasticities of the TAXRkt variable are persistently inelastic and do not differ significantly
across ownership groups. This supports the arguments from above of closer public scrutiny
for SOEs and governments forcing distributions via tax payments. I conclude that the general
results are robust to a different estimation technique applied to a very big sample.
4.5.3 Consolidated data
The next robustness test uses consolidated financial statements to estimate equation (4.5).
The analysis allows to a certain extent to control for conforming tax planning strategies,
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which affect both the numerator and the denominator of the ETR (Watrin and Thomsen,
2016). This is because the TAXit and respective profit variables capture the behavior of the
group as a whole. However, it is important to remember that EU member states levy taxes
usually on single accounts.
I identify consolidated financial statement in Orbis with the consolidation codes C1 and
C2. C1 refers to firms for which only consolidated data is available and C2 to firms with
consolidated and unconsolidated data. I use both types and apply the same data management
and estimation procedure as above.69 The sample sizes are much smaller compared to the
benchmark estimate from Table 4.4.3 but are still above 1,000 firm-years for all specifications.
Table 4.5.4 presents the results.
The general pattern from the basic results does not change. The coefficients of SOEi
have a positive and significant impact on all specifications of the dependent variable. Ceteris
paribus, SOEi increases the ETR
PTP
it by 3.16 percentage points, the ETR
OPP
it by 3.12 per-
centage points and the ETREBIit by 2.01 percentage points. These magnitudes are stronger
compared to the benchmark result from Table 4.4.3.
One possible interpretation of this finding is that private firms use the consolidation
process to reduce their tax liabilities, whereas SOEs do so to a lesser extent. Alternatively,
there may be subsidiaries or affiliates in low-tax third countries, which the unconsolidated
dataset does not contain. Such affiliates would reduce a group’s overall ETR. I conclude that
the basic result extends to consolidated financial statements of companies registered in EU
countries.
4.5.4 Falsification tests
In this Section, I use a falsification test to assess if the predicted effect of state ownership
could be random, i.e., a statistical coincidence without causal relation. In doing so, I follow
other studies that have used similar falsification tests (De Simone, 2016; Goldbach et al.,
2017). In a first step, I randomly assign state ownership SOEi = 1 to the same number of
69A few minor differences exist: First, I use IFRS and local GAAP firms. IFRS is the mandatory
reporting language for consolidated financial statements in the EU. Nevertheless, some firms chose
voluntarily to publish accounts in local GAAP. Orbis sometimes only contains these accounts. Second,
I use a probit specification of model (4.4) without the sales growth variable ∆log(SALES)it due to
the lack of convergence otherwise. Third, I use a caliper of 0.2 ∗ SDprobit instead of 0.1 ∗ SDprobit.
Results are robust for both calipers, but the sample size decreases significantly for the 0.1 caliper.
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Table 4.5.4: Consolidated financial statements
The table presents group-fixed effects regressions based on NA = 1, 393, NB = 1, 349, and NC = 1, 605
observations, respectively; group-fixed effects are based on 3 nearest neighbors in 2010; matches are
within country; standard errors are clustered at the firm level; *** significant at the 1 percent level;
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.







SOEi 0.0316** 0.0312*** 0.0201**
(0.0137) (0.0115) (0.0079)
LEVit 0.0531 -0.1565*** -0.0516***
(0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0184)
log(SALES)it -0.0034 0.0075 0.0240***
(0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0047)
ATANGit -0.0662* -0.0531* -0.0469**
(0.0398) (0.0288) (0.0185)
log(DEPR)it 0.0003 -0.0039 -0.0201***
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0041)
ROAit -0.0038*** -0.0017* 0.0010*
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0006)
GROPskt -0.0460 0.0478 -0.0141
(0.0386) (0.0381) (0.0271)
TAXRkt 0.6304* -0.1425 -0.2383
(0.3442) (0.2522) (0.1732)
Group effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
cross-sectional private firms as there are SOEs in the sample.70 Then, I repeat the estimation
procedure from Section 4.3 using the “pseudo” SOEs 1000 times.
Figures 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 contain empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of
the state ownership coefficients and the respective five percent confidence intervals (CIs) for




it . The left panel of both figures
contains the coefficient CDFs, the right panel the five percent CIs. The vertical lines represent
the benchmark results from Table 4.4.3.
In Figure 4.5.1, I assign pseudo-SOE status across countries. Coefficient estimates locate
evenly around zero – 50 percent of repetitions suggest a positive, and 50 percent a negative
impact of pseudo-ownership on all three ETR definitions. The benchmark coefficients from
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Figure 4.5.2: Within-country pseudo-SOE assignment
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Table 4.4.3 are much stronger in magnitude than all estimates with random ownership assign-
ment, suggesting that the effect is not statistical noise. The same holds for the five percent
CIs (right panel of Figure 4.5.1): The original estimates produce a much stronger effect than
any randomized estimate.
In Figure 4.5.2, I assign random state ownership to the same number of cross-sectional
units within countries as there are SOEs in the sample, which leaves the country weights
from the basic results in Table 4.4.3 unchanged. The additional constraint has no effect on
the empirical CDFs for both the ETRPTPit and the ETR
OPP
it . In all cases, coefficients are close
to zero, and with equal probability above or below zero. For the third dependent variable,
ETREBIit , one pseudo-estimate exists which predicts a stronger statistically robust effect.
Recall that the ETREBIit derives from EBITDA, and thus before the major tax-planning items
depreciation and interest of the profit cascade. Therefore, the fact that random estimates are
closer to the benchmark for the ETREBIit suggests that differences in other definitions of the
dependent variable relate to these items. I conclude that the effect of state ownership on the
dependent variables depends on true ownership and is not a product of statistical noise.
4.6 Conclusion
This study examines the tax neutrality of commercial state ownership in the EU. Results
suggest that SOEs in Europe pay, on average, higher effective tax rates than comparable
privately owned firms. I attribute this finding mainly to the budgetary importance of com-
mercial state ownership, which makes governments force distributions from their profitable
companies via tax payments. A complementing explanation is higher levels of tax-planning
in private firms.
The study uses financial statement data from 17 EU member countries and employs
selection-on-observables propensity score matching to identify a suitable control group for
each SOE. The control group consists of firms within a relatively strict caliper that also
operate in the same country as the SOE. This approach controls for non-random selection
into state ownership. In the outcome regressions, I additionally control for a vector of time-
varying firm characteristics that have been used in previous studies as well as time and sector
effects.
I conduct an extensive set of robustness tests. In particular, I analyze if the central find-
ing extends to variations in model specification and parametrization, consolidated financial
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statement data, long-term specifications of the effective tax rate, and different estimation
techniques. I also verify if results are a mere statistical coincidence by conducting an exten-
sive falsification test with pseudo-ownership assignment.
A central policy implication of my main finding is that tax neutrality in the EU’s single
market remains imperfect towards wide-spread state ownership, and the extent and direction
of imperfection depends on the member state. Therefore, regulators should pay closer atten-
tion to tax neutrality topics that may not grab the headlines like tax planning of MNEs does
but could distort competitive neutrality to a significant extent.
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.7.1 Additional sensitivity analyses
The benchmark result in Table 4.4.3 is robust to a large set of additional checks. Table 4.7.1
reports the coefficient estimates of these tests for the variable of interest, SOEi. Each row
represents a variation from the primary result, which the first column specifies in more detail.
I divide additional sensitivity analyses into five subgroups, namely variations in the dependent
variable specification, changes in the matching procedure, modifications in the probit model
(4.4) and the outcome equation (4.5), and modifications in the dataset.
The first line in Table 4.7.1 defines the dependent variable as the difference between
the respective ETR and a country’s statutory tax rate. The SOEi variable then measures
differences between SOEs and private firms in the ability to undercut statutory taxes. A
positive coefficient of the ownership variables indicates a lower ability to undercut statutory
rates. Results unambiguously show that this is the case for SOEs.
The next six lines refer to variations in the matching procedure. The first modification
presents results when group-fixed effects capture time-constant sector characteristics (instead
of the benchmark country characteristics). The reasoning behind this test is the fact that
sectoral characteristics may have a significant impact on taxes and ownership structure. Thus,
a sector group-fixed effect targets the business activity of firms more precisely. Coefficients
remain robust but are less significant. The next three rows contain estimates for five, two and
one nearest neighbors (instead of three). All SOEi coefficients remain significant at the one
percent level. The single exception is the coefficient for one nearest neighbor and the ETROPPit
as the dependent variable, which is significant at the five percent level. Furthermore, I vary
the caliper, which is the maximum distance a private firm can have in the linear probit index
from a treated firm to qualify as a group-fixed effect control. For a looser caliper of 0.2 times
the probit standard deviation, estimates increase in magnitude and remain significant. A very
strict caliper of 0.01 times the probit standard deviation yields a positive effect only for the
ETRPTPit . Note that a caliper of 0.01 times the probit standard deviation is much stricter
than the 0.2 factor proposed by Austin (2011). Hence, the matching procedure discards a
relatively large share of useful information.
The next test refers to a variation in the probit model (4.4). I exclude the dependent
variable to align the specification more with Borisova et al. (2012). Results are stronger in
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Table 4.7.1: Additional sensitivity tests
The table presents coefficient estimates for the variable of interest SOEi; each row represents a mod-
ification from the benchmark result in Table 4.4.3; results of covariates are not reported but available
upon request; standard errors are clustered at the firm level; *** significant at the 1 percent level; **
significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.








ETR - tax rate difference 0.0153*** 0.0184*** 0.0094***
(0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0030)
Matching procedure
2-digit NACE2 matching 0.0121* 0.0117** 0.0083**
(0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0034)
5 Nearest neighbors 0.0176*** 0.0169*** 0.0084***
(0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0030)
2 Nearest neighbors 0.0154*** 0.0119*** 0.0079***
(0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0029)
1 Nearest neighbor 0.0156*** 0.0088** 0.0101***
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0030)
Caliper 0.2*probit-SD 0.0214*** 0.0205*** 0.0100***
(0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0030)
Caliper 0.01*probit-SD 0.0144*** 0.0065 0.0038
(0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0033)
Variations in Model (4.4)
Probit ex ETRit 0.0306*** 0.0225*** 0.0060**
(0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0029)
Variations in Model (4.5)
Depreciation/sales 0.0160*** 0.0167*** 0.0018
(0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0031)
Intangible Assets 0.0158*** 0.0180*** 0.0082***
(0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0031)
Log(Total Assets) 0.0158*** 0.0161*** 0.0080***
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0031)
Dataset specification
Incl. financial firms 0.0200*** 0.0171*** 0.0113***
(0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0029)
Incl. IFRS 0.0116*** 0.0178*** 0.0096***
(0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0029)
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magnitude and remain significant.
The next block deals with modifications of the outcome regression (4.5). First, I scale
depreciation in a given year by a firm’s sales and use this indicator instead of log(DEPR)it.
The reasoning is that the indicator now controls for relative depreciation in contrast to
absolute depreciation. Except for the coefficient of ETREBIit (Column C), the impact remains
unchanged. Second, I include a proxy for intangible assets as an additional control. In doing
so, I address another balance sheet item that previous literature associates with tax planning
(Collins and Shackelford, 1995). Coefficient estimates of SOEi do not change significantly.
Third, I use log(TA)it instead of log(SALES)it as a size proxy. This increases the sample
slightly and mitigates concerns that results depend on the choice of the size proxy. Results
show that this is not the case.
The final set of variations deals with data management. First, I include financial firms
(NACE2 category K: Financial and insurance activities) to verify if results depend on their
exclusion. This is not the case. Second, I include all IFRS firms in the sample. The sample now
extends to Spanish firms but is not necessarily homogenous concerning accounting techniques
in other countries. The effect of SOEi is robust to this modification.
Summing up, I conclude that the primary results do neither depend on the definition of
the dependent variable, the matching procedure, the specification of the probit or outcome
equations, nor on the design of the dataset.
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4.7.2 Additional figures and tables
Figure 4.7.1: Average pre-tax profit ETR by country
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Table 4.7.2: Correlation matrix
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ETROPPit -0.05 0.74 1.00
ETREBIit -0.12 0.54 0.81 1.00
log(TA)it 0.20 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 1.00
log(SALES)it 0.09 -0.12 -0.03 -0.00 0.79 1.00
ROAit -0.09 -0.21 0.01 0.25 -0.12 0.07 1.00
LEVit 0.06 0.05 -0.24 -0.28 0.06 -0.11 -0.26 1.00
ATANGit 0.25 -0.07 -0.22 -0.40 0.18 -0.17 -0.20 0.38 1.00
log(DEPR)it 0.22 -0.09 -0.09 -0.30 0.79 0.68 -0.08 0.12 0.38 1.00
∆log(FA)it -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.03 1.00
∆log(SALES)it -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.14 1.00
GROPskt -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.28 1.00
TAXRkt -0.07 0.14 0.23 0.28 0.05 0.12 0.04 -0.06 -0.24 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 1.00
CREDITMkt -0.05 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.59 1.00
GDPGkt 0.08 -0.29 -0.24 -0.19 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.25 1.00
GDPPCkt 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.14 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.49 0.60 0.23 1.00
Table 4.7.3: Probit regressions of the basic result
The table presents probit results for model (4.4); the predicted propensities of state ownership are
used to construct the group-fixed effect of the outcome regressions in Table 4.4.3; *** significant at
the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.







LEVit -1.7343*** -1.6379*** -1.3258***
(0.4684) (0.4567) (0.4376)
LEV 2it 4.1351*** 5.0455*** 3.5452**
(1.5912) (1.5211) (1.4598)
LEV 3it -2.8080** -3.9321*** -2.6152**
(1.3286) (1.2545) (1.2076)
ROAit -0.0543*** -0.0193*** -0.0190***
(0.0079) (0.0035) (0.0031)
ROA2it 0.0016*** 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ROA3it -0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log(TA)it -1.7738*** -1.7092*** -1.6952***
(0.2612) (0.2672) (0.2618)
log(TA)2it 0.1792*** 0.1734*** 0.1730***
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Table 4.7.3: Probit regressions of the basic result (continued)








log(TA)3it -0.0053*** -0.0051*** -0.0051***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
∆log(FA)it 0.0754* 0.0815* 0.1271***
(0.0443) (0.0454) (0.0481)
∆log(FA)2it -0.0351 -0.0503* -0.0987***
(0.0244) (0.0265) (0.0304)
∆log(FA)3it 0.0034 0.0060 0.0114***
(0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0040)
∆log(SALES)it -0.1083** -0.1145** -0.1428***
(0.0472) (0.0452) (0.0434)
∆log(SALES)2it -0.0241* -0.0211 -0.0139
(0.0134) (0.0148) (0.0134)
∆log(SALES)3it 0.0014 0.0028 0.0025
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0020)
CREDITMkt -0.0022 -0.0400 -0.1174**
(0.0435) (0.0442) (0.0472)
CREDITM2kt 0.0000 0.0004 0.0011**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
CREDITM3kt -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
GDPGkt 0.2512*** 0.2596*** 0.2104***
(0.0490) (0.0500) (0.0508)
GDPG2kt 0.0247*** 0.0303*** 0.0556***
(0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0156)
GDPG3kt -0.0088*** -0.0101*** -0.0142***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0030)
GDPPCkt -0.0003* -0.0004** -0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
GDPPC2kt 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
GDPPC3kt -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
LO: French -0.2175 -0.5276 -1.6815**
(0.6146) (0.6240) (0.6775)
LO German 0.1821 -0.2840 -1.9399**
(0.8365) (0.8520) (0.9313)
LO Scandinavian -0.1057 -0.5133 -1.9410**
(0.7901) (0.8036) (0.8729)
NACE2 B -0.1285 -0.0545 -0.0807
(0.2510) (0.2485) (0.2434)
NACE2 C -1.0416*** -1.0341*** -1.1003***
(0.1458) (0.1425) (0.1382)
NACE2 D 1.7681*** 1.7642*** 1.6538***
(0.1445) (0.1412) (0.1367)
NACE2 E 1.3660*** 1.3650*** 1.3465***
(0.1473) (0.1439) (0.1391)
NACE2 F -0.2305 -0.2455* -0.2868**
(0.1416) (0.1387) (0.1341)
NACE2 G -0.8111*** -0.7911*** -0.7782***
(0.1415) (0.1382) (0.1332)
NACE2 H 0.3167** 0.4031***
(0.1417) (0.1386) (0.1323)
NACE2 I -0.3134* -0.3455* -0.4104**
(0.1865) (0.1837) (0.1733)
NACE2 J -0.0806 -0.1121 -0.0974
(0.1537) (0.1516) (0.1448)
NACE2 L 0.2176 0.2463* 0.2051
(0.1388) (0.1351) (0.1303)
NACE2 M -0.0136 -0.0302 -0.0495
(0.1445) (0.1425) (0.1373)
NACE2 N 0.1204 0.1588 0.1717
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Table 4.7.3: Probit regressions of the basic result (continued)








NACE2 R 0.7640*** 0.8271*** 0.7981***
(0.1805) (0.1786) (0.1676)
NACE2 S 0.2424 0.1907 0.2183
(0.1997) (0.1990) (0.1882)




















constant 8.2735*** 9.8044*** 14.6239***
(2.9562) (3.0402) (3.1906)
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4.7.3 Variable definitions and data
Table 4.7.4: Variable definitions
Firm level (Source: Orbis)
SOEi Binary indicator of state ownership.
TAXit Total financial statement tax payments of firm i in year t.
PTPit Pre-tax profit of firm i in year t.
OPPit Operating profit of firm i in year t.
EBIit Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA) of firm i in year t.
ETRPTPit Pre-tax profit effective tax rate (TAXit/PTPit).
ETROPPit Operating profit effective tax rate (TAXit/OPPit).
ETREBIit EBITDA effective tax rate (TAXit/EBIit).
log(TA)it log(total assets) of firm i in year t.
log(SALES)it log(turnover) of firm i in year t.
ROAit Return on assets of firm i in year t.
LEVit Total debt / total assets of firm i in year t.
ATANGit Asset tangibility: fixed assets / total assets of firm i in year t.
log(DEPR)it log(depreciation and amortization) of firm i in year t.
∆log(FA)it Investment proxy: log(fixed assets)it − log(fixed assets)i,t−1.
∆log(SALES)it Sales growth: log(turnover)it − log(turnover)i,t−1.
Country level
TAXRkt Statutory tax rate of country k in year t. (Source: Paying Taxes,
PWC).
CREDITMkt Domestic credit provided by banking sector in country k and year
t as percentage of GDP (Source: Worldbank).
GDPGkt Annual GDP growth in percent in country k and year t (Source:
Worldbank).
GDPPCkt GDP per capita in country k and year t, PPP at constant 2011
international USD (Source: Worldbank).
Legal origin dummies Legal origin dummy variables of country k based on La Porta et
al. (1997).
Sector level
Sector dummies Sector dummies are based on NACE2 categories.
GROPskt Growth opportunities are defined as in Huizinga et al. (2008): The
growth rate median of subsidiary sales in a subsidiary’s industry
s, country k, and year t.
• Ownership restriction on SOE part:
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– Historical ownership data base from Orbis: Label “public authority, state, gov-
ernment”.
– 100 percent stand-alone SOE or 100 percent group subsidiary where the group is
classified by Orbis as “SOE”.
• Ownership restriction on private firms:
– Historical ownership data base from Orbis: Any other label.
– 100 percent private stand-alone firms and subsidiaries.
• I consider only #conscode “U1” and “U2” subsidiaries, i.e., unconsolidated financial
statements. Robustness is performed with “C1” and “C2” in Section 4.5.
• I use only data from EU countries because commercially active SOEs and private firms
should receive the same tax treatment.
• A cross-sectional unit needs at least two firm-years in [2009, 2015]. The average – at
five firm-years – is much higher.
• Only local GAAP firms. Robustness including IFRS firms in the Appendix Section 4.7.
• #Taxation > 0
• ETRit ∈ ]0; 1[. Top and bottom 1 percent are winsorized. This holds for all ETR
specifications.
• TANit ∈ [0; 1].
• LEVit ∈ [0; 1[.
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5 State ownership, company risk, and societal value
5.1 Introduction
Do SOEs receive beneficial treatment compared to private competitors? A recent survey by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC, 2015) finds that 83 percent of private-sector CEOs believe
that state ownership distorts competition, and 67 percent feel that government ownership
affects industry regulation and its enforcement. Both responses suggest that state ownership
influences the way firms operate and the way they are treated, possibly yielding them a
competitive advantage. For instance, empirical observations indicate that SOEs benefit from
facilitated access to debt financing (Brandt and Li, 2003; Li et al., 2009; OECD, 2012, 2014a;
Chen et al., 2016). Implicit state guarantees on SOE debt are the most common explanation
for this phenomenon: Investors assume that SOE debt is less risky. Other studies have pointed
to political agendas as a key determinant of SOE financing costs (Brandt and Li, 2003; Zhang
and Zhang, 2016). While these factors indeed seem relevant, our results – based on field and
experimental data – show that societal bias in the general population towards state enterprise
could be another important cause.
In the PwC survey, 37 percent of private sector CEOs agreed that SOEs are beneficial to
societal value in some sectors of the economy. Such value may not lie in financial results for
the owning citizens alone: Previous literature has shown that SOEs are less profitable and
suffer from worse corporate governance than private firms (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001;
Megginson and Netter, 2001; Estrin et al., 2009; Borisova et al., 2012). Instead, consider the
argument that SOEs exist to combat market imperfections (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015). If
this is the case, then SOEs offer some form of less tangible return that goes beyond their
financial results in the sense that they internalize market failure. This additional return
benefits every constituent. Hence, the community that owns the firm is not only compensated
with the dividend of the SOE but also with some form of benefit that is distributed among
all citizens.
This paper first analyzes financial data of European companies and finds that SOEs ben-
efit from implicit debt guarantees. However, – assuming rational investors – our regression
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analysis points to additional factors influencing financing costs of SOEs in particular. There-
fore, we experiment in a second step to evaluate if people are willing to forgo private returns
in exchange for a societal benefit. Results indicate that people invest money in a company
that is inefficient but yields a societal return even if investing in an alternative option is
efficient. We argue that the “societal benefits” assumption of state ownership could be a
driving force not only in determining financing costs of SOEs but also in explaining recent
increases in equity ownership by governments and tolerance towards persistently worse SOE
book performance. Our findings seem especially relevant in countries with large state-bank
sectors, where this kind of bias may significantly affect lending policies.
We start by examining the empirical average cost of debt of SOEs and private firms using
a large firm-level panel dataset (Orbis) in the years 2008-2015. In the EU, the regulatory
framework of competitive neutrality bans preferential treatment (such as explicit debt guar-
antees) based on specific ownership types for commercial enterprises.71 As a result, SOEs
obtain debt uniquely in the commercial marketplace in OECD and EU countries (OECD,
2014a). Another study on competitive neutrality within the OECD (2012) argues that mem-
ber countries formally apply the same bankruptcy framework to commercial SOEs than to
private firms. Non-performing loans or even defaults of SOEs are a real possibility, which
banks should take into account. Nevertheless, it may be difficult for the government to con-
vince market actors, that it does not provide an implicit guarantee on the debt (or against
default) of a specific SOE (OECD, 2016). Even if lenders assume implicit guarantees but
behave otherwise rationally, they should attribute a positive (but lower) default risk to SOEs
and adjust loans accordingly. A proxy for default risk is firm profitability (Altman, 1968).
Thus, a worse corporate performance should, ceteris paribus, increase individual company
risk and therefore a firm’s cost of external finance. Our field data analysis investigates this
relation for both ownership types.
A key advantage of our data is that we have access to financial statements of non-listed
firms. Most other studies focusing on ownership research use data of publicly listed firms.
Hence, our data include companies such as municipal property developers and local energy
companies that are visible in the local public sphere and to local decision makers. A further
advantage is the considerable amount of available historical ownership data, which we observe
71We discuss a few exceptions in Section 5.2.1. Generally, Article 107 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the EU prohibits state aid for commercially active SOEs because it could undermine the
functioning of the single market. We elaborate further on state aid and access to finance in 5.2.1.
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on a yearly basis. This enables us to construct a much bigger sample of firms with verified
ownership information than in most previous studies.
State ownership is not random. Therefore, merely estimating a model that treats state
ownership as exogenous would lead to biased estimates. This is because some of our control
variables most likely correlate with selection into state ownership and not controlling for it
would bias their coefficients. To address potential bias, we consider a selection model as the
appropriate estimation strategy. It treats state and private ownership as two separate lending
regimes and controls for selection into the former. Specifically, we employ the Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010) selection approach, which has the additional advantage that it enables
us to address unobserved heterogeneity, potentially endogenous explanatory variables, and
selection within a simple, coherent framework.
We find that SOEs pay less for their debt than private firms and risk proxies are relevant
determinants of debt costs only for the latter. Our basic specification suggests that average
interest rates of SOEs across all debt contracts are between 1.1 percentage points (using a two-
sided test) and 1.2 percentage points (using regression analysis) lower than those of private
companies. Whereas an increase in operating profitability of 1 percentage point decreases
interest rates of private companies by 1.36 basis points, firm profitability is not a relevant
determinant for SOE interest rates.72 This finding is very robust, even under situations of
severe sovereign financial distress. This result indicates that investors attribute different levels
of risk to the two ownership types. However, we believe that implicit state warranties alone
are an insufficient explanation for this finding because we would have expected a significant
but weaker effect for SOEs compared to private firms.
An established alternative explanation could be political lending, especially since state-
owned banks have become increasingly important in European credit markets (Monnet et al.,
2014). There is evidence that state lenders act according to political agendas, even if this
behavior leads to lower returns or even losses (Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian,
2005). However, such action need not necessarily be restricted to state banks nor caused by
political opportunism: Many studies show that investors are willing to accept a sub-optimal
financial performance to pursue social or ethical objectives (see Renneboog et al. (2008) for
a survey). Goss and Roberts (2011) show that socially responsible US companies pay, on
average, less for their debt. Hence, banks may favor a particular group of companies because
72We derive our profitability proxy before financial expenses and thus avoid reverse causality.
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of ideological preferences (Brandt and Li, 2003). In our setting, it seems plausible that local
banks (often state-owned) feel a special attachment to local community-owned companies,
which induces a choice to forgo higher profits by catering to preference voluntarily. We test
this hypothesis with an experimental investment task. Participants can choose an investment
with a positive externality (mimicking an SOE), even though financial returns are lower
than an alternative investment option (emulating a private company). Results show that
participants allocate around one-third of their funds to the “SOE” even though this was
inefficient. As in our field data analysis, risk considerations seem relevant but not exclusive
explanatory factors.
The main result of our study is that SOEs pay less for their debt and risk considerations
have a relevant, but not exclusive influence on their financing costs. Hence, this study supports
prior research that has shown how government ownership affects the market perceptions of
firm value and risk (Borisova et al., 2015; Beuselinck et al., 2017). We add to the literature
by demonstrating that societal value considerations may impact their cost of finance. Our
study complements previous empirical research relying on political arguments to explain less
expensive SOE financing (Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005).
This study proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 defines our outcome variable, the risk proxy,
our definition of state ownership, and the institutional background of our data. Section 5.3
contains the econometric approach, the data management for implementation in Orbis as
well as descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 presents our basic result. Section 5.5 adds our main
robustness checks. Section 5.6 presents the setup and the results of our experimental analysis
and Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Definitions, hypothesis development and institutional
background
5.2.1 Outcome, profitability and state ownership
We start with analyzing firm-level data from Orbis to evaluate the determinants of the cost
of debt for SOEs and private firms. In particular, we want to check if both ownership types
differ concerning the effect of company risk on the cost of debt. We make use of the general
notion that more profitable firms should, on average, pay less for their debt because they
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face lower probabilities of bankruptcy (Altman, 1968).73 Our dependent variable is firm i’s





where INTEit is the total interest paid of firm i in year t, LTDBit is total long-term debt
(of maturity above one year) and STDBit is short-term debt (of maturity below one year).
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Profitability should affect a firm’s cost of finance because it is a proxy for the quality of
management and the underlying firm-level risk. However, the literature identifies no single
best way to measure a firm’s profitability. Our main proxy is a firm’s return on total assets
OROAit, calculated as operating profit divided by total assets. In this we follow Altman
(1968) and Goss and Roberts (2011). Operating profit is defined as all operating revenues
minus all operating expenses. We use OROAit as our main risk proxy because it is free of
reverse causality but estimate our model using the pre-tax return on assets as a robustness
check.
Throughout this study, we expect a differential impact of profitability on a firm’s AV INit,
depending on ownership. To be precise, we expect a negative impact of ROAit on AV INit
for private firms because higher profitability decreases the risk of financial distress. We do
not expect firm risk to affect the financing costs of SOEs because decision makers (1) assume
implicit guarantees, (2) cater for political favors, and (3) are biased to lend to state firms
because they assume societal benefits. We summarize this in Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1 Profitability is an essential determinant of the cost of debt of private firms
but is no relevant explanatory variable for the cost of debt of SOEs.
A firm is included in our main regression if we have data for it in at least five consecutive
non-missing years.75 To determine whether a firm is state-owned or privately owned, we rely
on the historical ownership database that forms part of Orbis. It allows us to identify wholly
73We focus on the impact of profitability on the cost of assumed target leverage. Hence, we are
not interested in the effect of profitability on firms’ debt-to-equity ratios, which is ambiguous in the
corporate finance literature (Frank and Goyal, 2009).
74Appendix Table 5.8.5 contains descriptions and sources of all variables used in this study. Appendix
Section 5.8.3 lists all data restrictions.
75Our results are robust to a decrease and increase in panel balance. Results are reported in Ap-
pendix Tables 5.8.2 and 5.8.3.
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owned subsidiaries or stand-alone firms which carry the ultimate ownership label “public
authority, state, government”. We introduce an ownership indicator SOEi = 1 if a firm
falls into this category. Orbis allows us to distinguish privately owned firms by additional
ownership groups. For example, we can determine if a firm is family-owned or in the hands
of a private equity fund. Numerous studies conclude that these ownership types affect firms’
performance and the cost of debt (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Kaplan
and Stromberg, 2009). We are interested in singling out the effect of state ownership on a
neutral benchmark. Therefore, we limit our private firm sample to the most common and
neutral ultimate ownership type “industrial company”. Private firms in our sample are thus
either stand-alone industrial companies or 100-percent subsidiaries of such firms and carry
the ownership label SOEi = 0. These ownership definitions allow us to generate a sample of
6,868 SOE firm-years and 94,345 private firm-years.
5.2.2 Institutional background and our data
The validity of our field-data analysis relies on two crucial institutional assumptions: The
first is that only implicit and imperfect guarantees for SOE debt exist. The second is that
SOEs must be subject to similar rules and financing conditions than private firms.
According to an OECD (2014a) survey on SOE financing, only the governments of Ger-
many, Poland, and Slovenia offer explicit debt guarantees to some SOEs, but such warranties
are either strictly limited to non-commercial objectives or apply to private firms as well. In
all other respondent countries, explicit guarantees on SOE debt are non-existent. Within the
EU, explicit guarantees to commercial ventures constitute state aid, which is prohibited. For
instance, Germany was obliged to abolish explicit guarantees for its savings banks in 2001
(Gropp et al., 2014). From this, we conclude that explicit guarantees are unlikely to be a
significant issue in our data.
A study on competitive neutrality within the OECD (2012) finds that member states
subject their SOEs to the same regulatory framework, i.e., no significant exemptions from
bankruptcy law exist. An exception is state-owned banks such as the German “Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau” or the French “Caisse de Dépôts et Consignations”. We can easily take
account of state banks by excluding all financial and public administration firms from our
sample. We also exclude all sectors connected with the passenger railway industry because na-
tional railway monopolies have received interest-free loans in some member countries – which
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is similar to a full guarantee.76 We further exclude firms incorporated as non-commercial
enterprises such as the German gemeinnützige Gesellschaft mit begrenzter Haftung (gGmbH)
and their European equivalents. Summing up, we conclude that debt guarantees in our data
are imperfect and implicit.
Our focus on EU data provides an important safeguard to ensure similar rules and fi-
nancing conditions for SOEs and private firms because any structural advantage would fall
foul on EU state aid legislation. A few pitfalls, however, remain: SOEs can get state support
for activities with a non-trivial public policy obligation. A primary example is again state-
owned banks and the railway sector, which we exclude from our sample. According to the
OECD (2014a), SOEs in member countries access debt almost exclusively on the market-
place, whereas compensation for public policy obligations takes the form of equity injections
or direct transfers in most member states. In some member states, notably the Czech Re-
public, Finland and Slovenia, state aid is non-existent OECD (2014a). Hence, our dependent
variable AV INit should be mostly unaffected by direct state support. Nevertheless, we ex-
clude all NACE2 categories with no private firm activity from the estimation sample as an
additional safeguard.
Financing conditions may also depend on the presence of state-owned banks, which have
increasingly penetrated commercial debt markets (Monnet et al., 2014). In Germany, which
is the country with the most observations in our sample, state-owned development banks
play an active role in lending to SOEs, but also to private companies.77 In others, such as
Sweden, SOEs are not allowed to borrow from government institutions at all (OECD, 2014a).
The fact that state ownership of banks may influence credit decisions is well-documented
(Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Politicized lending does, however, not
contradict our results because it could – on some occasions – be tantamount to social lending.
We address the public service obligation issue by estimating our model using only sectors with
a low public service propensity and both SOEs and private firms in Section 5.8.1. Summing
up, we conclude that institutional lending conditions in our data are similar across ownership
types.
76In total, we exclude from all our regressions the NACE2-categories K (“Finance and Insurance”),
O (“Public Administration and Defence”), and the 4-digit NACE2 sectors 4212 (“Construction of
railways and underground railways”), 4910 (“Passenger rail transport, interurban”), 4931 “Urban and
suburban passenger land transport”, and 5221 (“Service activities incidental to land transportation”).
77Our results are robust to the exclusion of all German companies.
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Table 5.2.1 shows the distribution of SOEs and private firms across countries. Unfortu-
nately, Orbis contains missing values in many control variables, which reduces the sample size
considerably. For example, the relatively low share of SOEs in France is not representative of
the French economy.78 The other big continental European economies are each represented
with a considerable share for both ownership groups. In total, our sample covers 15 EU coun-
tries. Despite the high number of missing values, two key advantages distinguish our field
Table 5.2.1: Country data
Table 5.2.1 presents the ownership distributions for our estimation sample across countries.
Country SOEi = 1: N SOEi = 1: % SOEi = 0: N SOEi = 0: % Total: N Total: %
Austria 56 0.82 1,184 1.25 1,240 1.23
Belgium 7 0.10 2,741 2.91 2,748 2.71
Czech Republic 333 4.85 2,516 2.67 2,849 2.81
Germany 2,619 38.13 7,565 8.02 10,184 10.06
Spain 909 13.24 20,047 21.25 20,956 20.70
Finland 371 5.40 1,811 1.92 2,182 2.16
France 5 0.07 27,720 29.38 27,725 27.39
Italy 867 12.62 13,901 14.73 14,768 14.59
Latvia 10 0.15 28 0.03 38 0.04
Poland 1,148 16.72 1,486 1.57 2,634 2.60
Portugal 36 0.52 1,444 1.53 1,480 1.46
Romania 5 0.07 207 0.22 212 0.21
Sweden 470 6.84 12,447 13.19 12,917 12.76
Slowenia 22 0.32 932 0.99 954 0.94
Slovakia 10 0.15 324 0.34 334 0.33
Total 6,868 100.00 94,353 100.00 101,221 100.00
data analysis from many other studies focusing on ownership structure: First, Orbis collects
ownership information from official sources, which makes our study less dependent on manual
ownership research. Second, our sample size is much larger than in most other studies using
manually collected ownership information.
Figure 5.2.1 plots our outcome variable AV INit and our main variable of interest OROAit
over the sample period from 2006-2015. It shows that SOEs pay lower average interest rates
in each year (left panel). The average interest rate curves of the two ownership types are very
parallel and indicate a persistent difference of around one percentage point between SOEs and
private firms in the first three years, which declines to around 0.5 percentage points afterward.
The initial increase in average interest rates coincides with tight credit and uncertainty at
the height of the financial crisis in 2008. The fall in subsequent years points to improved
access to finance, likely caused by better economic conditions in general and expansionary
78We assume sample selection in our data set is uncorrelated with our outcome variable and error
term since we only use information that is publicly available. More likely, missing values arise because
of differences in data-collecting processes of the dataset provider Bureau van Dijk.
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Figure 5.2.1: Average interest and operating return on assets
Figure 5.2.1 plots the empirical average interest rate AV INit and average return on assets ROAit
over our sample period 2006-2015.
ECB monetary policy. The third curve in the left panel represents the ECB’s benchmark on
new corporate loans. It follows a similar pattern than the average interest curves but declines
faster in later years. We explain the increasing difference between the ECB benchmark and
our indicators with legacy debt. Besides, most companies in our sample are relatively small
and probably borrow at higher interest rates than the average firm. The right panel of Figure
5.2.1 shows that SOEs also have lower profitability OROAit than private firms in our sample
period. The private firms again exhibit a behavior that is consistent with the financial crisis
and weak economic recovery in the EU: Profitability decreases sharply during the crisis years
2008 and 2009 and only recovers from 2014, i.e., after the peak of the Eurozone crisis. SOE
profitability is showing a weak but persistent trend upwards, which could reflect ongoing
efforts to improve the performance of SOEs across Europe.
5.3 Empirical approach
5.3.1 Econometric methodology
State ownership is not random. Therefore, merely estimating a model that treats state own-
ership as exogenous would lead to biased estimates. Numerous studies have used matching
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methods in the state ownership context (Borisova et al., 2012; Beuselinck et al., 2017). While
matching methods offer many advantages, we are particularly interested in coefficient dif-
ferences across two ownership groups. Under implicit guarantees alone, we would expect a
smaller effect of our risk proxy on the cost of SOE debt. We can also not exclude the possibil-
ity that other control variables differ in their impact on SOEs and private companies. Besides,
our experimental hypothesis states that the general public perceives state ownership differ-
ently. For these reasons, we consider a selection model as the appropriate estimation strategy,
which treats state and private ownership as two separate lending regimes and controls for
selection into the former.
Specifically, we employ the endogenous selection model proposed by Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010). We assume that two regimes R1 ∀ SOEi = 1 and R2 ∀ SOEi = 0
exist and determine the average cost of debt AV INit. Selection into one regime or the other
is not random because the government (or the general public) face different social, political
and economic incentives to own a specific company or not. Our basic outcome model takes
the form:
AV INRit = xitβ
R + ci1 + uit1, (5.2)
where R indicates whether we are in regime SOEi = 1 or regime SOEi = 0. The vector
xit denotes a 1×K vector of time-varying explanatory variables and βR denotes differential
coefficient estimates depending on the regime R. The unobserved effect ci1 is time-constant
and uit1 is an idiosyncratic error term. The index 1 denotes that the element belongs to our
outcome equation (5.2). Potentially, E (uit1|xi, ci1) 6= 0 for some element of xit because of
endogeneity. In our data set, this may be the case for firm leverage, which affects AV INRit
but could also be affected by it.79 Additionally, whether firm i is state-owned or privately
owned is not random, but depends itself on many factors, which potentially cause selection
bias. Estimates of (5.2) that do not take into account unobserved heterogeneity, potential
endogeneity and selection could be biased. The Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) approach
allows us to address all three issues within a coherent modeling framework.
We start with modeling the selection into state ownership with the following probit equa-
79We deal with this possibility in Section 5.8.1.
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tion:
P (sit = 1|zi) = Φ (zitδt2 + ci2) = Φ (zitδt2 + z̄iξt2) . (5.3)
The index 2 denotes that an element belongs to our selection equation (5.3). The 1 ×
L (L > K) vector of instruments zit is assumed to be free of unobserved heterogeneity due
to a Mundlak (1978) time-constant fixed effect ci2 = z̄iξt2 + ai2 with z̄i = T
−1∑T
t=1 zit and
E (ai2|zi) = 0. The vector zit contains all the exogenous elements of xit and needs at least
one additional regressor that affects selection. After estimating equation (5.3) for each year



























where φ (·) represents the standard normal density and Φ (·) the cumulative standard
normal distribution.
We then model the unobserved heterogeneity from equation (5.2) analogously to the
selection equation as ci1 = z̄iη+ai1, where z̄i = T
−1∑T
t=1 zit and we assume E (ai1|zi1) = 0.
Inclusion of the respective inverse Mills ratio to control for endogenous selection leads to our
outcome equation:
AV INRit = xitβ
R + z̄iη + γλ̂Rit + γ
tλ̂Rit × ψt + ψt + eit1, t = 1 . . . T, (5.6)
where R indicates the respective terms for either the SOE or the private regime. The inter-
action term λ̂Rit × ψt controls for time variation in unobserved effects and ψt is a set of time
dummies. The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio λ̂Rit as an additional regressor is standard
in the empirical corporate finance literature (Li and Prabhala, 2007). It allows controlling
for omitted variables such as unobserved private information on the management level or im-
plicit state warranties. The fact that we allow the impact of the selection terms to differ across
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time (by the inclusion of γtλ̂Rit × ψt) enables us to control for time-dependent unobservable
variables related to state ownership.
We estimate equation (5.6) by pooled 2SLS and use xit ≡ zit1 ⊂ zit, z̄i and λ̂Rit as instru-
ments. The vector zit1 is a subset of zit because it excludes the selection-specific instruments
used in the probit equation (5.3). In our basic model, we treat all elements of xit as exoge-
nous, which is why zit1 and xit contain the same elements. In Section 5.5.1, we report results
taking into account potentially endogenous elements of xit, which means that xit 6= zit1.
It is important to highlight that we estimate (5.6) twice, once for SOEs and once for
private firms and include the respective selection adjustment terms. After obtaining estima-
tion results, we apply the parametric error correction procedure suggested in Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010). For a detailed description of this procedure, we refer to their study.
5.3.2 Implementation and descriptive statistics
In a first step, we estimate the propensity of state ownership from equation (5.3). We employ
a similar set of control variables as Borisova et al. (2012) and Beuselinck et al. (2017), of which
Table 5.3.1 contains descriptive statistics (along with descriptive statistics for variables and
instruments used to estimate the outcome equation (5.6)).80
Table 5.3.1: Descriptive statistics
Table 5.3.1 presents summary statistics of the dependent variable AV INit, the profitability indicator
OROAit and the control variables used in the selection and outcome equations; based on 101,221
observations.
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
AV INit 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.25
OROAit 0.04 0.09 -0.54 0.41
LEVit 0.28 0.21 0.00 1.00
TANGit 0.31 0.28 0.00 1.00
log(SALES)it 9.42 1.67 1.10 17.93
∆log(FA)it 0.00 0.31 -1.69 2.47
∆log(SALES)it -0.00 0.26 -1.74 1.98
CREDITMkt 160.53 42.91 37.51 248.94
GDPGkt 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.11
TAXkt 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.39
INFLkt 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.06
STANGst 0.28 0.15 0.03 0.77
LAEFit 23.12 16.54 0.00 99.71
GDPPCkt 36,398.86 5,010.41 17,354.78 45,296.46
SLEVst 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.60
80The estimation procedure impedes the use of time-constant variables such as a country’s legal
origin, which is why we cannot use all controls as in Borisova et al. (2012) and Beuselinck et al.
(2017). Appendix Table 5.8.4 presents correlations for all variables.
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Specifically, we include all variables in the probit estimate which we initially treat as ex-
ogenous in our outcome equation (5.6). On the firm level, this is the case for our profitability
indicator OROAit, a firm’s asset tangibility TANGit, firm size log(SALES)it and leverage
LEVit.
81 On the country level we include a country’s credit market size CREDITMkt, GDP
growth rate GDPGkt, the statutory tax rate TAXkt and inflation INFLkt. In addition to
the exogenous variables from the outcome equation, we include on the firm level an invest-
ment proxy ∆log(FA)it and a sales growth proxy ∆log(SALES)it, as well as GDP per capita
GDPPCkt on the country level. The estimation procedure requires us to include at least one
additional time-varying instrument that affects selection into state ownership but not the
outcome variable AV INit. We use two instruments: First, in the spirit of Laeven and Levine
(2009), we use sectoral asset tangibility STANGst. It fulfills the economic criteria for good
selection instruments because a higher share of fixed assets is typical for network industries,
where SOE are particularly common. It is unlikely to have a causal impact on individual
firms’ financing cost, given that we control for individual asset tangibility TANGit. Concerns
of reverse causality when using sectoral instruments by Lin et al. (2011) and Lin et al. (2013)
seem less of a concern here due to the huge sample size, and the requirement that each sector
mean derives from at least two companies.82 The correlation between the individual and the
sectoral tangibility variables from Appendix Table 5.8.4 is 0.59, which suggests multicollinear-
ity is not a strong concern. The second instrument is the labor efficiency indicator LAEFit,
which we define as a firm’s labor costs divided by its operating revenue. The economic rea-
soning behind the performance ratio LAEFit as an instrument is previous empirical findings,
which relate state ownership to less productive workers (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). It
is also reasonable to assume that it does not directly affect the dependent variable AV INit.
The correlation from Appendix Table 5.8.4 is -0.01 and supports this argument. We estimate
the probit model for each year separately and use the results to calculate the inverse Mills
ratios according to equations (5.4) and (5.5).
In a second step, we estimate our outcome equation (5.6) using the exogenous regressors
from above, the respective inverse Mills ratios (including the time interactions), as well as time
dummies. Thus, our model contains commonly used firm and country-level control variables
81We report results for potentially endogenous firm-level variables in Section 5.5.1.
82Only 1 percent of firms are based in sectors with less than 400 firm-years because we calculate
sectoral instruments using a much larger sample, i.e., we include observations with missing values that
drop out of our selection and outcome equations (5.3) and (5.6).
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in bond price regressions.83 Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) propose to begin with a fixed
effects two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) and test the significance of the selection terms λ̂Rit
and λ̂Rit × ψt using a Hausmann test. In the absence of selection, FE-2SLS is preferable to
the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) correction procedure, which leads to a larger root mean
square errors. However, we can reject the null hypothesis of no selection by a wide margin
for both ownership types (the p-values are below 0.0001 for both tests).
5.4 Basic empirical results
Our field data analysis has the primary goals to compare lending rates of SOEs with those of
private firms and to test Hypothesis 1. We start with two-sided t-tests to see if the descriptive
AV INit difference between SOEs and private firms is meaningful. Then, we analyze the
impact of firm risk, which we proxy with the operating return on assets OROAit, on a firm’s
average interest rate AV INit. If implicit state guarantees are imperfect and the primary
driver of lower borrowing costs, we should see a significant impact of OROAit on AV INit for
both ownership types, albeit with a smaller magnitude for SOEs. If the risk proxy OROAit
does not affect the borrowing costs of SOEs at all, this is indirect evidence of other factors
driving borrowing costs, such as political considerations or social lending.
Table 5.4.1 contains yearly t-tests for differences in AV INit means between our ownership
groups. SOEs pay less for their debt than private firms in all years – the difference is significant
at the 1-percent level in each test. The spread is not time-constant: It ranges from a maximum
of almost 2.5 percentage points at the height of the financial crisis to a much lower 0.5
percentage points in 2015. SOEs have easier access to debt in times of crisis, a finding that
is in line with a study for publicly listed SOEs by Borisova et al. (2015).
Finally, we proceed to estimate equation (5.6) by pooled 2SLS for the two ownership
groups separately. It is important to note that the estimates control for selection into the state
or private ownership regime due to the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratios. Additionally, they
83Similar firm and country controls are suggested by Fama and French (1993), Borisova et al. (2015),
and Goss and Roberts (2011). A disadvantage of our data is that we are not able to control for a set
of firm and debt-contract specific factors because we do not observe this data. On the firm-level, this
is primarily the case for the market-to-book ratio, which we do not observe for our non-traded firms.
We believe debt-contract related factors are less of a concern in our case because we are primarily
interested in the impact of firm-level determinants on the average cost of debt, i.e., across all debt
contracts of a firm. Since our firms are largely medium-sized, we argue that conventional debt contracts
should be roughly similar within firms.
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Table 5.4.1: Statistical tests
Table 5.4.1 presents tests for differences in means of the dependent variable AV INit by year; based
on 101,221 observations; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *
significant at the 10 percent level.
Year Mean SOEi = 0 Mean SOEi = 1 Difference T-statistic
2007− 2015 0.0436 0.0546 -0.0110*** -22.70
2007 0.0417 0.0661 -0.0244*** -6.84
2008 0.0471 0.0712 -0.0241*** -13.43
2009 0.0429 0.0579 -0.0151*** -10.13
2010 0.0428 0.0501 -0.0073*** -5.59
2011 0.0446 0.0543 -0.0097*** -8.05
2012 0.0456 0.0551 -0.0095*** -7.74
2013 0.0432 0.0526 -0.0093*** -7.22
2014 0.0419 0.0510 -0.0091*** -6.74
2015 0.0411 0.0464 -0.0053*** -3.45
contain a Mundlak (1978) fixed effect that absorbs unobserved heterogeneity on the firm-level.
Table 5.4.2 presents our basic regression results. They are based on NA = 6, 868 SOE
firm-years and NB = 94, 353 private firm-years. Firm risk, proxied with firm performance
OROAit, does not affect the funding rate of SOEs at all (Column A). This suggests that
company-associated risk is not a key explanatory factor for average interest rates of SOEs.
The finding is remarkable in the sense that we should not observe any explicit state guarantees
on this debt and the variable is highly significant for private firms (Column B). For them, a
ceteris paribus increase in firm profitability by one percentage point will decrease the average
debt cost by 0.0136 percentage points or 1.36 basis points. This is what we expect: The more
profitable a firm is, the lower its funding costs should be because of lower default risk. This
result is in line with findings by Goss and Roberts (2011) and Borisova et al. (2015).84 Our
basic result confirms Hypothesis 1. The selection term λSOEit has a significantly negative sign
and confirms that ownership is not random.
The effects of other control variables have reasonable interpretations. LEVit negatively
affects AV INit of both SOEs and private firms. This may seem surprising at first because
the higher the debt level, the higher the risk of default. It is important to remember that
we look at a firms’ average interest rate for all long and short-term debt obligations. Firms
which can issue much debt are likely to be more creditworthy overall and should have a lower
marginal cost for the initial unit of debt. Besides, they may benefit from a flatter interest
rate curve. This could lead to lower average interest rates for higher levered firms. TANGit
84Both studies confirm a negative impact of firm profitability on the cost of debt. Magnitudes,
however, differ because of alternative definitions of the dependent variable.
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Table 5.4.2: Basic result
The table presents switching regressions based on NA = 6, 868 and NB = 94, 353 observations, re-
spectively; a firm has non-missing values in at least five consecutive years from 2007 to 2015; the
dependent variable is AV INit; estimates take into account endogenous selection into state ownership.
Selection is instrumented with sectoral asset tangibility STANGst and the employee efficiency mea-
sure LAEFit; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant
at the 10 percent level.























Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
λ× Time Yes Yes
positively affects average interest rates, probably because firms with more fixed assets can
afford to take on more expensive debt. An interesting finding is the differential impact of the
statutory tax rate TAXkt. While many studies confirm a positive effect of taxes on leverage
due to interest tax shields (Feld et al., 2013), the relation between taxes and the average
interest rate is not as straight-forward. What matters to tax-planning firms ultimately is the
amount of taxes they can offset from their bill using paid interest and not the average cost
of their debt. It may be that a firm pays, on average, less for its debt than a comparable
firm but offsets a higher share of its tax payments with interest. Hence, the negative impact
of TAXkt on AV INit for private firms (Column B) is not contradicting previous taxation
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research. The positive impact of TAXkt on AV INit for SOEs (Column A) may partly result
from an over-representation of low-tax and high average interest countries in the SOE sample
(especially Poland).
A surprising result is the negative relation of inflation to our dependent variable AV INit.
In normal times, we would expect higher inflation rates to cause higher interest rates. A
possible explanation could lie in the combination of exceptional macroeconomic circumstances
and unconventional monetary policy of the ECB. We look at average interest rates at a time of
initially strong deflationary tendencies during the financial crisis followed by a slight uptick in
inflation rates in the years afterward. At the same time, the ECB pursued a very expansive
monetary policy to bring interest rates down, which could be responsible for the negative
relation observed.
Our main result is very robust. In addition to the analysis presented in Section 5.8.1,
we confirm the differential impact of firm profitability OROAit on average interest AV INit
for the following model variations: First, a different firm size proxy log(total assets); second,
inclusion of a debt maturity proxy; third, variations in the selection instruments;85 and forth,




In this Section, we address potential reverse causality concerns from our baseline result of
the firm-level control variables, and in particular, financial leverage LEVit. Financial leverage
could affect our dependent variable AV INit because the relative share of debt financing could
affect the average interest rate a firm pays. However, LEVit could also be affected by AV INit
in the sense that companies only use as much debt as they can afford at their specific average
interest rate.
To disentangle these effects, we make use of the specific methodological approach of
85We use a set of different employee efficiency measures as well as the country-level variable public
sector quota of GDP instead of sectoral asset tangibility STANGst.
86Our main result allows a maximum AV INit of 25 percent a year and a time average of 15 percent.
We alternatively use 15 percent as a yearly maximum for AV INit as well as ten and five percent as
cut-offs for the time average per firm.
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Table 5.5.1: Endogenous firm-level controls
The table presents switching regressions based on NA = 6, 747 and NB = 91, 451 observations, respec-
tively; a firm has non-missing values in at least five consecutive years from 2007 to 2015; dependent
variable is AV INit; estimates take into account endogenous selection into state ownership and endoge-
nous firm-level variables LEVit, TANGit, and log(SALES)it; selection is instrumented with sectoral
asset tangibility STANGst and the employee efficiency measure LAEFit; firm-level controls are in-
strumented with sectoral leverage SLEVst, TANGi,t−1, and log(SALES)i,t−1 ; *** significant at the
1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
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λ× Time Yes Yes
the Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) framework, which allows us to re-estimate our basic
model and instrument the firm-level variables LEVit, TANGit, and log(SALES)it using all
exogenous information and the instruments sectoral leverage SLEVst, as well as the time
lags TANGi,t−1, and log(SALES)i,t−1. By using lagged variables as instruments and not as
proxy variables, we avoid a widespread misconception in empirical social sciences that lagged
explanatory variables avoid simultaneity bias (Reed, 2015). We use sectoral leverage SLEVst
as an instrument instead of lagged leverage because endogeneity concerns are strongest for this
variable. Sectoral leverage is an important determinant of a firm’s capital structure (Frank
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and Goyal, 2009). Given the fact that 99 percent of sectoral averages draw on more than
400 firm-years, SLEVst should not be a significant determinant of individual average interest
rates. We test the validity of these instruments using the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for
under-identification, the Stock-Yogo test for weak instruments, and the Hansen J-statistic for
over-identification. All these tests suggest the proposed specification is suitable. Table 5.5.1
presents the results.
Compared to the estimates from Table 5.4.2, the coefficients of OROAit are stronger
in magnitude. For SOEs, the model predicts a positive relation, which is not statistically
significant (Column A). For private firms, the model suggests that an increase in profitability
of 1 percentage point will decrease the dependent variable by 0.0269 percentage points or
2.69 basis points (Column B). The selection term λSOEit still has a negative sign but fails to
meet conventional significance thresholds. The coefficient of instrumented LEVit retains its
sign in both columns but is significant at higher magnitude only in Column B. The other
significant control variables from Table 5.4.2, TANGit, GDPGkt, and TAXkt, retain their
signs but are less significant in the SOE regression (Column A). In contrast, magnitudes are
stronger in the model for private companies (Column B). We conclude from this robustness
check that potential reverse causality of firm variables and in particular financial leverage
does not fundamentally alter our results from above.
5.5.2 Net income profitability
Throughout this study, we have used a firm’s operating profit to calculate the profitability
proxy OROAit. Even though we believe this is the most appropriate measure because we need
not worry about reverse causality, it is not the most commonly used indicator in practitioners’
work. Banks, when deciding on credit contracts, evaluate firms using widely reported financial
indicators. Thus, the reverse causality of post-financial performance profitability measures
may be lower than one might expect. Hence, we re-estimate our baseline model using ROAit
as a profitability proxy, which we define as net income divided by total assets. Table 5.5.2
presents the results.
Compared to the baseline result from Table 5.4.2, the coefficient of ROAit has a nega-
tive sign but remains statistically insignificant (Column A). The magnitude of the effect for
private firms has increased to -0.0357, suggesting a decrease in the average interest rate of
3.57 basis points for a profitability increase of one percentage point (Column B). The effect
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Table 5.5.2: Net income return on assets
The table presents switching regressions based on NA = 6, 749 and NB = 92, 057 observations, re-
spectively; the profitability measure ROAit is a firm’s net income divided by total assets; a firm has
non-missing values in at least five consecutive years from 2007 to 2015; dependent variable is AV INit;
estimates take into account endogenous selection into state ownership; selection is instrumented with
sectoral asset tangibility STANGst and the employee efficiency measure LAEFit; *** significant at
the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.























Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
λ× Time Yes Yes
remains significant at the one percent level. The selection indicator λSOEit is of slightly weaker
magnitude than in the primary result (-0.0094 compared to -0.0123) and remains statistically
significant at the ten percent level. Coefficients and significance levels of other controls do
not differ much from the benchmark. We conclude from this test that our result is robust to
a more commonly used but econometrically inferior specification of firm profitability.
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5.5.3 Implicit guarantees during sovereign debt crises
Let us now further evaluate the question whether implicit state guarantees alone offer a
sufficient explanation for lower SOE funding rates. In empirical terms, this question has al-
ready been answered in the sense that political considerations have been found to affect debt
allocations and costs significantly (Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005). Hence, the purpose of this
robustness check is not to refute established results on implicit guarantees but to reconsider
their predictions in the light of our data. Many studies have argued that state ownership
shields companies from adverse effects during financial crises such as debt constraints and re-
ductions in firm value (Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Borisova et al., 2015; Beuselinck et al.,
2017). Similarly, Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms are more likely to
be bailed out. What these studies have in common is that they implicitly assume solvency of
the respective government because they focus on data from solvent countries or defaults of
individual companies in normal economic times. The exceptional situation of public finances
in some EU member states during our sample period allows us to analyze the average cost
of debt in situations when the governments themselves were cut off from capital markets.
This was the case for a total of eight member states who requested financial assistance from
the EU, namely Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain.87
During the programs, all countries were under scrutiny from the European Institutions and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a consequence, a government’s ability to act
independently in case of an SOE default was severely constrained. Moreover, program coun-
tries usually had to comply with reform and privatization obligations to bring their budget
deficits under control. We argue that in such a situation, implicit state warranties should
become irrelevant because investors have lost trust in the government’s ability to service
debt. Figure 5.5.1 plots our dependent variable AV INit for Latvia, Portugal and Spain. If
implicit guarantees are the only explanation for cheaper funding rates, we would expect the
difference between the two groups disappear – or become at least much smaller – before the
beginning of the respective adjustment programs. Latvia and Portugal requested financial as-
sistance in 2011, whereas Spain only did in 2012. Spain and Portugal experienced significant
87Unfortunately, from these countries, Orbis only contains sufficient company ownership data for
Latvia, Portugal, and Spain.
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Figure 5.5.1: Average interest rates in program countries
Figure 5.5.1 plots the empirical average interest rate AV INit for Portugal and Spain.
sovereign downgrades from rating agencies prior to and during this period.88 Figure 5.5.1
reveals that Spanish and Latvian average interest rate spreads between the two ownership
groups remain roughly parallel over the whole period (left and central panel). Importantly,
there is no significant change in the years of the economic adjustment program, a time when
the European Institutions scrutinized the Latvian and Spanish governments, and bail-outs of
(non-financial) state firms were less likely. In contrast, the Portuguese spread between SOEs
and private firms is much lower in 2010-2014 than in previous years. Specifically, the SOE
curve approaches the average interest rate of private companies in 2010 and 2011, i.e., im-
mediately prior and at the beginning of the adjustment program. This finding indicates that
implicit guarantees have disappeared.89
Table 5.5.3: Country tests
Table 5.5.3 presents tests for differences in means of the dependent variable AV INit for Latvia,
Portugal and Spain during their respective economic adjustment programs; *** significant at the 1
percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
Year Mean SOEi = 0 Mean SOEi = 1 Difference T-statistic
Latvia 2011− 2014 0.0420 0.0587 -0.0167*** -6.01
Portugal 2011− 2014 0.0499 0.0534 -0.0035 -0.79
Spain 2012− 2014 0.0407 0.0512 -0.0105*** -6.95
88The rating agency Standard and Poor’s downgraded Portugal from A+ in January 2009 to BB in
January 2012 – a downgrade of 2 slots. Spain was downgraded from AA+ in January 2009 to BBB-
in October 2012 – also a downgrade of 2 slots.
89It should be noted that the Portuguese curve is based on a smaller sample of 199 firm-years
compared to 678 for Latvia and 2,516 for Spain. These numbers deviate from the ones reported in
Table 5.2.1 because they include observations with missing values in other control variables.
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Table 5.5.3 presents t-tests for differences in means for all three countries during their
adjustment programs. We use yearly data, so the time interval for both tests exceeds the
actual time interval of the adjustment programs, a fact that allows for a time lag of the effect.
Irrespective of government solvency, Latvia and Spain exhibit significantly lower average
interest rates for SOEs than for private firms during their respective adjustment programs.
We take this as evidence, that implicit state guarantees alone are unlikely to explain funding
rates of SOEs in these countries. In Portugal, the difference is not significant during the
adjustment program, a fact that instead points to implicit guarantees.
We conclude that implicit guarantees seem a necessary but not sufficient condition to ex-
plain cheaper funding rates of SOEs. Preferential allocation of debt could be a complementing
explanation for the non-existence of spreads in Latvia and Spain during their adjustment pro-
grams: In a period of recession and falling living standards, the perceived positive externality
of public ownership may bias fund allocation more strongly than in economically prosperous




So far we have analyzed financial data from European companies. Our results have shown
that risk proxies do not significantly affect the average interest rate for SOEs whereas they
are a critical determinant for private firms. The most common explanation for this finding
is that implicit state guarantees to bondholders render company risk less relevant. However,
implicit guarantees alone seem an insufficient justification because such warranties are not
explicit and default probabilities of SOEs remain positive. In other words, we would have
expected risk proxies to be less important but significant determinants of SOE debt.
Let us now address the question of whether behavioral arguments could offer a comple-
menting explanation for lower SOE financing costs. It is important to remember that we
look mostly at local SOEs, which provide a multitude of services affecting the daily life of
citizens.90 Ramsey (1980) gives an example of how state ownership may induce behavioral
90Our behavioral argument remains valid for large national champions. However, the increased
distance between citizens and company may render it less relevant.
114
distortions: A loss from an SOE could cause a larger decline in the citizens‘ utility than
an analogous gain would raise it. The argument rests on the plausible assumption that a
large number of welfare projects would dilute additional gains with relatively little impact
on individuals whereas a loss would trigger public anger about wasted tax-payers’ money.
Any behavioral argument leading to lower funding costs for SOEs would require that
citizens attribute some societal benefit to this specific ownership structure. If they price in
societal returns, they may be willing to accept lower individual returns for the sake of the
overall benefit of society. Do individuals care about the returns of their co-citizens? Since
the fundamental result of Kahneman et al. (1986), more than 100 experimental studies have
shown that around two-thirds of dictators in dictator games voluntarily share a part of their
profit with others (Engel, 2011). The same holds for experimental work on public goods, where
plenty of studies show that people are willing to take costly action to increase the payoffs of
others (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). A paper by Bartling et al. (2015) on social behavior in a
market environment reveals that consumers persistently chose socially responsible products
to avoid negative externalities on others. This choice is reflected in the composition of product
portfolios and the markup of the socially beneficial product. Thus, consumers are willing to
incur a higher cost to themselves for the benefit of their co-citizens. In an investment context,
Berg et al. (1995) find that self-interest alone cannot explain the investment behavior in their
experiment. A study that relates experimental results to SOEs is the one by Reynolds et al.
(2009), who find that participants of experiments are more risk-averse when making decisions
for others. The authors see this as a reason for conservative investment and innovation policies
in state firms.
In our setting, SOEs could have cheaper funding costs because citizens assume they
generate a positive externality to others. We summarize this argument in Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2 Citizens invest in SOEs with low financial returns if they assume an addi-
tional return to society – even if this investment behavior is inefficient.
The inefficiency argument rests on the empirical observation that SOEs have been found
to be less profitable and less efficient Dewenter and Malatesta (2001); Megginson and Netter
(2001); Estrin et al. (2009).
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5.6.2 Experimental methodology and results
To evaluate Hypothesis 2, we conduct an experiment in which participants decide whether
to invest in a project that pays a return only to them (mimicking a private company) or a
project that pays a return to them, and, additionally, to the general public (thus imitating
an SOE).91 Hence, our setup lets participants assume the role of bank employees, mayors or
other officials in board functions of SOEs. Our experimental design is thus a new variation of
a classical public goods game, where full investment into the company with externality (the
SOE) leads to an inefficient but more egalitarian outcome to the participant pool.
The experiment relies on questionnaires, which ask students 11 questions to allocate 100
Euros between both company types. The participant pool consists of economics students of
Kiel University, who had about ten minutes to answer the questionnaires.
In total, we used four questionnaires, which differ by the allocation mechanism and the
modeling of the social benefit. Two groups were given the task to distribute their 100 Euros
freely between the two companies (A & B). Two other groups had the binary task to chose
either one company or the other (C & D). These two groups were each again divided in one
group where the social return takes the form of a donation (A & C) and one group where the
social return is modeled as a positive externality to citizens (B & D). Otherwise, there is no
difference between the four questionnaires, which we summarize in Table 5.6.1.
Table 5.6.1: Questionnaires
Number Allocation type Social return is ... N
A continuous distribution among both companies ...donated to charity 34
B continuous distribution among both companies ...positive externality 24
C binary choice between both companies ...donated to charity 27
D binary choice between both companies ...positive externality 25
A translation of Questionnaire A is in Appendix Section 5.8.4. The eleven questions in
each questionnaire cover different scenarios of risk and return correlations. The purpose of
this is to check whether investment in company B (the SOE ) is persistent and independent
of diversification arguments or risk preferences of participants. For instance, we ask all spec-
ifications for two types of variances: First, we allow the private firm return variance to be
91Our experiment is based on hypothetical investments, i.e., no real payoffs were at stake.
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larger (which is the case in our field data), and second, we assume equal variances to exclude
the possibility of choices resulting from risk aversion. The conventional mean returns are –
at five percent for private investment and two percent for the SOE investment – the same in
all questions and similar to the actual observed mean OROAit from our field data analysis.
The SOE investment generates an additional return of two percent that goes either to char-
ity or co-citizens. The eleven questions also differ by overall returns of the SOE investment:
Only in Question 2 and 9 is it an efficient investment, i.e., the conventional and societal
expected returns combined equal the expected return of the private investment. Else, the
private investment yields an overall higher expected return.
Questions 1 and 2 cover decisions under certainty, and Questions 3-11 under uncertainty.
Under certainty, we cover a scenario where investing in the SOE is inefficient (Question 1)
and a scenario where it is efficient (Question 2). Question 3 deals with uncertain conventional
returns for both ownership types and certain societal benefits. Question 4 is similar but as-
sumes equal return variances. Question 5 correlates conventional returns negatively. Question
6 is like Question 5 but again assumes equal return variances. Question 7 and 8 repeat this
pattern with a risky societal payoff: Question 7 allows return variances to differ and Question
8 assumes equal variances across ownership groups. In Question 9, the externality remains
risky but investing in the SOE project becomes efficient because of identical expected returns.
Question 10 negatively correlates both risky return types of the SOE investment with the
risky private firm return. Question 11 is the same but again assumes identical variances.
Figure 5.6.1 plots the responses of all questionnaires. The first graph contains results for
Questionnaire A, the second graph for Questionnaire B, and the third graph for Question-
naires C and D.
The first two graphs (A and B) plot the fund allocation to the SOE investment as a
percentage share across all specifications of the questions Q1 to Q11. The horizontal line
within each box represents the mean value of the question, and the grey box indicates 5
percent confidence intervals. In both graphs, the participants could freely choose how much
they would like to invest in the SOE and how much in the private firm. The last, light
grey box indicates the mean across all questions. Both graphs show that participants put
a statistically significant share of their funds into the SOE investment in all scenarios. The
average investment share of company B across all eleven questions is – at around 30 percent
– very similar in Questionnaires A and B. As we would expect, it is also below the 40-60
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Figure 5.6.1: Questionnaire results
Figure 5.6.1 plots the results of all four questionnaires A, B, C, and D; the y-axis in the upper two
graphs contains the percentage allocation of funds to the SOE investment when participants could
allocate freely; the lower graph plots the percentage of participants choosing the SOE investment in
the two binary questionnaires; the x-axis in all graphs plots questions 1-11 and the mean value across
all questions.
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percent average investment level in standard public goods games, which treat investment in
the public good as efficient (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). Under certainty, participants put more
into the SOE investment if this is efficient (Q2 vs. Q1). An interesting observation is that
levels of SOE investment are lower under equal variances (Q4 vs. Q3, Q6 vs. Q5, Q8 vs.
Q7, and Q11 vs. Q10). This suggests that risk aversion partially drives investment decisions
– a result that nicely relates to our field data part where implicit guarantees cater to risk-
averse investors. However, even under identical variances (and thus same risk), investments
into company B remain significantly positive. As in the field data case, risk is not the only
explanatory factor. It does not matter if we model the societal return as a donation to a
charity or as a positive externality (Panel A vs. Panel B). Neither does it matter how returns
correlate across ownership groups.
The lower graph (Panel C) plots the percentage of participants choosing the SOE invest-
ment in the two binary questionnaires C and D. In both cases, participants could only invest
the full amount in either company A or B. Again, the share of participants that chose the
SOE is significantly different from zero in all specifications of the investment task. The overall
mean of the choice variants C and D is – at around 30 percent – very similar to the average of
the allocation variants A and B. Under certainty, participants again invest more in company
B if this is efficient (Q2 vs. Q1). We also observe the pattern that investment levels are lower
under equal variances (Q4 vs. Q3, Q6 vs. Q5, and Q8 vs. Q7). Under choice, we observe
a statistically significant difference between the charity and positive externality framework,
with the charity Questionnaire C getting a higher share across all questions. However, this
difference is only significant at the ten percent level.
The analysis presented in this Section supports Hypothesis 2. It indicates that participants
are willing to forgo a positive amount of private returns in exchange for a social benefit such
as charity or returns to co-citizens. While risk arguments remain a vital factor in determining
portfolio allocations, societal concerns seem very important as well. This finding could be an
additional explanation of why firms with constituent (state) ownership get cheaper funding
– especially in countries with large state bank sectors such as Germany.
5.7 Conclusion
This study has introduced a new argument on how state ownership affects companies: If the
general public assumes they are of societal value, they will be treated differently than private
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companies. Different treatment extends to finance metrics: Our results indicate that decision
makers accept inefficiently low returns from SOEs if they offer some value to society.
We start with field data analysis and check how firm performance affects the cost of
debt. Results show that the more profitable a private firm, the less it pays for its debt.
The reason behind this established result is that profitability functions as a risk proxy. The
relation does not hold, however, for SOEs. The most common explanation for the differential
impact is implicit state guarantees to bondholders. While risk considerations seem indeed
relevant, results indicate that they are not sufficient to explain our finding. We argue that
societal concerns could be an additional factor that provides easier financing access for state
companies, especially if SOEs exist to combat market imperfections. Using questionnaires,
we experiment to determine investment decisions of participants across ownership groups.
They choose between a project that generates a private return only (a private firm) and a
project that is less efficient but creates a payoff to society in addition to regular returns (a
state-owned company). Results indicate that investment into the social but inefficient asset is
positive in all specifications of the investment decision. Interestingly, risk considerations also
seem relevant in the experimental context but are insufficient to explain investment behavior
alone. We take this finding as evidence that citizens prize in societal value of SOEs even
to the extent that the presence of societal payoff is more important than overall company
performance.
SOEs and private firms are consequently not treated equally. Large multinational or-
ganizations like the OECD seem to be aware of that: Plenty of technical reports propose
regulations on how to limit distortions in competition caused by state ownership or how to
improve the lackluster performance of SOEs. They may all have missed that a fundamen-
tal underlying difference is the societal perception of state ownership, which could impede
ownership neutrality on behavioral grounds.
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5.8 Appendix to Chapter 5
5.8.1 Additional sensitivity analyses
5.8.1.1 Additional restrictions to ensure commercial activity
A key assumption of our ORBIS data analysis is that sample SOEs operate under the same
legal framework than private firms. We already take numerous precautions in our baseline
result to ensure this is the case. In this robustness check, we enforce even stricter criteria by
dropping a broader selection of industries with potential public service obligations. Besides
the already excluded categories “K: Finance and Insurance”, “O: Public Administration and
Defence” and railway sectors, we exclude the NACE2 categories “P: Education” and “Q:
Human Health and Social Work”. Furthermore, we only include sectors which contain both
ownership groups. Thus, we ensure that all remaining SOEs operate in commercial sectors
of the economy and, consequently, face the same regulatory framework as private companies.
Table 5.8.1 presents the estimation results.
The additional restrictions reduce the sample size significantly, to NA = 6, 155 for the SOE
model and NB = 28, 037 for the private-firm model, respectively. The differential impact of
OROAit is unaffected by these additional data restrictions. The coefficient is not significant in
the SOE model (Column A) and significant at the one percent level and of similar magnitude
than in Table 5.4.2 in the private firm model (Column B). The selection term is significant
at the ten percent level and predicts a decrease in average interest rates AV INit of 1.04
percent (Column A). The coefficient of leverage LEVit is highly significant and similar in
magnitude to the baseline result in both models. No major deviation exists for the other
significant control variables TANGit, GDPGkt, and TAXkt from Table 5.4.2. We conclude
from this robustness check that differences in the legal framework of SOEs due to public
service obligations do not cause our results.
5.8.1.2 Variation in panel balance
Our baseline result from Table 5.4.2 requires that we observe data of each company in at
least five consecutive years. This threshold is arbitrary and could influence our results. To
exclude this possibility, we re-estimate our outcome equation (5.6) using two different panel
structures, namely seven and three consecutive years. Table 5.8.2 contains the results for an
121
Table 5.8.1: Commercial activity
The table presents switching regressions based on NA = 6, 115 and NB = 28, 037 observations, respec-
tively; a firm has non-missing values in at least five consecutive years from 2007 to 2015; dependent
variable is AV INit; estimates take into account endogenous selection into state ownership; selection is
instrumented with sectoral asset tangibility STANGst and the employee efficiency measure LAEFit;
estimates exclude all sectors with a possible public service obligation and contain only sectors with
both ownership types; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *
significant at the 10 percent level.























Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
λ× Time Yes Yes
increase in panel balance.
The increase in panel balance leads to a significant drop in the number of observations:
The SOE model (Column A) draws on NA = 4, 074 observations. The private firm model
(Column B) uses NB = 28, 376 observations. The two variables of interest OROAit and
λSOEit , have very similar patterns than in the baseline model from Table 5.4.2. Whereas
the risk proxy OROAit does not significantly affect the average interest rate AV INit, the
coefficient in Column B is -0.0178, suggesting an AV INit decrease of 1.78 basis points for a
one percentage point increase of OROAit. The selection indicator λ
SOE
it predicts a decrease
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Table 5.8.2: Increased panel balance
The table presents switching regressions based on NA = 4, 074 and NB = 28, 376 observations, re-
spectively; a firm has non-missing values in at least seven consecutive years from 2007 to 2015; the
dependent variable is AV INit; estimates take into account endogenous selection into state ownership;
selection is instrumented with sectoral asset tangibility STANGst and the employee efficiency mea-
sure LAEFit; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant
at the 10 percent level.























Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
λ× Time Yes Yes
of one percentage point in average interest rates if a firm is an SOE. The pattern of other
control variables is mostly similar – except for the TAXkt variable, which is not significant in
the private firm model (Column B). We conclude from this robustness check that an increase
in panel balance does not significantly alter our results.
Table 5.8.3 presents the results for a decrease in Panel balance. If we include all companies
for which we observe data in three consecutive years, the SOE model (Column A) draws
on NA = 8, 785 observations and the private firm model (Column B) on NB = 131, 562
observations. The impact of OROAit remains unchanged to previous results, as does the




Table 5.8.3: Decreased panel balance
The table presents switching regressions based on NA = 8, 785 and NB = 131, 562 observations,
respectively; a firm has non-missing values in at least three consecutive years from 2007 to 2015; the
dependent variable is AV INit; estimates take into account endogenous selection into state ownership;
selection is instrumented with sectoral asset tangibility STANGst and the employee efficiency measure
LAEFit; *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the
10 percent level.























Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
λ× Time Yes Yes
sign but misses significance thresholds by a thin margin. A significant difference between
the baseline result from Table 5.5.1 is that inflation INFLit is negatively significant in both
models. As pointed out above, this surprising result is most likely due to the exceptional
deflationary environment and monetary policy during our sample period.
We conclude from this robustness check that a decrease in panel balance does not change
our results significantly.
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5.8.2 Additional figures and tables
Table 5.8.4: Correlation matrix
Table 5.8.4 presents correlations of the dependent variable LEVit, state ownership SOEi and the


































































































AV INit 0.07 1.00
OROAit 0.06 0.04 1.00
LEVit -0.07 -0.26 -0.18 1.00
TANGit -0.33 -0.10 -0.06 0.30 1.00
log(SALES)it 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.10 -0.14 1.00
CREDITMkt 0.11 -0.01 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
GDPGkt -0.06 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.27 1.00
TAXkt 0.17 0.03 0.01 -0.11 -0.28 0.07 0.36 -0.11 1.00
INFLit -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.03 1.00
STANGst -0.31 -0.09 -0.04 0.23 0.59 -0.17 0.00 0.04 -0.14 0.00 1.00
LAEFit -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 0.07 -0.24 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.02 1.00
∆log(FA)it 0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 1.00
∆log(SALES)it 0.01 0.01 0.18 -0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.01 -0.06 0.18 1.00
GDPPCkt 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 -0.08 0.17 0.19 -0.09 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03 1.00
SLEVst -0.20 -0.07 -0.05 0.30 0.42 -0.16 0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.73 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.05 1.00
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5.8.3 Variable definitions and data
Table 5.8.5: Variable definitions
Firm level (Source: Orbis)
SOEi Binary indicator: 1 indicates state ownership.
INTEit Total interest paid by firm i in year t.
LTDBit Total long-term debt of firm i in year t (maturity > 1 year).
STDBit Total short-term debt of firm i in year t (maturity < 1 year).
AV INit Total interest / total debt of firm i in year t.
OROAit Operating profit / total assets of firm i in year t.
ROAit Net income / total assets of firm i in year t.
LEVit Total debt / total assets of firm i in year t.
TANGit Asset tangibility: fixed assets / total assets of firm i in year t.
log(SALES)it log(Sales) of firm i in year t.
LAEFit Costs of employees / operating revenue of firm i in year t.
∆log(FA)it Investment proxy: log(fixed assetsit)− log(fixed assets)i,t−1.
∆log(SALES)it Sales growth: log(turnoverit)− log(turnover)i,t−1.
Country level
TAXkt Statutory tax rate of country k in year t.
CREDITMkt Domestic credit provided by banking sector in country k and year
t as percentage of GDP (Source: Worldbank).
GDPGkt Annual GDP growth in percent in country k and year t (Source:
Worldbank).
GDPPCkt GDP per capita in country k and year t, PPP at constant 2011
international USD (Source: Worldbank) .




SLEVst Average total debt / total assets of sector s in year t.
STANGst Average asset tangibility: fixed assets / total assets of sector s in
year t.
• State ownership:
– Stand-alone firms and wholly owned subsidiaries that carry the Orbis ultimate
ownership label “Public authority, state, government” in year t.
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• Private ownership:
– Stand-alone firms and wholly owned subsidiaries that carry the Orbis ultimate
ownership label “Industrial company” in year t.
• We impute up to two years of missing ownership data if the owning entity and the
owning share remained unchanged over this period.
• We only use unconsolidated financial data (BvD conscode “U1” and “U2” ).
• We drop duplicates in terms of id and year.
• We use only data from EU countries. Thus, we ensure a similar regulatory environment
is present for all firms.
• Only observations with at least 5 consecutive firm-years in LEVit from 2006-2015 are
considered. The result does not depend on this restriction.
• AV INit ∈ [0; 0.25]. We drop observations with a larger time mean of 0.15. The results
do not depend on this restriction.
• LEVit ∈ [0; 1[. We presume that a fully leveraged firm should be a reporting error since
every incorporation form we know requires some equity.
• TANGit ∈ [0; 1].
• The firm-level variables OROAit, ROAit, ∆log(SALES)it and ∆log(FA)it are win-





InstructionsIn each situation below you need to take an investment decision. All questions arehypothetical, and you should answer them as if you were investing your own money.There are two companies:  company A and company B. Assume that the companies areidentical except for the parameters mentioned explicitly in each question.There are two types of returns: Normal returns directly increase your hypotheticalpayoff, whereas a different kind of return will hypothetically be donated to charity.  Eachinvestment situation will explicitly state the return share that is going to charity.You can invest any share of your money in company A or company B. For this purpose,please insert a percentage between 0 and 100 into the corresponding box. Yourinvestment shares for both companies need to add up to 100 in each question (youcannot “save” your money).
1. (Certainty)Company A: return 5 %.Company B: return 2 %. Additionally, it donates the certain amount of 2% to a charitableinstitution.How would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
2. (Certainty, equal returns)Company A: Return 5 %.Company B: Return 2.5 %. Additionally, it donates the certain amount of 2.5 % to acharitable institution.How would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
3. (Risk baseline)
5.8.4 Questionnaire
Remark: The bold information in brackets was not part of the distributed questionnaires.
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Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates the certain amount of 2% to acharitable institution.state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 0% 4% 6% 10%Company B 1% 1.5% 2.5% 3%How would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
4. (Risk, same variance)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates the certain amount of 2% to acharitable institution.state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 4% 4.5% 5.5% 6%Company B 1% 1.5% 2.5% 3%How would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
5. (risk baseline, negative correlation)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates the certain amount of 2% to acharitable institution.state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 0% 4% 6% 10%Company B 3% 2.5% 1.5% 1%How would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
6. (Risk, same variance, negative correlation)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates the certain amount of 2% to acharitable institution.state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 6% 5.5% 4.5% 4%Company B 1% 1.5% 2.5% 3%How would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
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7. (Risk baseline, risky externality)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates a mean of 2% to a charitableinstitution. state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 0% 4% 6% 10%Company B 1.5% for you1.5% charity 1.75% for you1.75% charity 2.25% for you2.25% charity 2.5% for you2.5% charityHow would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
8. (Risk, same variance, risky externality)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates a mean of 2 % to a charitableinstitution. state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 4% 4.5% 5.5% 6%Company B 1.5% for you1.5% charity 1.75% for you1.75% charity 2.25% for you2.25% charity 2.5% for you2.5% charityHow would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
9. (Risk, same return and variance, risky externality)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2.5 %. Additionally, it donates a mean of 2.5% to a charitableinstitution. state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 4% 4.5% 5.5% 6%Company B 2% for you2% charity 2.25% for you2.25% charity 2.75% for you2.75% charity 3% for you3% charityHow would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
10. (Risk baseline, negative correlation, risky externality)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates a mean of 2% to a charitableinstitution. state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 0% 4% 6% 10%
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Company B 2.5% for you2.5% charity 2.25% for you2.25% charity 1.75% for you1.75% charity 1.5% for you1.5% charityHow would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
11. (Risk, same variance, negative correlation, risky externality)Company A: average return 5 %.Company B: average return 2 %. Additionally, it donates a mean of 2% to a charitableinstitution. state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4Company A 6% 5.5% 4.5% 4%Company B 1.5% for you1.5% charity 1.75% for you1.75% charity 2.25% for you2.25% charity 2.5% for you2.5% charityHow would you like to invest your budget? Please give relative percentage shares.Company A % Company B %
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6 Concluding remarks
This thesis has focused on a prominent economic feature of the global economy: State own-
ership of commercial firms. I have argued that state ownership is not only widespread in
emerging markets such as China but also in the mature economies of the OECD and the EU.
In this context, the novel results of the three content chapters seem of particular relevance
because they highlight so far neglected corporate finance aspects of state ownership, which
also have implications for public finance due to the interaction of ownership and taxation.
The thesis has looked at three novel research topics that arise from the fact that state
ownership is not neutral in the sense that it changes corporate incentives and perceptions,
which in turn affect corporate finance decisions. The first two look at tax-related aspects of
state ownership and the third focuses on the cost of finance as well as the public-good nature
often associated with state ownership.
The first topic looks at tax-related debt incentives of mixed-ownership firms. Mixed own-
ership refers to affiliates that are partially state-owned and partially owned by MNEs. The
Chapter extends previous research on tax-responsiveness of debt, which argues that firms use
debt to lower their tax burdens. Is state ownership relevant in this context? Yes, because it
changes the incentives of private co-owners. Also, governments are often inefficient in moni-
toring state companies, which gives private co-owners a substantial managerial levy. Whereas
purely private firms face a trade-off between tax payments (depending on the tax rate) and
debt-related bankruptcy risk, mixed-ownership firms use very high debt levels irrespective of
the tax rate because they rely on implicit state guarantees for that debt. The primary incen-
tive that determines debt levels is the state’s participation in the venture, and not the tax
rate. As government monitoring is weak, managers and private co-owners exploit this situa-
tion and adjust the capital structure to their needs, i.e., at a maximum level. This result has
substantial implications for governments: High debt-levels lower tax payments and thus avoid
unilateral returns to governments. At the same time, high debt-levels increase the return on
invested equity. While this is a good thing for private co-owners, the state may receive fewer
distributions due to the tax loss. Thus, contrary to the government’s investment purpose, it
may lose money from mixed-ownership firms. The bottom line from this content Chapter is
that commercial participation in mixed firms may be less beneficial for the government as it
believes them to be.
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The second topic compares effective tax rates of wholly owned commercial SOEs with
those of private firms. In comparison to the first content chapter, Chapter 4 deals with a
binary ownership situation between wholly owned subsidiaries. Besides, the research question
borrows from the accounting literature because it uses the effective tax rate as the dependent
variable, which is a widely used accounting measure. State ownership matters in this context
because – ultimately – the state controls both its firms and the tax authority. The political
view on state ownership suggests a conflict of interests in the sense that governments could
use taxation as a means to subsidize their companies. However, econometric results do not
support this hypothesis. Instead, effective tax rates of SOEs are higher than those of private
firms. Two main arguments arise to explain this finding: The first is that governments extract
distributions via tax payments to cover their budgetary needs. The second is that managers
of wholly owned SOEs are arguably more indifferent to tax payments then managers of
private (or mixed) firms, which could lead to lower levels of tax planning in SOEs. Again,
state ownership is not neutral but leads to robust differences in corporate finance metrics
between SOEs and private firms. While governments surely welcome higher tax payments
from their companies, this may adversely affect their competitiveness and investment levels,
at least in the absence of investment tax breaks. The bottom line from this Chapter is that
state ownership is not tax neutral in the EU, which has not achieved its regulatory goal of
competitive tax neutrality.
The third topic takes a closer look at the cost of finance of SOEs, which are substantially
lower than those of private companies. Starting from the conventional explanation that state
ownership induces implicit guarantees, the Chapter provides evidence that company risk is
not related to the cost of SOE debt, whereas it increases the financing cost of private firms.
Thus, it confirms previous findings on the existence of implicit state guarantees using a much
bigger sample of non-listed companies. Nevertheless, results indicate that implicit guarantees
are unlikely to be the only explanatory factors for this difference. By referring to the social
view of state ownership, the Chapter explores whether the framing of societal benefits caused
by state ownership induces a bias in society towards this ownership type. Experimental results
point in this direction: Participants consistently invest in a project mimicking an SOE that
offers inefficient returns but yields a societal benefit. Hence, behavioral arguments could be
an additional explanation for lower financing costs of SOEs. This finding is especially relevant
in the light of the persistently worse performance of SOEs: Investors (and more generally –
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citizens) may tolerate weaker book performance of state firms because they deduce societal
benefits from this ownership type. The bottom line from this last Chapter is that human
opinion and prejudice may affect the perception of corporate ownership and could lead to an
efficiency loss for overall society.
Summing up, this thesis contributes to the empirical literature on state ownership, capital
structure, taxation, and debt financing. It makes use of the social, political and agency view
on state ownership and uses them to formulate hypotheses on relevant and so far unaddressed
research questions that relate to corporate taxation and financing. Combined results across
the content chapters indicate that state ownership is not neutral in the sense that it changes
incentives and perceptions of firms, which are reflected in financial statement data. A relevant
normative question, though, remains difficult to answer: Should governments own commercial
companies? Politicians may answer this question affirmatively by pointing out how state
ownership yields better services and more jobs to constituents than profit-maximizing private
ownership. They may bear in mind both market imperfections and political agendas, and like
the power that state firms can give them. In the light of this doctoral thesis, regulators
should think twice: State ownership will not always lead to the expected outcome and comes
with many strings attached. As this thesis has shown, such strings are present in the fields
of corporate capital structure, tax payments, and the cost of finance – all of which are
likely to distort competition. In the EU, we can, therefore, draw one conclusion with near
certainty: If regulators aspire towards competitive neutrality for all companies, commercial
state ownership distorts this policy goal, no matter how much regulation is passed to create
a level playing field.
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